Opinion
No. 88-295
Submitted June 6, 1989 —
Decided August 16, 1989.
Courts — Mandamus to compel board of commissioners to appropriate funds — Decision granting writ reversed and remanded, when — Expert evidence improperly excluded.
APPEAL and CROSS-APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Lake County, No. 12-231.
In May 1986, relator-appellee and cross-appellant, Ross D. Avellone, the domestic relations judge of the Court of Common Pleas of Lake County, submitted two budget request forms to respondent-appellant Board of Commissioners of Lake County ("board"). One form sought 1987 funding in the amount of $747,350 for the Lake County Bureau of Support, an agency for which Judge Avellone was then administratively responsible. (It appears the bureau of support was subsequently removed from Judge Avellone's authority pursuant to an October 5, 1987 amendment to R.C. 2301.35.) The other form sought 1987 funding in the amount of $520,212.73 for the domestic relations court.
The budget request for the court basically contained a summary of its current expenses and projections for the upcoming year. While some expenses, like those for equipment ($28,000) and supplies ($32,000) were not projected at an increase over 1986 expenditures, some anticipated increases were listed. The most significant of these was the increase required for Judge Avellone to hire a third referee at a salary of $33,000, another secretary/bailiff at a salary of $12,000, and a constable/bailiff at a salary of $22,000. (The latter two positions were to be, respectively, the referee's and court's support staff.)
Judge Avellone first determined in 1984 that he needed one referee more than the two traditionally employed by the domestic relations court. Apparently, funding for this has been requested every year since 1984, but has not been allocated. Judge Avellone renewed this request for 1987 after consulting regular and special reports produced by his two referees and the administrative reports for the domestic relations court that are required by the Rules of Superintendence. These reports showed, among other things, that the court was not meeting prescribed deadlines for case processing, and that the court was taking about six months longer to set a first hearing in newly filed cases than it had during 1982-1983.
Judge Avellone discussed his 1987 budget with a board member and the board's budget director during hearings in December 1986 and in February 1987. He was told that the board could not meet his needs because it was in a budget crisis requiring "everybody to be cut 15 per cent" and there was a hiring freeze. Even so, on January 15, 1987, Judge Avellone entered an order requiring the board to provide the funding requested earlier for both the domestic relations court and the bureau of support.
Apparently, the board responded to this order by supplying at least some of the funding required for the domestic relations court to operate. However, the board did not allocate funds earmarked for hiring a third referee or for employing the related support staff. The board also did not appropriate funds to computerize the domestic relations court and the bureau of support, a project that had been discussed at the budget hearings, but was not specifically included in either the bureau's or the court's original budget request.
Judge Avellone entered another order for further appropriations on June 26, 1987. This order identified a $55,000 expenditure as necessary for the computerization of the domestic relations court, and a $175,000 expenditure as necessary for the computerization of the bureau of support. The order also identified the following $116,871 worth of personnel and services as necessary expenditures for the court's operation:
"Employee Salaries $72,000.00
"Court reporters $40,000.00
"Supplies $500.00
"Equipment $4,371.00"
When the board did not comply with this order, Judge Avellone filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus in the Court of Appeals for Lake County. His complaint alleged that the board had a duty to appropriate funds for both the $55,000 expense for computerizing the domestic relations court and the $116,871 expense for hiring a new referee and related personnel, equipment and supplies. The complaint also sought $175,000 for computerizing the bureau of support. The board answered by asserting that these expenses were unreasonable and unnecessary and, therefore, that it was not under a clear legal duty to make the appropriations.
The court of appeals heard the matter in October 1987. Prior to the hearing and on Judge Avellone's motion, the court had issued an order that precluded the board from submitting evidence regarding the "judicial administration" of the domestic relations court, the "poundage charge of the bureau of support other than evidence that the poundage charge had been changed," and "the compensation earned by other employees of the court except as to referees." In the same order, the appellate court had overruled the board's motion to amend its answer by adding a counterclaim for a writ of mandamus and injunctive relief. However, the court did grant the board what appears to be an ancillary injunction preventing Judge Avellone from executing a September 28, 1987 order that reduced child support poundage fees from two percent to one dollar per year.
The court of appeals adhered to its order limiting the evidence during the hearing. It did not admit the board's expert testimony and a report comparing the average cost of terminating cases in Judge Avellone's court over a five-year period to the average cost of terminating domestic relations cases in Cuyahoga County and Trumbull County. The appellate court excluded much of this evidence because it compared each court's cost efficiency as a whole. It found that any comparison had to factor in the number of referees each county employed to be directly relevant to the reasonableness and necessity of adding a third Lake County referee at an annual salary of $33,000.
