Rather, this language appears to have been pulled from Tennessee Court of Appeals decisions cited in Mr. Munson's briefing, which discuss only Tennessee common law claims for false arrest and false imprisonment. State ex. Rel. Anderson v. Evatt, 471 S.W.2d 949, 950 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1971); Woods v. Harell, 596 S.W.2d 92 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979). These cases - like the other cases cited by Mr. Munson on this issue - do not refer at all to § 40-7-101.

rson.See Rodriguez v. United States, 54 F.3d 41 (1st Cir. 1995); Schneider v. Kessler, 97 F.2d 542 (3rd Cir. 1938); King v. Robertson, 227 Ala. 378, 150 So. 154 (1933); Montgomery v. City of Montgomery, 732 So.2d 305 (Ala.Civ.App. 1999); Boies v. Raynor, 89 Ariz. 257, 361 P.2d 1 (1961); Walton v. Will, 66 Cal.App.2d 509, 152 P.2d 639, 641 (1944); Stewart v. Williams, 243 Ga. 580, 255 S.E.2d 699 (1979); Rodriguez v. Kraus, 275 Ga.App. 118, 619 S.E.2d 800 (2005); Blocker v. Clark, 126 Ga. 484, 54 S.E. 1022 (1906); Smith v. Sheriff of Cook County, 277 Ill.App.3d 335, 214 Ill.Dec. 20, 660 N.E.2d 211 (1995); Barnes v. Wilson, 450 N.E.2d 1030, 1033 (Ind.App. 1983); O'Neill v. Keeling, 227 Iowa 754, 288 N.W. 887, 889-890 (1939); Filer v. Smith, 96 Mich. 347, 55 N.W. 999 (1893); Boose v. City of Rochester, 71 A.D.2d 59, 421 N.Y.S.2d 740 (1979); Robinson v. City of Winston-Salem, 34 N.C.App. 401, 238 S.E.2d 628, 631 (1977); Golden v. City of Cleveland, 51 Ohio App.3d 39, 554 N.E.2d 148 (1989); State ex rel. Anderson v. Evatt, 63 Tenn.App. 322, 471 S.W.2d 949, 950-51 (1971); Mildon v. Bybee, 13 Utah 2d 400, 375 P.2d 458 (1962); Stalter v. Washington, 151 Wash.2d 148, 86 P.3d 1159 (2004); White v. Jansen, 81 Wash. 435, 142 P. 1140 (1914); Wallner v. Fidelity Deposit Co., 253 Wis. 66, 33 N.W.2d 215 (1948). For the contrary view, see Wolf v. Perryman, 82 Tex. 112, 17 S.W. 772 (1891) and Clark v. Heard, 538 F.Supp. 800 (S.D.Tex. 1982) (holding that, under Texas law, the protection ordinarily allowed an officer who proceeds under a facially valid warrant does not apply to the arrest and detention of the wrong person and that such an arrest, even under a duly issued warrant, amounts to false imprisonment); Jordan v. C.I.T. Corporation, 302 Mass. 281, 19 N.E.2d 5 (1939).

As there is no dispute that she was arrested and jailed, the court did not err when it held that the County was immune from suit. Ms. Luna cites State ex rel. Anderson v. Evatt, 471 S.W.2d 949, 950 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1971) as establishing that an officer has a duty to act "prudently, reasonably, and [to] use ordinary care in making arrest, including the ascertainment that the right person is being arrested." She cites Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-7-101 for the same proposition, although that statute only identifies the persons who are privileged to make an arrest, not how the arrest should be conducted.

See Miller v. Fano, 134 Cal. 103, 109, 66 P. 183, 185 (1901) (noting an officer “owes a duty to the public and to the party about to be arrested ” and “should use prudence and diligence to find out if the party arrested is the party described in [the] warrant” (emphasis added)), disapproved of by Hagberg v. California Fed. Bank FSB, 32 Cal.4th 350, 7 Cal.Rptr.3d 803, 81 P.3d 244 (2004); Wallner v. Fid. & Deposit Co. of Maryland, 253 Wis. 66, 70, 33 N.W.2d 215, 217 (1948) (“The officer is liable if he fails to take proper precaution to ascertain the right person, or if he refuses information offered that would have disclosed his mistake, or if he detains the person an undue length of time without taking proper steps to establish his identity.”); State ex rel. Anderson v. Evatt, 63 Tenn.App. 322, 328, 471 S.W.2d 949, 952 (1971) (finding evidence sufficient to support jury's finding officers guilty of “gross negligence in failing to make an additional investigation or inquiry as to the true identity of plaintiff before placing him under arrest ” (emphasis added)). In concluding that issues of fact precluded summary judgment regarding whether the defendant police officers had exercised due care in arresting the plaintiff, the Court specifically pointed to evidence—including contradictions in the defendants' evidence and omissions on key factors in the defendants' affidavits—regarding the lack of efforts to determine whether the plaintiff was the individual named in the warrant prior to arresting the plaintiff.

However, the instructions do not specifically charge the officers' duty under the plaintiff's theory of the case; see Rule, supra. On the issue of mistaken identity, our most recently reported case, State ex rel. Anderson v. Evatt, 63 Tenn. App. 322, 471 S.W.2d 949 (1971), states (pages 324 and 950): While there is authority in other states to support appellants' insistence, we think the better principles and greater weight of authority is, as the trial court charged the jury, that an officer must act prudently, reasonably and use ordinary care in making arrests, including the ascertainment that the right person is being arrested.

If there is any material evidence to support the verdict, it must be affirmed. State ex rel. Anderson v. Evatt, 63 Tenn. App. 322, 325, 471 S.W.2d 949, 951 (1971) (citations omitted). Plaintiffs admit that for them to be entitled to punitive damages, they must prove actionable fraudulent misrepresentation by defendant.

Accordingly, we adopt the rule, which appears to be the one followed by the majority of jurisdictions that have considered the matter, and hold that liability for false imprisonment will be imposed only when the arresting officer has failed to use reasonable diligence to determine that the party arrested was actually the person described in the warrant. For examples of cases following this rule, see Miller v. Fano, 134 Cal. 103, 66 P. 183 (1901); Wallner v. Fidelity Deposit Co., 253 Wis. 66, 33 N.W.2d 215 (1948); State ex rel. Anderson v. Evatt, 63 Tenn. App. 322, 471 S.W.2d 949 (1971). Under the rule which we adopt, the good faith of the arresting officer, in the sense of absence of malice, does not by itself relieve the officer from liability for compensatory damages.