Opinion
No. 75-257
Decided November 26, 1975.
Prohibition — To prevent exercise of Municipal Court's jurisdiction — Not available, when — Adequate remedy of appeal available.
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County.
On December 11, 1974, Nicholas Zannis filed a complaint in the Hamilton County Municipal Court alleging the existence of an agreement of sale of a paper route to John Gilla, relator herein, and that relator acted "contrary to the agreement" with respect to certain of its terms. The complaint, in addition to asking that the "sale be declared null and void," demanded that plaintiff "be paid reasonable compensation for services performed under the agreement in the amount of $1,365.00."
The "agreement of sale" does not appear in the record before this court.
Thereafter, relator filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the Municipal Court did not have jurisdiction of the cause of action. On February 7, 1975, the motion was overruled by Judge Fellerhoff, respondent herein.
On February 14, 1975, relator filed the instant complaint, in the Court of Appeals, for a writ of prohibition to prevent respondent from hearing the case of Zannis v. Gilla, alleging that respondent does not have jurisdiction to hear and determine that cause of action.
Respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the complaint does not state a cause of action, and that the complaint does not entitle relator to a writ of prohibition.
The Court of Appeals, by journal entry, found respondent's motion to dismiss "well taken," and dismissed the complaint for a writ of prohibition.
Mr. Stephen W. Young, for appellant.
Mr. Douglass L. Custis, for appellee.
The question to be decided is whether relator states a cause of action in prohibition.
It is well-settled that:
"A court having general jurisdiction of the subject matter of an action has authority to determine its own jurisdiction on issue raised, and a party challenging its jurisdiction has a remedy at law in appeal from an adverse holding of the court that it has such jurisdiction, and may not maintain a proceeding in prohibition to prevent the prosecution of such action." Paragraph three of the syllabus in State, ex rel. Miller, v. Court of Common Pleas (1949), 151 Ohio St. 397; State, ex rel. Gonzales, v. Patton (1975), 42 Ohio St.2d 386, 388; and, as to jurisdiction of Municipal Courts, State, ex rel. Indus. Comm., v. Municipal Court (1940), 137 Ohio St. 321, 322.
In the instant case, the Hamilton County Municipal Court determined the question of its jurisdiction prior to the institution of the prohibition proceedings in the Court of Appeals. The proper course of action for relator herein is an appeal from the decision of the Municipal Court. Relator contends, however, that this court's decisions in State, ex rel. Safeco Ins. Co., v. Kornowski (1974), 40 Ohio St.2d 20, and State, ex rel. Adams, v. Gusweiler (1972), 30 Ohio St.2d 326, have altered the above rule with respect to a party first pursuing his remedy of appeal. Those cases are distinguishable.
In the Gusweiler case, this court, at page 329, determined that if the "inferior court is without jurisdiction whatsoever to act," the availability of a remedy of appeal is immaterial to the issuance of a writ of prohibition to prevent the resulting injustice. (Emphasis added.) Similarly, in Kornowski, the writ was allowed because the critical language of App. R. 7(B) provided a patent and unambiguous restriction on the monetary jurisdiction of the Municipal Court involved.
The case, at bar, however, does not involve such a "total want of jurisdiction" ( Gusweiler), or "patent and unambiguous" restriction ( Kornowski), to warrant dispensing with relator's adequate remedy of appeal. Furthermore, prohibition is not a substitute for appeal. State, ex rel. Toerner, v. Common Pleas Court (1971), 28 Ohio St.2d 213.
R.C. 1901.18(C), the relevant statute herein, gives a Municipal Court original jurisdiction to proceed:
"In any action at law based on contract, to determine, preserve, and enforce all rights, legal and equitable, involved therein, to decree an accounting, reformation or cancellation of the contract, and to hear and determine all legal and equitable remedies necessary or proper for a complete determination of the rights of the parties thereto."
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed for the reason that the complaint for a writ of prohibition does not state a cause of action.
Judgment affirmed.
O'NEILL, C.J., HERBERT, CORRIGAN, STERN, CELEBREZZE, W. BROWN and P. BROWN, JJ., concur.