Opinion
No. 86-1777
Decided February 10, 1988.
Workers' compensation — Commission must briefly explain its reasoning in granting or denying benefits — Evidence relied upon must be stated specifically — Remand for clarification ordered, when.
O.Jur 2d Workmen's Compensation §§ 151, 167, 174.
1. An order of the Industrial Commission must briefly explain the reasoning of the commission in granting or denying the benefits requested by the claimant, and must specifically state which evidence, in particular, the commission relied upon in reaching its decision. ( State, ex rel. Mitchell, v. Robbins Myers, Inc., 6 Ohio St.3d 481, 6 OBR 531, 453 N.E.2d 721, followed.)
2. An order of the Industrial Commission which is not sufficiently specific for the Supreme Court to review without searching the record will be remanded to the commission for clarification.
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County.
On June 28, 1978, appellant James F. Smith was working for appellee, the Frigidaire Division of the General Motors Corporation, when a compressor fell on, and broke a bone in, his right foot. Appellant applied for and received workers' compensation benefits for this injury.
Appellant continued to feel pain in his foot after it had healed. On January 25, 1980, a district hearing officer determined appellant's percentage of permanent partial disability to be two percent. Subsequently, appellant was diagnosed to be suffering from a "conversion neurosis." A district hearing officer granted appellant's motion for the allowance of this additional condition on September 11, 1980, and increased his permanent partial disability award to ten percent on April 22, 1983. Upon appellant's application for reconsideration, however, the commission, on October 24, 1983, increased the award to fifteen percent.
Conversion neurosis, or conversion hysteria, is defined as "`[a] form of hysteria or psychoneurosis in which physical signs and symptoms are substituted for anxiety. A condition in which the cause of anxiety is converted into functional symptoms which may include blindness or deafness, paralysis, etc.' Schmidt, Attorneys' Dictionary of Medicine and Word Finder (1985)." State, ex rel. Thompson, v. Fenix Scisson, Inc. (1985), 19 Ohio St.3d 76, 81, 19 OBR 117, 122, 482 N.E.2d 1241, 1247 (Locher, J., dissenting).
On June 3, 1985, a district hearing officer increased appellant's percentage of permanent partial disability to twenty percent, relying upon the medical reports of Dr. D.D. Kackley, Dr. Lee Howard and Dr. Eugene S. Cherry. Both appellant and appellee filed applications for reconsideration. On October 17, 1985, the commission affirmed the order of the district hearing officer in the following decision:
"It is the finding of the Staff Hearing Officer the [ sic] the claimant's and employer's Applications for Reconsideration be denied and the order of the District Hearing Officer be affirmed for the reason that it is supported by proof of record and is not contrary to law.
"* * *
"The dicision [ sic] is based on consideration of reports of Dr. Kackley and Dr. Cherry."
In his medical report, Dr. Kackley came to the following conclusions:
"On the basis of orthopedic examination and evaluation today, there are no positive objective findings relative to the previously fractured right second metatarsal bone. Based on some subjective discomfort, I would estimate his orthopedic impairment at approximately 5% permanent partial impairment. There obviously is no orthopedic impairment beyond the 15% permanent partial impairment that has already been awarded."
Dr. Cherry, however, submitted the following opinion in his medical report:
"In the opinion of the examiner Mr. Smith is experiencing a psychological impairment which is directly and causally related to the industrial injury of June 28, 1978. The examiner feels that his Conversion Disorder with Anxiety and his Major Depression, Recurrent, are directly related to his industrial injury. He has a pre-existing condition of Passive Aggressive Personality Disorder. The examiner feels at the present time, as a result of his psychological impairments, Mr. Smith is impaired at a permanent level of 40%."
On October 30, 1985, appellee filed a complaint in mandamus in the court of appeals. The referee to whom the matter was assigned concluded that a writ of mandamus should issue compelling the commission to vacate its October 17, 1985 order and issue a new order denying appellant an increase in his permanent partial disability award. The court of appeals adopted the referee's recommendation and granted the writ of mandamus.
The cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right.
Cowden, Pfarrer, Crew Becker and Robert J. Davidek, for appellee.
Anthony J. Celebrezze, Jr., attorney general, and Donald Ford, for appellant Industrial Commission.
Michael J. Muldoon, for appellant James F. Smith.
The sole issue presented by this appeal is whether the commission abused its discretion in affirming the order of the district hearing officer. Our review is limited to a determination of whether there is some evidence to support the decision of the commission. See, e.g., State, ex rel. Stephenson, v. Indus. Comm. (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 167, 170, 31 OBR 369, 372, 509 N.E.2d 946, 949; State, ex rel. Burley, v. Coil Packing, Inc. (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 18, 20, 31 OBR 70, 72, 508 N.E.2d 936, 938.
