State, ex Rel. Clark, v. Toledo

31 Citing cases

  1. State ex Rel. Steckman v. Jackson

    70 Ohio St. 3d 420 (Ohio 1994)   Cited 296 times
    Holding that "[d]iscovery orders are interlocutory and, as such, are neither final nor appealable"

    r Printing Co. v. Watkins (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 129, 609 N.E.2d 551 (trial preparation and confidential law enforcement investigatory records); State ex rel.Johnson v. Cleveland (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 331, 603 N.E.2d 1011 (trial preparation, investigatory work product, risk to witnesses and state/federal law exemptions); State ex rel. Williams v. Cleveland (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 544, 597 N.E.2d 147 (trial preparation and confidential law enforcement investigatory exemptions — postconviction); State ex rel. Clark v. Toledo (1992), 62 Ohio St.3d 452, 584 N.E.2d 662 (" Clark II") (postconviction relief); State ex rel. Coleman v. Cincinnati (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 83, 566 N.E.2d 151 (trial preparation records — police department's homicide investigation files); State ex rel. Natl. Broadcasting Co. v. Cleveland (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 77, 566 N.E.2d 146 (investigatory and trial preparation records); State ex rel. Zuern v. Leis (1990), 56 Ohio St.3d 20, 564 N.E.2d 81 (trial preparation records); State ex rel. Clark v. Toledo (1990), 54 Ohio St.3d 55, 560 N.E.2d 1313 (" Clark I") (postconviction relief); State ex rel. Multimedia, Inc. v. Whalen (1990), 48 Ohio St.3d 41, 549 N.E.2d 167 (confidential law enforcement investigatory records); State ex rel. Outlet Communications, Inc. v. Lancaster Police Dept. (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 324, 528 N.E.2d 175 (arrest and intoxilyzer records — confidential law enforcement investigatory records; Furtherance of Justice Fund records); State ex rel. Natl. Broadcasting Co. v. Cleveland (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 79, 526 N.E.2d 786 (" NBC I") (investigatory work product exception); and State ex rel. Beacon Journal Publishing Co. v. Univ. of Akron (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 392, 18 O.O.3d 534, 415 N.E.2d 310 ("routine incident reports"). Any objective review of these cases leads to the conclusion that we construed the last cited case too liberally — the 1980 Beacon Journal case.

  2. State ex Rel. Vindicator Printing Co. v. Watkins

    66 Ohio St. 3d 129 (Ohio 1993)   Cited 20 times

    On December 31, 1991, the court of appeals rendered judgment in the mandamus action. The court held (1) that appellants did not have an adequate remedy at law by way of appeal because it was clear they lacked standing to intervene in Biros' criminal proceeding; (2) that, pursuant to the decision of this court in State ex rel. Clark v. Toledo (1990), 54 Ohio St.3d 55, 560 N.E.2d 1313, appellants were entitled to no more information than could be obtained by Biros in the underlying action pursuant to Crim.R. 16, but that, irrespective of its interpretation of Clark, supra, the court was required by R.C. 149.43 and the decision of this court in State ex rel. Natl. Broadcasting Co. v. Cleveland (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 79, 526 N.E.2d 786, to conduct an in camera review of the documents at issue. Following a review of these documents, the court ordered the release of those documents designated as Exhibits AAA, but denied disclosure of those documents designated as Exhibits BBB. Release of Exhibits AAA was stayed pending appeal.

  3. Chillicothe v. Knight

    75 Ohio App. 3d 544 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992)   Cited 16 times
    Stating that "[t]o establish self-defense in a nondeadly-force case, one may use such force as the circumstances require in order to defend against danger which one has good reason to apprehend"

    Only the legislature can do so, as hereinabove indicated." State ex rel. Clark v. Toledo (1990), 54 Ohio St.3d 55, 56-57, 560 N.E.2d 1313, 1313-1315; see, also, State ex rel. Martin v. Cleveland (Jan. 8, 1992), Cuyahoga App. No. 60977, unreported, 1992 WL 2861; but, see, Cunningham, supra. Although the Clark decision noted that it was only deciding whether R.C. 149.43 is available to a criminal defendant in a post-conviction proceeding and found it unnecessary to address the possible application of R.C. 149.43 to original trial proceedings, its rationale manifestly appears to require a similar holding in the context of an original criminal trial.

  4. Esparza v. Anderson

    CASE NO. 3:96 CV 7434 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 27, 2013)   Cited 11 times

    On October 10, 1990, the Ohio Supreme Court decided this unrelated litigation, holding an inmate who has exhausted his direct appeals may employ the Ohio Public Records Act to support his/her petition for post-conviction relief. See State ex rel. Clark v. City of Toledo, 54 Ohio St.3d 55 (1990). Shortly thereafter, on November 6, 1990, the City of Toledo notified Esparza it had "compiled 118 documents (119 page sides)" and "[i]nformation has been redacted only from 18 of these pages (Exhibits 1 - 15) pursuant to O.R.C. Sections 149.43(A)(2)(a), (b), (d) and (A)(4)."

