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State, ex Rel. Lampkins, v. Dayton Malleable, Inc.

Supreme Court of Ohio
Aug 16, 1989
45 Ohio St. 3d 14 (Ohio 1989)

Summary

noting that Wallace had been relaxed since its ruling

Summary of this case from Bennett v. Scotts Miracle-Gro Co.

Opinion

No. 88-214

Submitted April 25, 1989 —

Decided August 16, 1989.

Workers' compensation — Review of commission's decision — Medical report does not constitute "some evidence," when.

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 86AP-772.

Appellee, Robert L. Lampkins, was injured in 1979 while in the course of and arising out of his employment with appellant, Dayton Malleable, Inc., now known as Amcast Industrial Corporation. Following allowance of his workers' compensation claim for "post concussion syndrome," appellee began receiving temporary total disability compensation for periods of work missed. Appellant contested continued payment of such compensation, and in 1983, this matter came before an Industrial Commission ("commission") district hearing officer who denied temporary total disability compensation subsequent to September 1, 1981 "for the reason that medical proof on file does not support a finding of temporary total disability based upon the allowed condition in this claim." This order was affirmed by the Columbus Regional Board of Review and appellee appealed to the commission.

Commission staff hearing officers referred appellee's claim to the commission's medical review section for an opinion on appellee's ability to return to his former position of employment for the period September 1, 1981 through February 1984. The file was initially reviewed by Dr. William E. Walsh, Jr., who on April 9, 1986 issued the following report:

"The information on file is limited regarding his physical condition and treatment. However, the information on file from three physicians documents that no significant neurological deficit was present. There are also references to the intermittent nature of the condition as well as a favorable response to medication. It would seem reasonable that claimant could work at most positions during the period in question. At times his medication (Talwin, Valium) would not allow work at heights or * * * [with] heavy equipment. For the most part his med[ication]s asp[irin], [C]afergot, [M]idrin would be compatible with employment. Information as to his job responsibilities is not on file for a definitive answer."

Following submission of relevant job data, an additional file review was performed by the commission's Dr. Watson H. Walker. Asked to address appellee's ability to return to his former position of employment, Dr. Walker's June 19, 1986 response reads in full: "I see no reason related to his allowed injury why cl[aiman]t can't return to his usual customary duties."

On June 27, 1986, appellee's appeal was denied by an order which stated in part that "[b]ased on the medical reviews dated 4-9-86 and 6-19-86, the Staff Hearing Officers find that temporary total is denied from 9-1-81 forward as claimant was able to return to his former position of employment."

Appellee filed an action in mandamus in the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, alleging that the commission abused its discretion in failing to award him further temporary total disability compensation. The appellate court found that the reports of Drs. Walker and Walsh did not constitute "some evidence" supporting the commission's decision. It therefore granted the writ and ordered the commission to both vacate its June 27, 1986 order denying compensation and to issue an order awarding appellee temporary total disability compensation from September 1, 1981 through February 1984.

This appeal is now before this court as a matter of right.

Michael J. Muldoon, for appellee Lampkins.

Bricker Eckler, Gerald L. Draper and Charles D. Smith, for appellant.


Where the record contains "some evidence" to support the commission's findings, there has been no abuse of discretion and mandamus will not lie. State, ex rel. Burley, v. Coil Packing, Inc. (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 18, 31 OBR 70, 508 N.E.2d 936. We are asked to determine whether the commission order at bar is supported by "some evidence." We hold that it is not.

The parties concentrate on the sufficiency of the Walker and Walsh reports under State, ex rel. Wallace, v. Indus. Comm. (1979), 57 Ohio St.2d 55, 11 O.O. 3d 216, 386 N.E.2d 1109. That decision held that a non-examining physician's report that did not indicate express acceptance of the findings of examining doctors was not "some evidence" on which the commission could rely. Appellant challenges the continued vitality of Wallace, contending that the requirement of express acceptance was relaxed by the subsequent plurality decision in State, ex rel. Hughes, v. Goodyear Tire Rubber Co. (1986), 26 Ohio St.3d 71, 26 OBR 61, 498 N.E.2d 459. We agree.

