See Tyler v. Warden, Nebraska State Prison, No. A–02–295, 2003 WL 21398153 (Neb.App. June 17, 2003) (not designated for permanent publication). Moreover, most states with statutory requirements similar to § 29–2801 do not treat compliance with such requirements as jurisdictional. See, Nguyen v. State, 282 Ga. 483, 651 S.E.2d 681 (2007), overruled on other grounds, Brown v. Crawford, 289 Ga. 722, 715 S.E.2d 132 (2011); State ex rel. v. Adult Parole, 80 Ohio St.3d 639, 687 N.E.2d 761 (1998); People ex rel. Negron v. Herold, 33 A.D.2d 1076, 307 N.Y.S.2d 710 (1970); State ex rel. Hansen v. Utecht, 230 Minn. 579, 40 N.W.2d 441 (1950); State ex rel. Chase v. Calvird, 324 Mo. 429, 24 S.W.2d 111 (1930); In the Matter of Beard, 4 Ark. 9 (1842); In re Spates, No. 14–14–00524–CV, 2014 WL 3051311 (Tex.App. July 3, 2014) (unpublished). But see Evans v. Dist. Ct., 194 Colo. 299, 572 P.2d 811 (1977).
When the writ is issued the petition has accomplished its purpose, and ordinarily thereafter the issues are based on the return to the writ, and the transverse thereof. State ex rel. Chase v. Calvird, 324 Mo. 429, 434-5, 24 S.W.2d 111, 114. In this instance the relators here, when they were respondents below in the habeas corpus case, did file a motion to dismiss alleging voluminous facts, which was equivalent to a return challenging the court's jurisdiction.
" [See also: State ex rel. St. Louis v. Caulfield, 333 Mo. 270, 273, 62 94 S.W.2d 818; State ex rel. Adler v. Ossing, 336 Mo. 386, 389, 79 S.W.2d 255; House v. Clinton County Court, 67 Mo. 522, 523.] It is apparent, therefore, that this court cannot go to the application for the writ to search out facts which should be in the return. State ex rel. Products Co. v. Pearcy, supra, 325 Mo. 335, 344; State ex rel. Chase v. Calvird, 324 Mo. 429, 437, 24 S.W.2d 111, 115; State ex rel. School Dist. v. Williams, 70 Mo. App. 238, 242; State ex rel. Packing Co. v. Stephens, 146 Mo. 662, 686, 48 S.W. 929 (majority opinion holding that undenied allegation in application cannot be considered as establishing a fact not shown in the return). Evidence and exhibits sent up in response to the writ, even though incorporated in the return and referred to in the records, may not be considered, and will be disregarded, where same are not properly a part of the record of the tribunal to whom the writ was directed.
The lower court had jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject matter and the judgment is supported by the petition. Since there is no error on the face of the record proper, the writ of certiorari should be quashed: State ex rel. v. Patterson, 229 Mo. 368; State ex rel. v. Reynolds, 190 Mo. 588; State ex rel. v. St. Louis, 207 Mo. 366; Hannibal Railroad v. State Board, 64 Mo. 308; House v. Clinton County Court, 67 Mo. 523; State ex rel. v. Williams, 70 Mo. App. 241; Stone v. New York, 25 Wend. 134; State ex rel. v. Dowlin, 50 Mo. 134; State ex rel. v. Board, 108 Mo. 242; State ex rel. v. Cauthorn, 40 Mo. App. 96; State ex rel. v. Mayor, 57 Mo. App. 192; State ex rel. v. Edwards, 104 Mo. 125; State ex rel. v. Wells, 210 Mo. 621; State ex rel. v. Clark, 9 S.W.2d 638; School District v. Pace, 113 Mo. App. 140; State ex rel. Chase v. Calvird, 24 S.W.2d 111, 324 Mo. 429; State ex rel. v. Ossing, 79 S.W.2d 255; State ex rel. Shartel v. Skinker, 25 S.W.2d 472, 324 Mo. 955. (4) Since there is nothing here but the record proper, the sole questions that can be presented are, did the lower court have jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties, did the petition state a cause of action and does the petition support the judgment? Osborn v. Benbow, 38 Mo. App. 25; Oakes v. School District, 98 Mo. App. 163; Orchard v. Bank, 121 Mo. App. 338; Miller v. Falloon, 187 S.W. 839; Growney v. O'Donnell, 272 Mo. 167, 198 S.W. 863; Advance Thrasher Co. v. Speak, 167 Mo. App. 470, 151 S.W. 235; Layne v. Miners Co., 180 Mo. App. 684, 163 S.W. 569; Ryan v. Growney, 125 Mo. 474; Roden v. Helm, 192 Mo. 71; Bruner v. Johnson, 228 S.W. 92; Hearst v. Trust Co., 5 S.W.2d 3.
A respondent to whom a writ of habeas corpus is addressed can attack the petition if he desires by a motion to quash the writ. State ex rel. Chase v. Calvird, 324 Mo. 429, 24 S.W.2d 111, l.c. 114. The authorities hold that a petition for a writ of habeas corpus must on its face show probable cause for the issuance of the writ and when the petition fails to show grounds for the release of the infant, the court will not and should not issue the writ.
(1) There are no facts before the court on which it can base a determination of the questions involved because the exhibits referred to in the return are not made a part of the record. State ex rel. Duraflor Products Co. v. Pearcy (Mo.), 29 S.W.2d 83, l.c. 87; State ex rel. Chase v. Calvird (Mo.), 24 S.W.2d 111, l.c. 115; State ex rel. Adler v. Ossing (Mo. en banc), 79 S.W.2d 255, l.c. 256. (2) Certiorari is not the proper remedy in the present case because: (a) The writ will not reach the question of insufficiency of the evidence.