"(8m) PROPERTY OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT. Where property owned by the U.S. government or any of its instrumentalities is leased to, used by or in the charge or possession of a person and is used for pecuniary profit, an amount equivalent to the real and personal assessments shall be placed on the assessment roll opposite the name of such person and the taxes thereon shall become due and payable at the same time and in the same manner as other property taxes. . . ." Sec. 70.11 (8m) was held invalid in State ex rel. General Motors Corp. v. Oak Creek (1971), 49 Wis.2d 299, 182 N.W.2d 481. The engines produced by Teledyne pursuant to the two government contracts were unique and had no commercial counterpart because of the particular and exacting government specifications.
" As with most rules, however, there are exceptions.State ex rel. Gen. Motors Corp. v. City of Oak Creek, 49 Wis. 2d 299, 319, 182 N.W.2d 481 (1971).State v. Outagamie County Bd. of Adjustment, 2001 WI 78, ¶ 55, 244 Wis. 2d 613, 628 N.W.2d 376.
" State ex rel. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Oak Creek, 49 Wis.2d 299, 319-20, 182 N.W.2d 481 (1971). ¶ 57.
In deciding whether to exercise our discretion, we must consider "the facts and circumstances disclosed by the particular record" in a given case. State ex rel. General Motors Corp. v. City of Oak Creek, 49 Wis.2d 299, 319, 182 N.W.2d 481 (1971). ¶ 13.
The respondents argue that this court has, on at least one occasion, deviated from the general rule that courts have no authority to invalidate legislation on the ground of legislative noncompliance with procedural statutes. In State ex rel. General Motors Corp. v. Oak Creek, 49 Wis.2d 299, 182 N.W.2d 481 (1971), the basic and dispositive question was, however, whether the statute had been enacted in compliance with Article VIII, sec. 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution which requires that the yeas and nays be recorded in the legislative journals. Peripherally, a question was raised whether the statute had been validly enacted when the legislature had not first referred the matter to the joint finance committee as required by the provisions of sec. 13.10(1), Stats. (1967).
" After analyzing the lease agreement between the company, a private air carrier, and the county, the court concluded that although legal title was in fact in the county there were insufficient additional indicia of ownership to constitute the county the true owner of the property under the provisions of sec. 70.11 (2), Stats. The same principles were applied in State ex rel. GeneralMotors Corp. v. Oak Creek, 49 Wis.2d 299, 182 N.W.2d 481 (1971), within the framework of sec. 70.18 (1). However, the appropriate test in determining whether the property in question is exempt from local taxation on the principle that it is "owned by" or is "the property of" an entity entitled to a tax exemption is the practical ownership of the property rather than the holding of the naked legal title.
We have reserved the power, however, in the exercise of our discretion and in the proper case, to consider issues raised for the first time on appeal. The question is one of judicial administration and policy, and not one of power. Terpstra v. Soiltest, Inc., supra, at 593; Allen v. Allen, supra, at 270; State ex rel. General Motors. Corp. v. Oak Creek, 49 Wis.2d 299, 319-20, 182 N.W.2d 481 (1971); Northern States P. Co. v. Hunter Bd. of Supv., 57 Wis.2d 118, 132-33, 203 N.W.2d 878 (1973). This is a proper case in which to assert our reserved power to consider the issue raised for the first time on appeal, not only for the sake of the litigants now before the court but also for future litigants.
See: Clay v. Bradley, 74 Wis.2d 153, 161, 246 N.W.2d 142 (1976); State v. Killory, 73 Wis.2d 400, 410, 243 N.W.2d 475 (1976); Heldt v. Nicholson Mfg. Co., 72 Wis.2d 110, 115, 240 N.W.2d 154 (1976); Schneider Fuel v. West Allis State Bank, 70 Wis.2d 1041, 1047, 236 N.W.2d 266 (1975); Howard v. State Farm Mut. Auto Liability Ins. Co., 70 Wis.2d 985, 994, 236 N.W.2d 643 (1975). This court may, however, in the exercise of its discretion and in the proper case, consider new issues raised for the first time on appeal. Terpstra, supra, 593; State ex rel. General Motors Corp. v. Oak Creek, 49 Wis.2d 299, 319, 182 N.W.2d 481 (1971). However, this is not such a case.
Mr. Binder has no appeal of right. Because the issue involves a question of law rather than of fact, and has been briefed by both sides, we hold that it is one of sufficient public interest to merit decision. State v. Conway (1967), 34 Wis.2d 76, 82, 83, 148 N.W.2d 721; State ex rel. General Motors Corp. v. Oak Creek (1971), 49 Wis.2d 299, 319, 182 N.W.2d 481. School district is defined for purposes of Title XIV of the statutes (which includes ch. 118) in sec. 115.01(3), Stats. Plaintiff argues that since the statute does not specifically mention VTAE districts, they should not be considered "school districts" for purposes of sec. 118.26, and that since no comparable statutory provision requiring presentation of a claim is contained in ch. 38, Stats., which concerns VTAE District functions specifically, the VTAE District does not benefit from any notice-of-claim requirement.
This court rejected the waiver argument and concluded that the issue, being one of law, should have been decided by the circuit court. Furthermore, we stated: (1971), 49 Wis.2d 299, 182 N.W.2d 481. "However, even if this inquiry into the jurisdiction of the board is deemed to have been waived in the trial court and raised for the first time on appeal, it would appear that the court should still consider it because of its fundamental nature and importance.