Opinion
No. 29,805.
Filed June 30, 1959.
MANDAMUS AND PROHIBITION — Jurisdiction of Subject Matter and Person — Prohibitory Injunction — Prescribing Imprisonment. — Relator contends that the respondent court is acting without its jurisdiction in proposing to modify its decree and in prescribing imprisonment for relator for failure to comply with a prohibitory injunction. The Supreme Court refuses such contention since the pleadings show that the trial court had jurisdiction of both the subject matter and person, that the trial court had jurisdiction to enforce its decree and that under such circumstances there is no authority to issue a writ of prohibition.
Original Action by State of Indiana on relation of John C. Blackard and General Fabricators, Inc., relators, which seeks a writ of prohibition directed against Marion Superior Court, Room No. 5, John F. Linder, Judge. A temporary writ was issued.
Permanent writ is denied.
Philip S. Kappes and Dutton Kappes, both of Indianapolis, for relators.
Charles L. Whistler, Daniel E. Johnson and Baker Daniels, all of Indianapolis, for respondents.
On June 4, 1959, relators filed their Petition For Writ Of Prohibition alleging therein that Marion Superior Court, Room No. 5, John F. Linder, Judge, had acted and was proposing to act without jurisdiction, and in excess of its lawful jurisdiction in proposing to modify and expand its original decree in Cause No. C31810 in said court entered on June 20, 1958; and in prescribing imprisonment for John C. Blackard for failure to comply with a prohibitory injunction, etc. A temporary writ was issued on June 4, 1959.
On June 18, 1959, respondents filed a verified return to relators' petition, praying therein that the temporary writ of prohibition so entered on June 4, 1959, be dissolved and that relators' petition for an absolute writ of prohibition be denied.
The pleadings filed herein clearly indicate that the trial court had jurisdiction of both the subject matter and the person; that the trial court had jurisdiction to enter its order to enforce the injunctive decree there entered; therefore, the respondent court is not acting outside its jurisdiction, and under such circumstances this court is without authority to issue the writ of prohibition as prayed.
The alternative writ heretofore issued is dissolved, and a permanent writ is denied.
Achor, C.J., Arterburn, Bobbitt and Landis, JJ., concur.
NOTE. — Reported in 159 N.E.2d 401.