Opinion
No. 86-1356
Decided January 13, 1988.
Workers' compensation — Claimant unable to handle increased workload — Denial of application for reactivation of temporary total disability benefits proper, when — R.C. 4123.56.
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County.
On February 4, 1980, appellant, Sharon Huffman, sustained an injury while working in the course of her employment as a journeywoman for appellee Xerox Corporation. Appellant timely filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits which was initially recognized for "[f]racture left navicular with contusion left hand thumb." Based on this finding, appellant received temporary total disability compensation. On March 10, 1982, the commission determined that appellant suffered from a permanent partial disability of one percent.
Thereafter, appellant filed a motion requesting that her claim be amended to include an additional condition. This motion was granted, and on April 22, 1983, the commission recognized the additional condition of "post trauma to the left hand, arm, shoulder, cervical and dorsal myositis" and awarded appellant temporary total disability compensation from October 29, 1981 through January 4, 1982. Appellant returned to her former position of employment on January 5, 1982.
Appellant remained in her former position of employment with Xerox until early February 1984, at which time appellant alleges that the company increased the workload associated with her position to the point where her pre-existing injury hindered her ability to perform her job. On February 23, 1984, appellant filed an application to reactivate her claim with the Industrial Commission seeking, inter alia, temporary total disability benefits. This application was supported by the report of appellant's treating physician, Dr. James C. Cameron, who concluded that appellant was temporarily and totally disabled as of February 6, 1984.
On September 10, 1984, appellant was examined by Dr. Robert B. Larrick. In a medical report which came before the commission, Dr. Larrick noted appellant's allegation that her workload was doubled due to the fact that another Xerox plant had closed down. Dr. Larrick estimated appellant's demonstrable disability at only twelve percent of the body as a whole, but concluded that she would not be able to handle the increased workload now expected of her position. Dr. Larrick stressed that appellant would be able to perform in her position as it existed prior to the work increase.
On June 21, 1984, appellant was examined by Dr. Gary Wise. Dr. Wise reported that appellant would not be able to return "to her previous work" and that she suffered from a permanent partial impairment of a relatively low degree.
In an order dated June 12, 1984, a district hearing officer of the commission held that appellant was not temporarily and totally disabled and denied appellant's request for such benefits. This decision was based on the finding that appellant had returned to work and been able to persist in her return for a period of two years, until the employer increased her expected workload. As appellant was and remains capable of performing her job as it existed at the time of her injury, she is no longer entitled to temporary and total disability compensation under R.C. 4123.56. The district hearing officer based his finding on the reports of Drs. Cameron, Larrick, Wise, and appellant's own testimony during the hearing on the matter.
The decision of the district hearing officer was affirmed by the Columbus Regional Board of Review and a subsequent appeal to the Industrial Commission was refused.
Appellant instituted a mandamus action in the court of appeals, alleging that the commission abused its discretion in denying appellant temporary total disability benefits, and requesting that the commission be directed to award those benefits to her. On June 25, 1986, the appellate court denied the requested writ.
The cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right.
Michael J. Muldoon, for appellant.
Vorys, Sater, Seymour Pease, Thomas M. Taggart and William G. Porter II, for appellee Xerox Corp. Anthony J. Celebrezze, Jr., attorney general, and Dennis L. Hufstader, for appellee Industrial Commission.
Appellant argues that the employer in this case increased her workload to the point where she is unable, as a result of her industrial injury, to fulfill the requirements of her position as it now exists. Under such circumstances, appellant asserts that it is inequitable to deny her eligibility for temporary total disability compensation simply because she has successfully fulfilled the obligations of her position as it existed prior to the workload increase.
Contrary to this proposition, the appellees essentially argue that pursuant to R.C. 4123.56 as it existed prior to its recent amendment, the commission must terminate temporary total disability compensation when an employee has returned to work or where the employee's treating physician has made a written statement that the employee is capable of returning to his former position of employment. In State, ex rel. Horne, v. Great Lakes Constr. Co. (1985), 18 Ohio St.3d 79, 80, 18 OBR 117, 118, 480 N.E.2d 753, 754, this court interpreted the phrase "former position of employment" as meaning the position held when the claimant was injured. The fact that the claimant in this case was able to work in the position she held at the time of her injury for more than two years after returning to work in January 1982 is said to demonstrate that she is no longer entitled to temporary total disability compensation under R.C. 4123.56.
This court has repeatedly held that mandamus will not lie where there is some evidence to support the findings of the Industrial Commission. State, ex rel. GF Business Equip., Inc., v. Indus. Comm. (1981), 66 Ohio St.2d 446, 20 O.O. 3d 379, 423 N.E.2d 99; State, ex rel. Wallace, v. Indus. Comm. (1979), 57 Ohio St.2d 55, 11 O.O. 3d 216, 386 N.E.2d 1109. We determine that the commission's finding that appellant was able to perform the duties of her former position as it existed at the time of her injury is substantiated by the report of Dr. Larrick. Pursuant to this court's interpretation of R.C. 4123.56 in State, ex rel. Horne, supra, the commission was justified in denying appellant's application for reactivation of temporary total disability benefits.
Appellant contends that our decision today will enable employers to circumvent their responsibilities under R.C. 4123.56 by increasing the workload of employees who have returned to work from a temporary total disability to the point where they are no longer able to perform the duties of their position as it existed prior to the injury.
We are not persuaded by appellant's prediction. Pursuant to R.C. 4123.90, an employer is forbidden from taking any punitive action against an employee in response to the employee's filing for workers' compensation benefits. This statute would prohibit employers from acting as appellant has speculated they would act.
We note that the only evidence in the record of this case which addresses the reason for appellant's alleged workload increase is found in Dr. Larrick's report. Therein, Dr. Larrick relates that appellant attributes her workload increase and that of other workers at the plant to the fact that another Xerox plant had closed down. Assuming the veracity of this statement, appellant, by her own admission, has indicated that her alleged workload increase was not in response to her filing for workers' compensation benefits.
For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we hereby affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
Judgment affirmed.
MOYER, C.J., and SWEENEY, J., concur.
LOCHER, HOLMES, DOUGLAS and WRIGHT, JJ., concur in judgment only.
H. BROWN, J., not participating.
My concurrence in the result in this case does not imply acquiescence in the reasoning or result achieved in State, ex rel. Horne, v. Great Lakes Constr. Co. (1985), 18 Ohio St.3d 79, 18 OBR 117, 480 N.E.2d 753.
LOCHER, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion.