This matter is before the court on the limited issue of whether a multiple offender adjudication must be completed prior to the defendant serving the sentence imposed on the underlying offense. We must also consider whether the holdings in the per curiam opinion of this court in State ex. rel. Glynn v. Blackburn, 485 So.2d 926 (La. 1986), and the opinion in State ex. rel. Williams v. Henderson, 289 So.2d 74, (La. 1974), are correct. Following conviction and on the day of sentencing of the defendant for 17 counts of access device fraud, the State filed a habitual offender bill charging the defendant as a multiple felony offender.
The defendant claims that he never requested a continuance, and should not have been sentenced as a multiple offender. He citesState ex rel. Glynn v. Blackburn, 485 So.2d 926, 926 (La. 1986), for its holding that enhancement proceedings have to be completed before a defendant has satisfied his sentence on the underlying felony and been discharged from custody for the offense. This writer counts seventeen times that the matter was reset.
In State ex rel. Williams v. Henderson, 289 So.2d 74, 77 (La. 1974), this Court set forth a bright line rule that "a proceeding to have a defendant sentenced as a multiple offender must be completed before the defendant serves the sentence which is to be enhanced." Additionally, in State ex rel. Glynn v. Blackburn, 485 So.2d 926 (La. 1986), the defendant had served his two year sentence before he was adjudicated a multiple offender. This Court, citing Williams, unequivocally stated, "Proceedings against a convicted defendant to enhance his sentence under R.S. 15:529.1 must be completed before he has satisfied his sentence on the underlying felony and been discharged from custody for that offense."
In State ex rel. Williams v. Henderson, 289 So.2d 74, 77 (La. 1974), this Court set forth a bright line rule that "a proceeding to have a defendant sentenced as a multiple offender must be completed before the defendant serves the sentence which is to be enhanced." Additionally, in State ex rel. Glynn v. Blackburn, 485 So.2d 926 (La. 1986), the defendant had served his two year sentence before he was adjudicated a multiple offender. This Court, citing Williams, unequivocally stated, "Proceedings against a convicted defendant to enhance his sentence under R.S. 15:529.1 must be completed before he has satisfied his sentence on the underlying felony and been discharged from custody for that offense."
Mr. Cureaux was resentenced to twenty years on December 2, 2013. Mr. Cureaux now argues that his right to a speedy trial was violated by the delay between his original sentencing in August of 2010 and his December 2, 2013 sentencing on the current multiple bill. Mr. Cureaux further asserts that under State ex. rel. Williams v. Henderson, 289 So.2d 74 (La.1974), and later, under State ex. rel. Glynn v. Blackburn, 485 So.2d 926 (La.1986), proceedings intended to enhance a defendant's sentence must be completed before the sentence for the underlying felony is satisfied and the defendant is discharged from custody. However, as previously stated, this “bright line rule” was abrogated by State v. Muhammad, which overruled the prior cases and held that each defendant's situation should instead be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.
SeeState v. Broussard, 416 So.2d 109, 110-11 (La. 1982). Though cited by the defendant herein on appeal, the Louisiana Supreme Court overruled State ex rel. Williams v. Henderson, 289 So.2d 74 (La. 1974) and State ex rel. Glynn v. Blackburn, 485 So.2d 926 (La. 1986), to the extent that they established a bright line rule that multiple offender proceedings must be completed before the defendant satisfies his sentence on the underlying felony. Muhammad, 875 So.2d at 56.
Prior to the supreme court's decision in State v. Muhammad, 03-2991 (La. 5/25/04), 875 So.2d 45, the rule was that the adjudication and sentencing of a defendant as a multiple offender had to be completed prior to defendant's completion of the underlying sentence. State ex rel. Williams v. Henderson, 289 So.2d 74 (La.1974), and State ex rel. Glynn v. Blackburn, 485 So.2d 926 (La.1986). In Muhammad, the above "bright line" rule was modified.
In his third assignment of error, appellant argues that he was denied his right to due process of law guaranteed under Article I, Section 2 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974 and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution when he was adjudicated a third habitual offender, as the State failed to timely file the multiple bill of information. Defendant specifically argues that his habitual offender sentence should be vacated because he was released from the custody of the Department of Corrections before the State filed the habitual offender bill of information, rendering the bill untimely under State ex rel. Williams v. Henderson, 289 So.2d 74 (La. 1974) and State ex rel. Glynn v. Blackburn, 485 So.2d 926 (La. 1986). The State responds that this Court has previously ruled on this issue and, as such, should not be reconsidered by this Court on appeal.
State v. Muhammad, 03-419 (La.App. 5 Cir. 9/30/03), 857 So.2d 1223. The Supreme Court granted the State's writ of certiorari and held that there is no "bright line rule" for determining when multiple offender proceedings must be brought, overruling its previous opinions of State ex rel. Glynn v. Blackburn, 485 So.2d 926 (La. 1986) (per curiam) and State ex rel. Williams v. Henderson, 289 So.2d 74 (La. 1974). The Supreme Court reinstated defendant's adjudication and life sentence as a fourth felony offender and remanded to this Court for consideration of the other Assignments of Error raised in his last appeal to this Court.
However, proceedings against a convicted defendant to enhance his sentence under the Habitual Offender Law must be completed before he has satisfied his sentence for the underlying felony and been discharged from custody for that offense. State ex rel. Glynn v. Blackburn, 485 So.2d 926 (La. 1986) (per curiam); State ex rel. Williams v. Henderson, 289 So.2d 74 (La. 1974). Although a defendant might be released on parole, he is not yet discharged from custody because "[T]he expiration of a sentence is the date that the defendant is discharged from supervision; that is the discharge date under the sentence imposed."