Finally, the District Hearing Officer relied upon a C-84 dated 06/26/2000 from Dr. Lyons [sic]. The Staff Hearing Officer finds that, based on Hoover v. Industrial Commission (1995) 72 O.S.3d 387, that C-84 cannot be used to pay temporary total compensation for the period already denied (9/24/2000 through 04/17/2000). However, the Staff Hearing Officer finds that the a [sic] C-84 can be used for the period after the date of the last hearing.
{¶ 15} In his sixth and final objection, relator argues that the magistrate erred in concluding that the commission is not precluded by State ex rel. Zamora v. Indus. Comm. (1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 17, 543 N.E.2d 87, from considering Dr. Randolph's October 8, 2004 addendum. Relator argues that Dr. Randolph's February and October 2004 reports "rely on identical evidence and offer identical opinions" and, pursuant to State ex rel. Hoover v. Indus. Comm. (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 387, 650 N.E.2d 459, because the commission rejected the February report when it allowed relator's claim, it is prohibited from relying on the October report. Relator's Objections, at 6.
The Bacon case is not applicable to the facts in the present case. {¶ 25} In State ex rel. Hoover Co. v. Indus. Comm. (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 387, the court was faced with the question of whether a finding terminating temporary total disability compensation after concluding that a claimant could return to their former position of employment, which was administratively affirmed and never judicially challenged, became the commission's final pronouncement on the claimant's extent of disability thereby precluding a future award of PTD compensation. The court found that it did not and commented on the applicability of res judicata as follows:
The same would be true of any situation in which the facts are altered by a change in the time frame * * *.'" State, ex rel. B.O.C. Group v. Industrial Commission (1991), 58, Ohio St.3d 199, 201. {¶ 16} More recently, the Supreme Court of Ohio has noted if there is a changed condition that was unknown at the first determination, res judicata does not apply. State, ex rel. Hoover Company v. Industrial Commission (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 387. Further, "a bare reference to medical conditions, as here, in a physician's correspondence or medical test summary does not constitute a request for recognition of that condition by a claimant.
In his report, Dr. Beltz (hired by the same company that hired Dr. Farrell) essentially adopted Dr. Farrell's findings and conclusions, but those findings and conclusions had already been rejected by the commission. See, generally, State ex rel. Hoover Co. v. Indus. Comm. (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 387. {¶ 28} Moreover, even without explicit reliance on Dr. Farrell, Dr. Beltz took a position and stated a conclusion (i.e., that claimant's symptoms from September 1999 through July 2000 were unrelated to the allowed condition) that directly contradicted the commission's findings in October 2000, at least in part.
Zamora has been repeatedly followed by the Supreme Court of Ohio. State ex rel. Jeep Corp. v. Indus. Comm. (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 378; State ex rel. Hoover Co. v. Indus. Comm. (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 387; State ex rel. Verbanek v. Indus. Comm. (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 562. The Supreme Court of Ohio has also had occasions to distinguish Zamora.