But, as mother correctly argued at the hearing, there is no legal requirement that a parent be able to care for his or her children independently. See State ex rel. Dept. of Human Services v. Smith, 338 Or. 58, 86, 106 P.3d 627 (2005) (observing that “there is no statutory requirement that parent be able to care for the child ‘independently.’ All that [the juvenile code] requires is that the parent's inability to parent the child independently not work to the detriment of the child.”).

A parent's untruthful answers during a termination proceeding are not a ground for termination of parental rights unless the parent's lack of honesty is seriously detrimental to the child. State ex rel Dept. of Human Services v. Smith, 338 Or 58, 85-86, 106 P3d 627 (2005). Here, although father's lack of candor with child's doctors could have caused delays in child's receiving appropriate medical care, there is no evidence that there was any actual, serious detriment to child as a result of that lack of candor.

Evidence is clear and convincing when it makes the existence of a fact "highly probable." State ex rel. Dept. of Human Services v. Smith , 338 Or. 58, 79, 106 P.3d 627 (2005). In considering whether a parent's conduct or condition is "seriously detrimental," the court focuses on the detrimental effect of the parent's conduct or condition on the child , "not just the seriousness of the parent's conduct or condition in the abstract."

court also must find that the ‘integration of the child into the home of the parent * * * is improbable within a reasonable time due to conduct or conditions not likely to change.’ ” State ex rel. SOSCF v. Stillman, 333 Or. 135, 145, 36 P.3d 490 (2001); see also State ex rel. Dept. of Human Services v. Smith, 338 Or. 58, 80–81, 106 P.3d 627 (2005). The state must establish statutory grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence, meaning that the record must disclose evidence that makes it highly probable that the parents are not presently able, and will not be able within a reasonable time, to meet their children's physical and emotional needs.

That statute requires us to decide (1) whether the parent is unfit — that is, whether the parent has engaged in conduct or is characterized by a condition and whether the conduct or condition is seriously detrimental to the child — and (2) whether, given the parent's conduct or condition, it is improbable that the child may be integrated into the parent's home within a reasonable time. State ex rel Dept. of Human Services v. Smith, 338 Or. 58, 80-81,106 P.3d 627 (2005); State ex rel SOSCF v. Stillman, 333 Or. 135, 145-46, 36 P.3d 490 (2001). A "reasonable time" is measured by "a child or ward's emotional and developmental needs and ability to form and maintain lasting attachments."

'"State ex rel SOSCF v. Stillman, 333 Or 135, 145, 36 P3d 490 (2001) (quoting ORS 419B.504); see also State ex rel Dept. of Human Services v. Smith, 338 Or 58, 80-81, 106 P3d 627 (2005) (focus is on detrimental effect of the parent's conduct or condition on the child, not the seriousness of parent's conduct or condition in the abstract). Additionally, the court must find that termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child.

In addition, it is not sufficient that the conduct or condition was harmful to the child in the past; rather, the state must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that it is seriously detrimental at the time of the hearing. State ex rel Dept. of Human Services v. Smith, 338 Or 58, 83, 106 P3d 627 (2005). In Smith, the court concluded that the state had failed to establish the necessary nexus between the mother's alleged conduct and conditions and a serious, present detriment to her child.

Second, if the parent is unfit, the court must determine whether it is improbable that the child will, within a reasonable time, be integrated into the parent's home. State ex rel Dept. of Human Services v. Smith, 338 Or 58, 80-81, 106 P3d 627 (2005); State ex rel SOSCF v. Stillman, 333 Or 135, 145-46, 36 P3d 490 (2001). As the Supreme Court has emphasized, ORS 419B.504 assumes that a formerly unfit parent can change, and termination is authorized only if the parent is presently unfit.

State ex rel Dept. of Human Services v. Simmons, 196 Or App 787, 106 P3d 699 (2004). Mother petitioned for review, and the Supreme Court vacated our decision and remanded for us to reconsider this case in light of State ex rel SOSCF v. Stillman, 333 Or 135, 36 P3d 490 (2001), and State ex rel Dept. of Human Services v. Smith, 338 Or 58, 106 P3d 627 (2005). State ex rel Dept. of Human Services v. Simmons, 338 Or 374, 110 P3d 113 (2005).

But Andrews's, Carroll's, and Kniskern's credible testimony, along with mother's entire testimony, conflict with any inference arising from selective portions of mother's testimony and Ewell's and Richardson's testimony. By focusing only on selective portions of the record rather than the entire record, the dissent fails to acknowledge the mandate of the statutory language or heed the Supreme Court's instructions in State ex rel SOSCF v. Stillman, 333 Or 135, 36 P3d 490 (2001), and State ex rel Dept. of Human Services v. Smith, 338 Or 58, 106 P3d 627 (2005). Last year, the Supreme Court in Smith addressed the circumstance where, as in this case, there is an absence of evidence establishing a nexus between a parent's mental disorders and the parent's capacity to parent at the time of the termination hearing.