In fact, this Court has, on occasion, relied upon dicta to establish new points of law. See Yeager v. Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 192 W. Va. 556, 560, 453 S.E.2d 390, 394 (1994) (relying upon dicta in Davis v. Safe Insurance Co., 120 W. Va. 505, 199 S.E. 364 (1938) to establish a new principle of law); State ex rel. Blake v. Chafin, 183 W. Va. 269, 272, 395 S.E.2d 513, 516 (1990) (relying upon dicta in Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969), to establish a new principle of law); State v. Oldaker, 172 W. Va. 258, 266, 304 S.E.2d 843, 850 (1983) (relying upon dicta in State v. Hall, 171 W. Va. 212, 298 S.E.2d 246 (1982) to establish a new principle of law). We believe the dicta in Clark has laid the groundwork for resolution of the issue now before us.
In the circuit court's order denying the appellant's second habeas petition, the circuit court found that, regardless of the outcome of the appellant's second habeas petition, the appellant's petition for a second habeas petition was moot until the appellant had completed his sentence for the appellant's 2001 bank robbery conviction. In Syllabus Point 1 of State ex rel. Blake v. Chafin, 183 W. Va. 269, 395 S.E.2d 513 (1990), this Court held: Although there may be occasions where the validity of one sentence has been upheld in review and the review of a separate conviction will not alter the circumstances of a defendant's confinement, a defendant is still entitled to a ruling on the merits when post-conviction habeas corpus relief is sought.
The majority affirms the lower court's decision to deny the Appellant's habeas corpus petition without appointing counsel to assist the Appellant in developing his habeas corpus claims. Indeed, as explained in syllabus point two of State ex rel. Blake v. Chafin, 183 W. Va. 269, 395 S.E.2d 513 (1990), this Court has consistently held that: "A court having jurisdiction over habeas corpus proceedings may deny a petition for a writ of habeas corpus without a hearing and without appointing counsel for the petitioner if the petition, exhibits, affidavits or other documentary evidence filed therewith show to such court's satisfaction that the petitioner is entitled to no relief."
Thus, to the extent that the majority opinion might be wrongly construed, my concurrence has been appended to make clear the standing of our law on this issue. We carved out a narrow exception to this rule in State ex rel. Blake v. Chafin, 183 W. Va. 269, 395 S.E.2d 513 (1990). Blake was presented to this Court as a mandamus proceeding in which the petitioner sought to compel a circuit court to review a habeas corpus petition.
However, we do not agree with the trial court's conclusion that the concurrent sentencing cured violations of double jeopardy provisions prohibiting multiple punishments for the same offense. Concurrent sentencing does not cure violations of constitutional double jeopardy provisions prohibiting multiple punishments for the same offense. See State ex rel. Blake v. Chafin, 183 W. Va. 269, 395 S.E.2d 513 (1990). In Chafin, this Court explicitly rejected the view known as the "concurrent sentence rule."
Finally, regarding appellant's contention that the lower court erred in imposing consecutive sentences upon the appellant, while we have not directly addressed this issue, we have implicitly upheld such a consecutive imposition of sentence. See generally, State ex rel. Blake v. Chafin, 183 W. Va. 269, 395 S.E.2d 513 (1990). Further, in syllabus point 2 of Hutchinson v. Dietrich, 183 W. Va. 25, 393 S.E.2d 663 (1990) we specifically held that "[m]ultiple convictions rendered on the same day should be treated as a single conviction for the purposes of the habitual criminal statute, W. Va.Code, 61-11-19, and multiple sentences can be enhanced under the habitual criminal statute only once where the sentences are imposed for convictions rendered on the same day."