The board ultimately proffered the excluded expert testimony on the report. According to the board, this evidence established (1) that the average administrative cost per case terminated in Judge Avellone's court was "well above those of other area courts," and (2) that the average administrative cost per case terminated in Judge Avellone's court has "risen at a faster rate than the other courts' average costs."
The court of appeals also refused to admit testimony of the board's budget director regarding the specific effect of Judge Avellone's order reducing support poundage on the county's financial position. The board proffered this evidence, too. It shows that the order would have decreased the general fund revenues by $260,000.
The court of appeals admitted much of the other evidence that the board presented, however. Evidence that pertains to the board's argument before this court established that Judge Avellone hired two part-time referees, each to work twenty hours per week, in September 1987. He paid them with money made available by the 1986 retirement of a bailiff, but this source was depleted by December 31, 1987. The record additionally reflects that these interim referees were paid at a rate that would have yielded approximately $31,000 for each of them if they had worked for a full year, and that, prior to September, Judge Avellone had relied on a law clerk to handle some of the court's caseload.
Other evidence demonstrated that, in the last quarter of 1987, Judge Avellone raised the salary rate of his two full-time referees to yield a $3,000 pay increase. This increase was later rescinded, however, and both referees repaid as much of it as they had received.
The board's evidence further established that, on September 28, 1987, Judge Avellone ordered a reduction in the poundage fees necessitated by orders administered through the bureau of support. Judge Avellone ordered this reduction after he had identified $282,000 of these fees as an anticipated source of funding for the bureau of support in the bureau's original budget request form. (Apparently, this order never took effect due to the court of appeals' injunction and subsequent administrative changes in the bureau.)
Finally, testimony generally established that the annual number of new case filings in Judge Avellone's court had decreased each year since 1984. Expert testimony also suggested that the caseload in the Lake County domestic relations court had declined at a faster rate than it had in either Trumbull County or Cuyahoga County.
The court of appeals granted Judge Avellone a writ of mandamus on December 22, 1987, but only with respect to part of his prayer for relief. Finding that the board had not shown his request for funding to be unreasonable or unnecessary, the court ordered the board to appropriate $116,871 for him to hire a third referee, another secretary, a bailiff, and to pay for related court reporting, supplies, and equipment costs. However, the court did not order appropriations for computerizing the bureau of support ($175,000) or for computerizing the domestic relations court ($55,000). It found the former expense unreasonable and unnecessary because Judge Avellone would not be the bureau's administrator as of January 1, 1988. In contrast, the court found that the board had no duty to appropriate the latter expense because Judge Avellone had not requested it in the original budget request form for the domestic relations court.
The board appeals the decision ordering the appropriation of $116,871. Judge Avellone cross-appeals on the issue of an appropriation for computerizing the domestic relations court. He asks this court to either determine the reasonableness and necessity of a $28,000 appropriation or to remand the matter to the court of appeals. The causes are now before this court on an appeal and cross-appeal as of right.
Ulrich Cantor and Abraham Cantor, for appellee and cross-appellant.
Klammer Trebets and Theodore R. Klammer, for appellants and cross-appellees.
Four questions are raised in this appeal. They are, in the order presented: (1) Did the court of appeals err in finding that the board has a clear legal duty to appropriate $116,871 for the Lake County domestic relations court to hire a third referee and support staff in light of Judge Avellone's having hired two part-time referees? (2) Did the court of appeals err in excluding the board's expert evidence? (3) Did the court of appeals err in excluding the budget director's testimony on the effect of Judge Avellone's order reducing poundage? and (4) Does the board also have a clear legal duty to appropriate $28,000 for computerizing the domestic relations court?
For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that the board's expert evidence was relevant and that its exclusion constituted prejudicial error. We therefore do not reach the ultimate issue of whether the board is obligated to make the $116,871 appropriation. Beyond this, however, we find that there is no justification for reversing the court of appeals in response to either of the parties' remaining arguments.
The principles of law that are applicable in mandamus actions seeking to compel appropriations for a common pleas court's operation were generally set forth in State, ex rel. Britt, v. Bd. of Cty. Commrs. (1985), 18 Ohio St.3d 1, 2, 18 OBR 1, 2, 480 N.E.2d 77, 78:
"A court of common pleas possesses inherent authority to require funding for its services at a level that is both reasonable and necessary to the administration of the judicial process. State, ex rel. Rudes, v. Rofkar (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 69, 71-72. In turn, the board of county commissioners must provide the requested funds, unless the commissioners can establish that the court abused its discretion in submitting a budget which is unreasonable and unnecessary. State, ex rel. Giuliani, v. Perk (1968), 14 Ohio St.2d 235, 237 [43 O.O. 2d 366]; State, ex rel. Foster, v. Bd. of Cty. Commrs. (1968), 16 Ohio St.2d 89, 90 [45 O.O. 2d 442]; State, ex rel. Johnston, v. Taulbee (1981), 66 Ohio St.2d 417, 422 [20 O.O. 3d 361]; State, ex rel. Durkin, v. Youngstown City Council (1984), 9 Ohio St.3d 132, 134; Arbaugh, supra [(1984), 14 Ohio St.3d 5], at 6. The burden of proof is clearly upon the party who opposes the allocation of funds. State, ex rel. Musser, v. Massillon (1984), 12 Ohio St.3d 42; Rofkar, supra, at 72."
