Furthermore, courts have frequently used writs of prohibition to bar a trial court from conducting probation revocation proceedings when the lower court exceeded its statutory authority. See, e.g., State ex rel. Breeding v. Seay, 244 S.W.3d 791, 792 (Mo.App. S.D. 2008); State ex rel. Heberlie v. Martinez, 128 S.W.3d 616, 617 (Mo.App. E.D. 2004); State ex rel. Moyer v. Calhoun, 22 S.W.3d 250, 252-53 (Mo.App. E.D. 2000); State ex rel. Brown v. Combs, 994 S.W.2d 69, 73 (Mo.App. W.D. 1999); State ex rel. Limback v. Gum, 895 S.W.2d 663, 665 (Mo.App. W.D. 1995). Here, Relator is arguing that Respondent exceeded its statutory authority to hold a hearing to revoke his probation because the probationary period had expired.
Trowbridge could have also sought extraordinary relief by filing a petition for writ of prohibition in this court seeking to bar Judge Gabbert from conducting the probation revocation proceeding. See, e.g., State ex rel. Heberlie v. Martinez, 128 S.W.3d 616, 616 (Mo.App. 2004); State ex rel. Moyer v. Calhoun, 22 S.W.3d 250, 251 (Mo.App. 2000); State ex rel. Brown v. Combs, 994 S.W.2d 69, 70 (Mo.App. 1999); State ex rel. Wright v. Dandurand, 973 S.W.2d 161, 161 (Mo.App. 1998); State ex rel. Limback v. Gum, 895 S.W.2d 663, 663 (Mo.App. 1995). This court has superintending control over the circuit courts and other courts within its district.
A court may take advantage of Section 559.036.3's permission to revoke and impose a new term of probation only once. State ex rel. Brown v. Combs, 994 S.W.2d 69, 71 (Mo.App. 1999) (citing State ex rel. Light v. Sheffield, 768 S.W.2d 590, 592 (Mo.App. 1989)). If the court again revokes probation, it has no authority under this or any other statute to impose a third period of probation. Id. Respondent agrees that this is a correct statement of the law.