That is not how the Supreme Court views the matter. See, e.g., State ex rel Cox v. Davidson Ind., 291 Or. 839, 844, 635 P.2d 630 (1981). We follow the legislature's intent and hold that ORS 192.502 (16) governs our decision. It supersedes the exemptions on which defendants previously relied.

Rather, the legislature's use of the word "may" leaves it to the OLCC to determine in how much negotiation, if any, it is willing to engage. See State ex rel Cox v. Davidson Ind., 291 Or. 839, 851, 635 P.2d 630 (1981). Indeed, the dependent clause — "as the commission may negotiate with said agents or representatives" — merely modifies the phrase "such agreement."

When used in a statute, the word "shall" expresses an intent to mandate the doing of an act. State ex rel Cox v. Davidson Ind., 291 Or. 839, 851, 635 P.2d 630 (1981). Also, plaintiff's reliance on ORS 609.090(2) is misplaced. ORS 609.090(2) provides the Board with discretion to release a dog that has been a public nuisance but is not dangerous.

The Supreme Court is of the view that statements of committee members who had the responsibility for approving a measure are relevant legislative history for determining the intent of the bill. State ex rel Cox v. Davidson Industries, Inc., 291 Or. 839, 844, 635 P.2d 630 (1981); Jones v. Wallace, 291 Or. 11, 17, 628 P.2d 388 (1981). It is clear, however, that the committees that considered SB 351 had different understandings as to what the bill would accomplish.