State ex Rel. Holterman v. Patterson

9 Citing cases

  1. Carpenter v. Carpenter

    159 S.W.3d 880 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005)   Cited 5 times
    Holding Holterman controlling when reversing trial court's order directing mother to pay portion GAL fees

    Mother argues that as she was represented by LSSM, an organization funded in substantial part by moneys appropriated by the general assembly which has as its primary purpose the provision of legal services to indigent people, and that as LSSM filed a certification with the trial court stating that it had determined that she was unable to pay the costs, fees and expenses necessary to prosecute or defend the suit, she is not required to pay fees to the GAL. In support of her argument, Mother cites State ex rel. Holterman v. Patterson, 24 S.W.3d 784 (Mo.App.E.D. 2000). That case involved a motion to modify a decree of dissolution in which the mother sought a writ of prohibition to prevent the trial court from enforcing an order requiring her to pay GAL fees.

  2. S.W. v. Fitzsimmons

    327 S.W.3d 541 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010)

    This Court has held that once the certificate required by Β§ 514.040.3 has been filed, "the trial court does not have discretion to assess fees, costs, and expenses." Bober v. Bober, 277 S.W.3d 294, 297 (Mo. App. 2009); see State ex rel. Holterman v. Patterson, 24 S.W.3d 784, 786 (Mo.App. 2000). Respondents' suggestions concede that "[t]here's no question that [Relator] meets the requirements of eligibility" for the waiver of costs under Β§ 514.040.3. They assert, however, that the "psychological evaluation ordered by Commissioner Lukachick does not fall within the definition of `costs'" waived by Β§ 514.040.3. Because it is undisputed that Relator has met the qualifications for waiver of costs under Β§ 514.040.3, the only issue to be resolved by this Court is whether a court-ordered psychological evaluation constitutes a cost or expense "related to the prosecution of the suit" within the meaning of the statute.

  3. Versey v. Jirak

    219 S.W.3d 774 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007)   Cited 4 times
    Holding that mother in paternity action filed by putative father could not be liable for fees after qualified legal services organization filed certification that mother lacked ability to pay

    As a result, Mother argues she is not required to pay a portion of Father's attorneys' fees or to be held jointly and severally liable for the GAL's fees. Mother relies upon State ex rel. Holterman v. Patterson, 24 S.W.3d 784 (Mo.App.E.D.2000), and Carpenter, 159 S.W.3d 880, to support her argument. In Holterman, a mother sought a writ of prohibition, seeking to prohibit the trial court from enforcing its order which directed her to pay a portion of the assessed GAL fees.

  4. State ex Rel. Wecker v. Ohmer

    105 S.W.3d 511 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003)

    The Certificate also states that Relator is unable to pay the cost, fees, and expenses necessary to prosecute or defend that action. In their suggestions in opposition, Respondent, the City of St. Louis, and the Guardian ad Litem (GAL) request that we reconsider State ex rel. Holterman v. Patterson 24 S.W.3d 784, 786 (Mo.App.E.D. 2000). We decline to do so and follow Holterman as precedent.

  5. Metzner v. State

    2015 Ark. 222 (Ark. 2015)   Cited 14 times
    In Metzner v. State, 2015 Ark. 222, 462 S.W.3d 650, our supreme court stated that the collection and testing of a person's blood constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and thus, either a warrant must be obtained or an exception to the warrant requirement must apply.

    We therefore look at the context in which β€œnone shall be given” is used to determine to whom this passive command is directed. See State ex rel.Holterman v. Patterson, 24 S.W.3d 784, 786 (Mo.App.2000). When we read Section 577.041.1 with Section 577.020.1, as we must, Eyberg v. Director of Revenue, 935 S.W.2d 376, 379 (Mo.App.1996), the only actor to whom this clause can be directed is a law enforcement officer.

  6. Kocina v. Johannes

    505 S.W.3d 474 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016)   Cited 6 times
    Finding a former tenant's mother who refused to vacate the apartment was never in a landlord-tenant relationship with the owner and thus the facts supported unlawful detainer under the intruder class rather than the holdover-tenant class

    Pursuant to section 514.040.3, so long as "the legal services organization representing the party make[s] a determination that the party is unable to pay the [court costs] and a certificate of such determination [is] filed with the clerk of the court[,]" the "court does not have jurisdiction or discretion to assess cost[s] or fees against [that] party." State ex rel. Holterman v. Patterson , 24 S.W.3d 784, 786 (Mo. App. E.D. 2000). The only relevant distinction in this case is that Johannes was not the prosecuting party.

  7. State ex rel. Mo. Dep't of Soc. Servs., Family Support Div. v. Campbell

    386 S.W.3d 229 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012)   Cited 12 times
    Holding that prohibition is available when a circuit court acts in clear excess of jurisdiction or abuse of discretion such that the lower court lacks the power to act as contemplated

    And even if Respondent's supposition is accurate, we are at a loss to understand why the record does not then reflect a waiver of the filing fee for Fields's Petition, or why the record reflects that Respondent entered an order in this case on April 4, 2012, appointing a guardian ad litem and ordering Fields β€œto deposit $500.00 into the Trust account of [the GAL] as security for costs to be applied to her fees in this matter.” See Holterman v. Patterson, 24 S.W.3d 784, 785–86 (Mo.App. E.D.2000) (holding mother who was properly certified as indigent under section 510.040.3 could not be ordered to pay GAL fees).We are not suggesting, however, that it is too late for Fields to seek an order finding him to be indigent.

  8. Bober v. Bober

    277 S.W.3d 294 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009)   Cited 2 times
    Holding that trial court lacked discretion to assess fees where statute dictated fees must be waived under certain conditions

    In order for the fees, costs and expenses to be waived, the party must show "'that the legal services organization representing the party [made] a determination that the party is unable to pay the fee and a certificate of such determination [was] filed with the clerk of the court[.]'" Versey v. Jirak, 219 S.W.3d 774, 776-77 (Mo.App. E.D. 2007), quoting State ex rel. Holterman v. Patterson, 24 S.W.3d 784, 786 (Mo.App. E.D. 2000). If a party meets the requirements of Section 514.040.3, the trial court does not have discretion to assess fees, costs, and expenses.

  9. State v. Smith

    134 S.W.3d 35 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003)   Cited 21 times
    Holding that "then none shall be given" clause in implied consent statute was a passive command that applied to police officers acting without a warrant; it did not prohibit courts from issuing search warrants for blood

    We therefore look at the context in which "none shall be given" is used to determine to whom this passive command is directed. See State ex rel. Holterman v. Patterson, 24 S.W.3d 784, 786 (Mo.App. 2000). When we read Section 577.041.1 with Section 577.020.1, as we must, Eyberg v. Director of Revenue, 935 S.W.2d 376, 379 (Mo.App. 1996), the only actor to whom this clause can be directed is a law enforcement officer.