By giving a common pleas court broad, but not unfettered, discretion to act in making its budget, the "reasonableness and necessity" test seeks to maintain the respective sovereignty of each branch of government when a budget conflict arises. State, ex rel. Arbaugh, v. Richland Cty. Bd. of Commrs. (1984), 14 Ohio St.3d 5, 6, 14 OBR 311, 312, 470 N.E.2d 880, 881. It necessarily entails a determination as to whether the court of common pleas abused its discretion in requesting budgetary amounts. Britt, supra, at 3, 18 OBR at 2, 480 N.E.2d at 79. In Britt, we recognized that this standard is difficult to apply in many instances. Id.
A board of county commissioners must be given ample opportunity to show that a common pleas court abused its discretion in making an appropriation request. All relevant evidence should be considered, even if its relevance is only marginal. Permitting the admission of such evidence increases a board's chances of carrying its burden of proof, but does not impede the preservation of judicial autonomy. It thus prevents the constitutionally mandated balance of power between the governmental branches from being tipped too far in favor of the judiciary.
Here, the board's excluded expert evidence generally suggested that the Lake County domestic relations court used allocated funds less efficiently than two other Ohio courts. While the weight of this evidence is debatable, the evidence may increase the probability that Judge Avellone could make better use of the appropriations that the board has already given him. If true, this fact could affect the reasonableness and necessity of an appropriation request. Therefore, the board's expert evidence was relevant under Evid. R. 401.
A final judgment may not be disturbed due to the exclusion of evidence unless a substantial right of a party is affected. Civ. R. 61. See, also, generally, Leichtamer v. American Motors Corp. (1981), 67 Ohio St.2d 456, 473-475, 21 O.O. 3d 285, 296-297, 424 N.E.2d 568, 580-581. Because all relevant probative evidence should be admitted, the court of appeals' evidentiary ruling affected a substantial right in that it unduly restricted the board's efforts to sustain its burden of proof. Allowing this ruling to stand would be inconsistent with both substantial justice, Civ. R. 61, and with maintaining the tripartite balance of power. Therefore, we are compelled to reverse the court of appeals' decision and to remand the cause for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
As for the remaining issues at bar, we have no reason to find that the court of appeals' exclusion of the budget director's testimony was error. If this testimony had any relevance below, it was only in connection with the appropriation request for computerizing the bureau of support. The court of appeals' order did not require the board to make this appropriation and that finding is not the subject of this appeal.
Likewise, we have no reason to find that the court of appeals erred by not including in its order a $28,000 appropriation for computerizing the domestic relations court. The appellate court's hearing and its decision were based on Judge Avellone's complaint seeking $55,000 to computerize the domestic relations court. The court of appeals correctly found that a $55,000 appropriation request had not been made in the domestic relations court's original budget request form. This finding may not be circumvented by the assertion of a revised $28,000 request for the first time on appeal.
Based on the foregoing, the court of appeals' decision is affirmed in part and reversed in part. The cause is remanded for the admission of the board's expert evidence and for further proceedings that are consistent with our opinion.
Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part and cause remanded.
MOYER, C.J., SWEENEY, HOLMES, WRIGHT and H. BROWN, JJ., concur.
DOUGLAS, J., concurs in judgment only.
RESNICK, J., dissents in part.
I would affirm the court of appeals' decision in its entirety.
Broad discretion is placed in a court in the admission and exclusion of evidence. See Calderon v. Sharkey (1982), 70 Ohio St.2d 218, 24 O.O. 3d 322, 436 N.E.2d 1008.
In the instant case the relevancy of expert testimony as to the issue of whether the Lake County domestic relations court was operating as efficiently as the Cuyahoga County and Trumbull County domestic relations courts was a question to be resolved by the appellate court. It can hardly be said that by excluding this testimony the court of appeals acted in an arbitrary, unreasonable or unconscionable manner. I would find no abuse of discretion and therefore would affirm the judgment of the court of appeals in its entirety.