State ex Rel. A.R. v. C.R

20 Citing cases

  1. State ex rel A.C.C. v. State

    2000 UT App. 120 (Utah Ct. App. 2000)

    The applicability of the exclusionary rule to juvenile court proceedings and whether juvenile probationers have a reasonable expectation of privacy present questions of law which we review for correctness. See In re A.R., 1999 UT 43, ¶ 10, 982 P.2d 73; State v. Jarman, 1999 UT App 269, ¶ 4, 987 P.2d 1284. A trial court's factual findings underlying its decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard, and its legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness.

  2. D.T.O. v. State

    337 P.3d 1039 (Utah Ct. App. 2014)   Cited 1 times

    Father also claims that the second search warrant was untimely executed. Because we determine that the exclusionary rule simply does not apply in the child welfare context, see infra ¶ 15, “it is unnecessary to consider in this case whether the searches by police officers were unreasonable,” see In re A.R., 1999 UT 43, ¶ 23, 982 P.2d 73.¶ 4 In addition to physical evidence, the teenage friends testified that Father fondled their breasts, took nude pictures of them, asked them to text him sexually explicit images and videos, and showed them sexually explicit images of their friends that he kept on his phone.

  3. State ex Rel. J.M.S

    2010 UT App. 326 (Utah Ct. App. 2010)   Cited 1 times

    We note that it would have been improper for the juvenile court to order the removal of the Children merely as a "sanction" against Father for his failure to comply with the court's orders. Cf. In re A.R., 1999 UT 43, If 18, 982 P.2d 73 ("Although parents may suffer a severe detriment in losing temporary or permanent custody of their children, punishment of the parents is not the purpose of the proceeding. A child is never removed from a home as a `punishment' to the parent.").

  4. State v. Rentz

    2006 UT App. 365 (Utah Ct. App. 2006)

    Consistent with the Court's reasoning, we observe that "[t]here appears to be little likelihood that any substantial deterrent effect on unlawful police intrusion would be achieved by applying the exclusionary rule to [probationary] proceedings." In re A.R., 1999 UT 43, ¶ 21, 982 P.2d 73. Hence, we may not apply the exclusionary rule to the case at hand. Furthermore, the Utah Supreme Court reached the same conclusion in a different context.

  5. State v. Hansen

    2002 UT 125 (Utah 2002)   Cited 99 times
    Recognizing three levels of encounters between police and the public and stating that a level two detention requires the officer to have “ ‘specific and articulable facts and rational inferences ... give rise to a reasonable suspicion a person has [committed] or is committing a crime’ ” (quoting United States v. Werking, 915 F.2d 1404, 1407 (10th Cir.1990))

    ¶ 62 Evidence obtained by police exploitation of a prior illegality is tainted by the violation of a person's constitutional rights. See State ex rel. A.R. v. C.R., 1999 UT 43, ¶ 15, 982 P.2d 73 (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961)). When conducting an exploitation analysis, a court "evaluates the relationship between official misconduct and subsequently discovered evidence to determine if excluding the evidence will effectively deter future illegalities."

  6. Beller v. Rolfe

    194 P.3d 949 (Utah 2008)   Cited 11 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding exclusionary rule does not apply to administrative license suspension proceeding

    Id. at 14-15. On the other end, we find State ex rel. AR. v. C.R. (In re A.R.), 1999 UT 43, 982 P.2d 73 (1999). There, we concluded that the exclusionary rule did not apply because the child protection proceedings at issue were primarily intended to protect the interests of children and were not predominately criminal in nature.

  7. In re R.R.

    2021 Ohio 2369 (Ohio Ct. App. 2021)

    State of N.M. ex rel. CYFD v. Michael T., 143 N.M. 75, 2007-NMCA-163, 172 P.3d 1287 (purpose of the exclusionary rule is not served in abuse and neglect proceeding whose focus is the health and safety of innocent children); People ex rel. A.E.L., 181 P.3d 1186 (Colo. 2008) (societal costs of applying exclusionary rule would exceed any deterrent effect exclusion would have on the department or the police in investigating a child welfare issue); State ex rel. A.R. v. C.R., 1999 UT 43, 982 P.2d 73 (Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule is inapplicable to child protection proceedings); Idaho Dept. of Health & Welfare v. Doe, 150 Idaho 103, 113, 244 P.3d 247, 257 (interests at stake in child protective proceedings are not the same as liberty interest at stake in criminal prosecutions, and purpose of the exclusionary rule is not served in abuse and neglect proceedings); Matter of Diane P., 110 A.D.2d 354, 356, 494 N.Y.S.2d 881, 884 (1985) (exclusionary rule should not be utilized in a child protective proceeding); In re Corey P., 269 Neb. 925, 935, 697 N.W.2d 647, 655 (Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule is inapplicable in child protection proceedings); State ex rel. Dept. of Human Services v.W.L.P., 345 Or. 657, 669, 202 P.3d 167 (exclusionary rule does not apply in juvenile dependency proceedings). {¶15} We agree with the reasoning of the Utah Supreme Court, which held as follows in concluding the exclusionary rule should not apply in child protection proceed

