No court has found that prisoners have a constitutional right to possess personal computers, or items that are similar to personal computers, in their cells. See Endsley v. Luna, 2008 WL 3890382 at *3 (C.D.Cal. May 23, 2008) (unpub.) (citing Sands v. Lewis, 886 F.2d 1166, 1172 (9th Cir.1989) (prisoners do not have a constitutional right to have memory typewriters in cells), overruled on other grounds by Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 350-55 (1996); Taylor v. Coughlin, 29 F.3d 39, 40 (2nd Cir.1994) ("If prison inmates do not enjoy a constitutional right to typewriters as implements of access to the courts, it would be illogical for us to rule that there is a constitutional right to typewriters of a specific memory capacity."); State ex rel. Anstey v. Davis, 203 W.Va. 538, 545, 509 S.E.2d 579 (1998) ("We are persuaded by the uniformity of opinion on this issue and therefore hold that prison inmates have no constitutional right to possess personal computers in their cells."); Endsley v. Luna, 2009 WL 3806266 (C.D.Cal. Nov.12, 2009) (unpub.) at * 16 (citing Fogle v. Blake, 227 Fed. Appx. 542, 542 (8th Cir.2007) (finding civil committee failed to state a constitutional claim regarding denial of a computer or typewriter); Spicer v. Richards, 2008 WL 3540182 at *7 (W.D.Wash. Aug.11, 2008) (unpub.) (finding no authority to show that SVP had a 14th Amendment right to possess a "cell phone, pager, computer, [or] color ink cartridge printer.");

We have previously found that, in order to state a retaliation claim against prison officials, a prisoner must set forth his allegations "with specificity." State ex rel. Anstey v. Davis, 203 W.Va. 538, 550, 509 S.E.2d 579, 591 (1998). Preliminarily, petitioner contends that the five specific claims that the circuit court identified do not comprise the entirety of his complaint against MOCC officials.

We note that a heightened pleading standard applies when an inmate alleges that prison officials have retaliated against him for exercising his fundamental rights. See State ex rel. Anstey v. Davis, 203 W.Va. 538, 550, 509 S.E.2d 579, 591 (1998). On appeal, the parties dispute whether the circuit court dismissed the action for a failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. Based on his contention that the doctrine of qualified immunity was the only reason for the circuit court's dismissal, petitioner argues that qualified immunity does not bar his claims for declaratory and injunctive relief. However, in the circuit court, petitioner replied to respondent's argument that his allegations were conclusory. Therefore, because a dismissal for a failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted disposes of all of petitioner's claims, we affirm the circuit court's dismissal on that ground—for reasons discussed infra—and do not address the qualified immunity issue.

To have a property interest in a benefit, a person must have "a legitimate claim of entitlement to it" under federal or state law, which means having more than just an abstract need or desire for it, or a unilateral expectation of it. Id. at 577; see also Syl. pt. 6, State ex rel. Anstey v. Davis, 509 S.E.2d 579, 582 (W. Va. 1998). Property interests are not created by the Constitution, but "[r]ather they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law."

An inmate, moreover, does not have a recognizable property interest in an item, which prison policy and procedure do not allow him to have. See Wenzler v. Warden of G.R.C.C., 94[9] F. Supp. 399 (E.D. Va. 1996); State ex rel. Anstey v. Davis, 203 W. Va. 538, 509 S.E.2d 57[9] (1998). (ECF No. 28 at 9).

No court has found that prisoners have a constitutional right to possess personal computers or items that are similar to personal computers which are capable of accessing the internet in their cells. See Endsley v. Luna, 2008 WL 3890382 at *3 (C.D.Cal. May 23, 2008) (unpub.) (citing Sands v. Lewis, 886 F.2d 1166, 1172 (9th Cir.1989) (prisoners do not have a constitutional right to have memory typewriters in cells), overruled on other grounds by Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 350-55 (1996); Taylor v. Coughlin, 29 F.3d 39, 40 (2nd Cir.1994) ("If prison inmates do not enjoy a constitutional right to typewriters as implements of access to the courts, it would be illogical for us to rule that there is a constitutional right to typewriters of a specific memory capacity."); State ex rel. Anstey v. Davis, 203 W.Va. 538, 545, 509 S.E.2d 579 (1998) ("We are persuaded by the uniformity of opinion on this issue and therefore hold that prison inmates have no constitutional right to possess personal computers in their cells.")).

(listing the following cases for the same proposition: see Endsley v. Luna, 2008 WL 3890382 at *3 (C.D.Cal. May 23, 2008) (unpub.) (citing Sands v. Lewis, 886 F.2d 1166, 1172 (9th Cir.1989)) (prisoners do not have a constitutional right to have memory typewriters in cells), overruled on other grounds by Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 350-55 (1996); Taylor v. Coughlin, 29 F.3d 39, 40 (2nd Cir.1994) ("If prison inmates do not enjoy a constitutional right to typewriters as implements of access to the courts, it would be illogical for us to rule that there is a constitutional right to typewriters of a specific memory capacity."); State ex rel. Anstey v. Davis, 203 W.Va. 538, 545, 509 S.E.2d 579 (1998) ("We are persuaded by the uniformity of opinion on this issue and therefore hold that prison inmates have no constitutional right to possess personal computers in their cells."); Endsley v. Luna, 2009 WL 3806266 (C.D.Cal. Nov.12, 2009) (unpub.)

No court has found that prisoners have a constitutional right to possess personal computers, or items that are similar to personal computers, in their cells. See Endsley v. Luna, 2008 WL 3890382 at *3 (C.D. Cal. May 23, 2008) (unpub.) (citing Sands v. Lewis, 886 F.2d 1166, 1172 (9th Cir. 1989) (prisoners do not have a constitutional right to have memory typewriters in cells), overruled on other grounds by Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 350-55 (1996); Taylor v. Coughlin, 29 F.3d 39, 40 (2nd Cir. 1994) ("If prison inmates do not enjoy a constitutional right to typewriters as implements of access to the courts, it would be illogical for us to rule that there is a constitutional right to typewriters of a specific memory capacity."); State ex rel. Anstey v. Davis, 203 W.Va. 538, 545, 509 S.E.2d 579 (1998) ("We are persuaded by the uniformity of opinion on this issue and therefore hold that prison inmates have no constitutional right to possess personal computers in their cells.")). More recent cases involving civil committees, pretrial detainees and SVPs have concluded the same-despite application of the heightened 14th Amendment protection required for those not currently serving criminal sentences.

A prisoner within the DCR's custody may file a habeas petition to "challenge[ ] . . . the constitutionality of prison . . . conditions[.]" State ex rel. Anstey v. Davis, 203 W. Va. 538, 544, 509 S.E.2d 579, 585 (1998). On appeal, petitioner argues that his Hepatitis C is not being treated with antiviral drugs because of the cost of those drugs.

On appeal, petitioner argues that the circuit court's dismissal was improper because a habeas proceeding is also available to challenge the constitutionality of prison conditions. See State ex rel. Anstey v. Davis, 203 W. Va. 538, 544, 509 S.E.2d 579, 585 (1998). Respondent counters that the circuit court properly dismissed the habeas petition.