  5. State ex Rel. Williams v. Cleveland

    64 Ohio St. 3d 544 (Ohio 1992)   Cited 25 times

    As a threshold matter, it is clear that an action in mandamus is available to each appellant. In State ex rel. Clark v. Toledo (1990), 54 Ohio St.3d 55, 560 N.E.2d 1313, syllabus, we held that "[a] criminal defendant who has exhausted the direct appeals of his conviction may avail himself of R.C. 149.43 to support his petition for post-conviction relief." Further, R.C. 149.43(C) authorizes a cause of action in mandamus to a person allegedly aggrieved by the failure of a governmental unit to promptly prepare a public record and make it available for inspection in accordance with R.C. 149.43(B).

  6. State v. Thompson

    87 Ohio App. 3d 570 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993)   Cited 19 times

    It was appropriate, therefore, for the defendant in this case to seek relief in the trial court from the prosecutor's alleged refusal to comply with R.C. 149.43. In State ex rel. Clark v. Toledo (1990), 54 Ohio St.3d 55, 560 N.E.2d 1313, the Supreme Court found that a criminal defendant who had exhausted the direct appeals of his conviction was entitled to documents available pursuant to R.C. 149.43 in order to search for evidence to support a petition for postconviction relief. The court reached that conclusion even though those same documents would not have been available to the defendant pursuant to Crim.R. 16.

  7. State ex Rel. Jenkins, v. Cleveland

    82 Ohio App. 3d 770 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992)   Cited 12 times
    In Jenkins, the city of Cleveland asserted that the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of the victims relatives fell within the public safety exception in R.C. 149.43(A)(2)(d).

    Beacon Journal, supra, 64 Ohio St.2d at 398, 18 O.O.3d at 538, 415 N.E.2d at 314. See, also, State ex rel. Clark v. Toledo (1990), 54 Ohio St.3d 55, 560 N.E.2d 1313 (" Clark I"), and State ex rel. Zuern v. Leis (1990), 56 Ohio St.3d 20, 564 N.E.2d 81. In State ex rel. Natl. Broadcasting Co. v. Cleveland (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 79, 526 N.E.2d 786 (" NBC I"), the Ohio Supreme Court established broad rules for examining records for disclosure.

  8. State v. Moore

    74 Ohio App. 3d 334 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991)   Cited 30 times
    In Moore, the defendant was robbed of approximately $1,000 which represented the proceeds from a drug sale, by the victim and a male individual posing as her brother.

    BOWMAN, Presiding Judge, concurring separately. While I concur with the judgment of the majority in overruling defendant's first assignment of error, I find it necessary to further clarify the opinion in light of the Ohio Supreme Court's recent decision in State ex rel. Clark v. Toledo (1990), 54 Ohio St.3d 55, 560 N.E.2d 1313. In Clark, the court held that R.C. 149.43 may be used by a criminal defendant in a post-conviction relief proceeding to gain access to information otherwise not discoverable under Crim.R. 16 for the reason that R.C. 149.43 creates a substantive right which cannot be abridged by Crim.R. 16.

  9. Byrd v. Collins

    209 F.3d 486 (6th Cir. 2000)   Cited 1,244 times
    Holding that a prosecutor's comment that jurors "should impose the death penalty . . . in order to fulfill their societal duty" was not improper because the prosecutor "d[id] not ask the jury to send a message to other potential murderers or robbers"

    On October 10, 1990, the Ohio Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant who has exhausted his direct appeals is a "person" who may avail himself of the State's public records law in Ohio Rev. Code § 149.43 in order to support a petition for post-conviction relief. See Ohio ex rel. Clark v. City of Toledo, 560 N.E.2d 1313, 1315 (Ohio 1990). Obtainable public records include law enforcement investigatory files.

  10. D'Ambrosio v. Bagley

    Case No. 1:00 CV 2521 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 24, 2006)   Cited 19 times
    In D'ambrosio v. Bagley, 2006 WL 1169926 * 37 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 24, 2006), the court used Herrera's dissent standard, i.e., the petitioner must show that he is probably innocent.

    InSteckman, decided September 7, 1994, the Ohio Supreme Court held that "[a] defendant in a criminal case who has exhausted the direct appeals of her or his conviction may not avail herself or himself of R.C. 149.43 to support a petition for postconviction relief." Id. at 85, syllabus ¶ 6 ( overrulingState ex rel. Clark v. Toledo, 560 N.E.2d 1313 (Ohio 1990)). D'Ambrosio's direct appeal did not conclude until August 16, 1995, when the Ohio Supreme Court reaffirmed the Court of Appeals' weighing of the sentencing decision based on the full record.