  8. C.A. v. State (In re J.A.)

    2018 UT App. 29 (Utah Ct. App. 2018)   Cited 5 times   1 Legal Analyses

    See, e.g. , In re L.P. , 1999 UT App 157, ¶ 6, 981 P.2d 848 ("It is incumbent upon the juvenile court to apply the proper definition from the appropriate statute.... [W]e are not reviewing a criminal case and therefore criminal statutes are inapplicable.... Here, we are reviewing a juvenile court proceeding held to determine whether that court may assert jurisdiction over [the child], and the concept of varying definitions for varying purposes is not foreign to our jurisprudence." (citation omitted) ); In re A.R. , 1999 UT 43, ¶¶ 18–20, 982 P.2d 73 (rejecting the petitioner’s argument that a child protection proceeding was "quasi-criminal in nature," observing that "[t]he primary focus of and sole statutory justification for child protection proceedings is to protect the interests of children who are neglected or abused," and concluding that "the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule is inapplicable to child protection proceedings" given the "purpose of the exclusionary rule, as well as the State’s interest in protecting children"); Ibarra v. Holder , 736 F.3d 903, 905 (10th Cir. 2013) ("The purpose of civil definitions is to determine when social services may intervene. The purpose of criminal definitions is to determine when an abuser is criminally culpable.").

  9. C.A. v. State (In re J.A.)

    2017 UT App. 227 (Utah Ct. App. 2017)

    Here, we are reviewing a juvenile court proceeding held to determine whether that court may assert jurisdiction over [the child], and the concept of varying definitions for varying purposes is not foreign to our jurisprudence." (citation omitted)); In re A.R., 1999 UT 43, ¶¶ 18-20, 982 P.2d 73 (rejecting the petitioner's argument that a child protection proceeding was "quasi-criminal in nature," observing that "[t]he primary focus of and sole statutory justification for child protection proceedings is to protect the interests of children who are neglected or abused," and concluding that "the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule is inapplicable to child protection proceedings" given the "purpose of the exclusionary rule, as well as the State's interest in protecting children"); Ibarra v. Holder, 736 F.3d 903, 905 (10th Cir. 2013) ("The purpose of civil definitions is to determine when social services may intervene. The purpose of criminal definitions is to determine when an abuser is criminally culpable.").

  10. In re A.E.L

    181 P.3d 1186 (Colo. App. 2008)   Cited 13 times
    Holding that the exclusionary rule was not applicable to child protection proceedings where the societal costs of applying the rule would exceed any deterrent effect that exclusion would have on the department or the police in investigating a child welfare issue

    (concluding the potential harm to children in remaining in an unhealthy environment outweighs any deterrent effect that would result from suppressing evidence); In re Corey P., 269 Neb. 925, 697 N.W.2d 647, 655 (2005) (any possible benefits of the exclusionary rule do not justify the costly result in a juvenile proceeding of a possible erroneous conclusion that there has been no abuse or neglect, leaving innocent children in unhealthy or compromising circumstances); State ex ret. Children, Youth Families Dep't v. Michael T., 143 N.M. 75, 172 P.3d 1287, 1290 (Ct.App. 2007) (because the nature of an abuse and neglect proceeding is to protect the interests and well-being of the children, the purposes of the exclusionary rule would not be advanced if the evidence is suppressed); In re Diane P., 110 A.D.2d 354, 494 N.Y.S.2d 881, 884 (1985) (concluding state's interest in protecting and promoting the best interests and safety of children far outweighs the rule's deterrent value); State in Interest of A.R. v. C.R., 982 P.2d 73, 78-79 (Utah 1999) (rejecting argument that child protection proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature and concluding that deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule is far outweighed by the need to provide for the safety and health of children in peril); Marjorie A. Shields, Annotation, Admissibility, in Civil Proceeding, of Evidence Obtained Through Unlawful Search and Seizure, 105 A.L.R.5th 1 (2003) (collecting state cases). Further, in an employment context, the Colorado Supreme Court set forth a balancing test for applying the exclusionary rule in civil cases.