The state concedes that the court's written findings were not sufficiently detailed. Appellant, on the other hand, concedes that under State ex rel Juv. Dept. v. Cole, 280 Or. 173, 570 P.2d 365 (1977), the inadequacy in the form of the written findings does not require reversal. In that case the court upheld a remand order despite inadequately detailed written findings.
"f. The above juvenile is emotionally immature for his age * * *." Appeals from the juvenile court are reviewed de novo. ORS 419.561(4); State ex rel Juv. Dept. v. Slack, 17 Or. App. 57, 520 P.2d 905, rev den (1974), with the findings of the juvenile court given no weight except on matters of credibility of witnesses.State ex rel Juv. Dept. v. Cole, 28 Or. App. 367, 373, 559 P.2d 918, aff'd 280 Or. 173, 570 P.2d 365 (1977). We are speaking of credibility in its broad sense.
See State v. Franklin, 36 Or. App. 413, 415, 584 P.2d 368 (1978).Compare State ex rel Juv. Dept. v. Cole, 280 Or. 173, 570 P.2d 365 (1977). The presentence report and statement of reasons also provide the appellate court with an adequate record on review.
Our review of the entire record, in light of the order waiving jurisdiction, reveals that the requirements of Kent have been met and that appellant was not deprived of due process of law. People v. Chi Ko Wong, supra; In re Cole, 280 Ore. 173, 570 P.2d 365 (1977); State v. Salas, 520 P.2d 874 (Utah 1974); Lujan v. District Court, 161 Mont. 287, 505 P.2d 896 (1973); Lewis v. State, 86 Nev. 889, 478 P.2d 168 (1970); In re Welfare of Burtts, 12 Wn. App. 564, 530 P.2d 709 (1975); Sherfield v. State, 511 P.2d 598 (Okla. Crim. 1973). Our review of the record further reveals that the family court properly exercised its discretion in determining that waiver of jurisdiction was warranted in this case. Cf. State v. Smith, 59 Haw. 456, 465-66, 583 P.2d 337, 343-44 (1978) (a decision by the family court to waive jurisdiction is discretionary); State In re B.T., 145 N.J. Super. 268, 274, 367 A.2d 887, 890 (1976) (a waiver decision is overturned only if arbitrary as a mistaken exercise of discretion), petition for certification denied, 73 N.J. 49, 372 A.2d 314 (1977).
The second is to facilitate appellate review when the decision is not made on an evidentiary record or when the precise facts and inferences on which the decision was grounded might be in doubt. The requirement is more familiar in administrative than in judicial decisions, but the purposes it serves are comparable. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Children's; Services Div'n, 280 Or. 431, 435, 571 P.2d 505 (1977); State ex rel Juvenile Dep't v. Cole, 280 Or. 173, 177, 570 P.2d 365 (1977); Peterson v. Klamath Falls, 279 Or. 249, 257, 566 P.2d 1193 (1977); Dickinson v. Davis, 277 Or. 665, 673, 561 P.2d 1019 (1977); Green v. Hayward, 275 Or. 693, 706, 552 P.2d 815 (1976) (quoting 2 K.C. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 16.05, at 444 (1958)).See e.g., South of Sunnyside Neighborhood League v. Board of Comm'rs, 280 Or. 3, 22-23, 569 P.2d 1063 (1977); Peterson v. Klamath Falls, 279 Or. 249, 257, 566 P.2d 1193 (1977); Dickinson v. Davis, 277 Or. 665, 673-675, 561 P.2d 1019 (1977).
As a preliminary matter, child asserts that the trial court's findings are inadequate under ORS 419.533(2), because they simply recite the statutory language contained in ORS 419.533(1)(c), (d). ORS 419.533(2) requires the juvenile court to "make a specific, detailed, written finding of fact" to support an order of remand. In State ex rel Juv. Dept. v. Cole, 280 Or. 173, 177, 570 P.2d 365 (1977), the Supreme Court recognized that the purpose of the statutory requirement is to ensure "that the judges actually consider the criteria which the legislature has laid down for [the transfer of juveniles to adult court.]" Here, the written remand order does more than merely restate the statutory language.
The test stated in Thornton is contrary to the express legislative directive of ORS 419.561(4), and we must conclude that the Supreme Court's statements regarding appellate court review of the sufficiency of the evidence in juvenile proceedings were simply incorrect. See State ex rel Juv. Dept. v. Cole, 280 Or. 173, 570 P.2d 365 (1977); State ex rel Juv. Dept. v. Kent, supra. At the hearing, the state asked the juvenile court to find that the juvenile had committed assault in the second degree or any lesser included offense.
Defendants' appeal with regard to attorney fees correctly asserts that the trial court was without jurisdiction to modify its earlier award during the pendency of the proceedings in this court. State ex rel Juvenile Department v. Cole, 280 Or. 173, 570 P.2d 365 (1977); State v. Jackson, 228 Or. 371, 365 P.2d 294 (1961). However, we conclude that under Pritchett v. Fry, 286 Or. 189, 593 P.2d 1133 (1979), the original award was in error.
Inasmuch as the court did not exceed its authority, the argument has merit. We rule otherwise, however, because of the language of the Supreme Court, although it might be regarded as dicta, in State ex rel Juv. Dept. v. Cole, 280 Or. 173, 570 P.2d 365 (1977). There, a juvenile remand order was upheld under a statute requiring written findings, apparently because the transcribed oral findings constituted substantial compliance.
(3) Was the remand proper under the facts of this case? We reserved decision in this case pending our Supreme Court's decision in State ex rel Juv. Dept. v. Cole, 280 Or. 173, 570 P.2d 365 (1977), which involved the first two issues set forth above. In order to resolve the above issues the procedural setting of this case must first be briefly set forth.