It is well-settled that the determination of disputed facts and the weighing of evidence are exclusively within the jurisdiction and authority of the Industrial Commission. See, e.g., State, ex rel. Milburn, v. Indus. Comm. (1984), 26 Ohio St.3d 119, 120, 26 OBR 102, 103, 498 N.E.2d 440, 441; State, ex rel. Hudson, v. Indus. Comm. (1984), 12 Ohio St.3d 169, 170, 12 OBR 237, 239, 465 N.E.2d 1289, 1291. Accordingly, we have repeatedly stated that this court will not search the record for some evidence to support a decision by the commission. State, ex rel Mitchell, v. Robbins Myers, Inc. (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 481, 484, 6 OBR 531, 534, 453 N.E.2d 721, 724. See, also, State, ex rel. Stephenson, supra, at 173, 31 OBR at 374, 509 N.E.2d at 951; State, ex rel. Thompson, v. Roadway Express, Inc. (1984), 12 Ohio St.3d 76, 77-78, 12 OBR 66, 68, 465 N.E.2d 437, 438-439.
Thus, we are limited to searching the face of the commission's order for some evidence to support its decision. For this reason, we require that an order of the commission must briefly explain the reasoning of the commission in granting or denying the benefits requested by the claimant, and must specifically state which evidence, in particular, the commission relied upon in reaching its decision. State, ex rel. Mitchell, supra, at 483-484, 6 OBR at 534, 453 N.E.2d at 724.
Specific decisions by the commission also enable the parties involved to better understand why the requested benefits were granted or denied. See State, ex rel. Mitchell, supra, at 484, 6 OBR at 534, 453 N.E.2d at 725.
The order of the commission in the case sub judice does not meet these requirements. The totality of the commission's explanation of its reasoning is that "[t]he dicision [ sic] is based on consideration of reports of Dr. Kackley and Dr. Cherry." The problem with such a vague, homogeneous explanation is that it does not tell us what evidence, in particular, the commission relied upon. Dr. Cherry's conclusions as to the appellant's degree of impairment are apparently based on the existence of two conditions, "Conversion Disorder with Anxiety" and "Major Depression, Recurrent." While the former is an allowed condition, the latter is not. If it relied unconditionally on the medical report of Dr. Cherry, the commission may have abused its discretion. Thus, the commission's order should have included an explanation of what evidence, in particular, it relied upon and of how it arrived at its decision in this case. We would then have been able to tell whether the commission had abused its discretion by relying on improper evidence, namely, the evidence of "Major Depression, Recurrent" contained in Dr. Cherry's report.
Appellant's motion for the allowance of "conversion neurosis" as an additional condition was granted on September 11, 1980.
The commission's use of such hollow phrases as "the decision is based on the evidence in the file and/or evidence adduced at the hearing" to explain its reasoning has been previously rejected by this court as being insufficiently specific. See State, ex rel. Nye, v. Indus. Comm. (1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 75, 22 OBR 91, 488 N.E.2d 867; State, ex rel. Thompson, supra. Conversely, this court has held statements by the commission to the effect that "the decision is based on consideration of the medical reports" of certain doctors to be in compliance with the requirements of Mitchell. See State, ex rel. Smith, v. Indus. Comm. (1986), 26 Ohio St.3d 128, 26 OBR 110, 498 N.E.2d 447; State, ex rel. Lucente, v. Indus. Comm. (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 87, 15 OBR 188, 472 N.E.2d 718; State, ex rel. Burdette, v. Dayton Walther Corp. (1984), 14 Ohio St.3d 29, 14 OBR 331, 470 N.E.2d 897; State, ex rel. Hudson, supra; and State, ex rel. Hutt, v. Frick-Gallagher Mfg. Co. (1984), 11 Ohio St.3d 184, 11 OBR 497, 464 N.E.2d 1005. Ordinarily, more detailed explanations in such cases would be repetitive and unnecessary. As can be seen in this case, however, these abbreviated explanations are sometimes not enough, without more, to support the commission's decisions. See, e.g., State, ex rel. Stephenson, supra. Accordingly, we hold that an order of the commission which is not sufficiently specific for this court to review without searching the record will be remanded to the commission for clarification. Id. We therefore reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand this case to the commission for an amended order stating the specific basis for its decision.
Parties may also request that a limited writ of mandamus be issued compelling the commission to conform its order to the requirements of State, ex rel. Mitchell, supra.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
SWEENEY, HOLMES, DOUGLAS, WRIGHT and H. BROWN, JJ., concur.
MOYER, C.J., not participating.