The Hughes plurality sustained as "some evidence" the reports of several non-examining physicians including one which merely indicated that all medical reports had been reviewed (without naming the doctors) and which cited numerous findings from those reports (without attributing them to any specific examiner). The Hughes decision stated:

"* * * [O]ur opinions should not provide the basis for usurping the role of the commission in determining disability by creating arbitrary exclusionary rules that eliminate evidence the commission might find credible because such evidence fails to include `magic words' to conform with hypertechnical evidentiary rules, e.g., `I expressly adopt the findings but not the opinion of Dr. "X."' * * *" Id. at 74, 26 OBR at 64, 498 N.E.2d at 462.

However, even under an implicit acceptance analysis, we hold that the Walker and Walsh reports are deficient. Dr. Walker's report states in full that "I see no reason related to his allowed injury why cl[aiman]t can't return to his usual customary duties." There is no indication, express or implied, that Dr. Walker even considered, let alone accepted, the findings of the examining physicians. It is thus not "some evidence."

Dr. Walsh's report also fails under Hughes. There is nothing in that report to indicate that all medical reports were reviewed and considered. The report actually implies the contrary. Although reports from six physicians were on file, Walsh's report only refers to "the information on file from three physicians." Apart from the Hughes problem, the report also fails in another respect, i.e., it does not address the key issue of appellee's ability to return to his former position of employment. It merely notes in a general way that appellee's medications are not incompatible "with employment," conceding that "[i]nformation as to his job responsibilities is not on file for a definitive answer." Thus, on an alternative basis, Dr. Walsh's report fails to constitute "some evidence."

The removal of the Walker and Walsh reports from evidentiary consideration leaves the commission order unsupported by "some evidence," as these were the sole reports upon which the commission expressly relied. Accordingly, we affirm that portion of the appellate court judgment directing the commission to vacate its June 27, 1986 order denying compensation. However, we reverse that portion of the judgment which orders the commission to award appellee temporary total disability compensation from September 1, 1981 through February 1984.

Any award of temporary total disability compensation must be supported by some evidence establishing that a temporary condition precludes the return to the former position of employment. See State, ex rel. Ramirez, v. Indus. Comm. (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 630, 23 O.O. 3d 518, 433 N.E.2d 586. Therefore, a lack of evidence supporting a denial of temporary total disability benefits cannot automatically translate into some evidence supporting an award of such benefits. Recognizing that the determination of disability is a commission function, we thus remand the cause to the commission to determine whether appellee qualifies for temporary total disability compensation and to identify the evidence supporting its finding.

Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part and cause remanded.

MOYER, C.J., SWEENEY, HOLMES, WRIGHT, H. BROWN and RESNICK, JJ., concur.

DOUGLAS, J., dissents.


Summaries of

State, ex Rel. Lampkins, v. Dayton Malleable, Inc.

Supreme Court of Ohio
Aug 16, 1989
45 Ohio St. 3d 14 (Ohio 1989)

noting that Wallace had been relaxed since its ruling

Summary of this case from Bennett v. Scotts Miracle-Gro Co.

In State ex rel. Lampkins v. Dayton Malleable, Inc. (1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 14, the court agreed with the appellant that the requirement of express acceptance under the Wallace rule had been relaxed.

Summary of this case from State ex rel. Roxbury v. Indus. Comm'n of Ohio

In Lampkins, the court reiterated its holding from State ex rel. Wallace v. Indus. Comm. (1979), 57 Ohio St.2d 55, wherein the Supreme Court of Ohio held that a non-examining physician's report which does not indicate express acceptance of the findings of examining doctors does not constitute "some evidence" upon which the commission can rely.

Summary of this case from State ex Rel. Williams v. Indus. Comm.

noting that, if "some evidence" supports the commission's findings, there has been no abuse of discretion and mandamus will not lie

Summary of this case from STATE EX REL. SEARLES v. INDUS. COMM., OH
Case details for

State, ex Rel. Lampkins, v. Dayton Malleable, Inc.

Case Details

Full title:THE STATE, EX REL. LAMPKINS, APPELLEE, v. DAYTON MALLEABLE, INC., N.K.A…

Court:Supreme Court of Ohio

Date published: Aug 16, 1989

Citations

45 Ohio St. 3d 14 (Ohio 1989)
542 N.E.2d 1105

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