Summary
finding that Oregon imposes no statutory time bar to a paternity action except in the context of probate proceedings
Summary of this case from Smith v. DoeOpinion
1122-F-1; CA A26534
Argued and submitted December 8, 1983 Reversed and remanded with instructions July 25, 1984 Reconsideration denied September 28, 1984
Petition for review denied November 27, 1984
Appeal from Circuit Court, Jackson County.
L. A. Merryman, Judge.
Jan Peter Londahl, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief were Dave Frohnmayer, Attorney General, and William F. Gary, Solicitor General, Salem.
William A. Mansfield, Medford, argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent Keusink.
No appearance for respondent Terry Stanley.
Before Buttler, Presiding Judge, and Warren and Rossman, Judges.
PER CURIAM
Reversed and remanded to trial court for proceedings on merits of paternity claim.
The sole issue raised on this appeal is whether respondent Keusink, the putative father, was denied his right to justice without delay under Article I, section 10, of the Oregon Constitution, because the state failed to file a paternity suit against him until seven and one-half years after the birth of the child which is alleged to be his. In the light of the Supreme Court's holding in State ex rel Adult Fam. Ser. v. Bradley, 295 Or. 216, 666 P.2d 249 (1983), it is clear that there can be no constitutional or statutory time bar to a filiation proceeding.
The only apparent exceptions concern the declaration of heirship, which must be commenced within ten years of a father's death, ORS 111.095(2), 28.040, 12.140, and the establishment of paternity for purposes of intestate succession, which must be done during the lifetime of the child. ORS 112.105. See State ex rel Adult Fam. Ser. v. Bradley, supra, 295 Or at 222 n 11.
Reversed and remanded to the trial court for proceedings on the merits of the paternity claim.