Opinion
21AP-587
01-17-2023
State ex rel. Samantha A. Adams et al., Relators, v. Industrial Commission of Ohio et al., Respondents.
Nager, Romaine & Schneiberg Co. L.PA., Jerald A. Schneiberg, and Austin J. Enger, for relators. Dave Yost, Attorney General, and Denise A. Gary, for respondent Industrial Commission of Ohio.
IN MANDAMUS
On brief:
Nager, Romaine & Schneiberg Co. L.PA., Jerald A. Schneiberg, and Austin J. Enger, for relators.
On brief:
Dave Yost, Attorney General, and Denise A. Gary, for respondent Industrial Commission of Ohio.
DECISION
BEATTY BLUNT, P.J.
{¶ 1} Relators, Samantha A. Adams (individually "Samantha Adams"), Daniel Adams, Arianna Adams (sometimes spelled "Airianna" in the record), Michael Adams (referred to as "Micah" in the record), and Gregory Adams, have filed this original action requesting that this court issue a writ of mandamus ordering respondent Industrial Commission of Ohio (the "commission") to vacate its order finding that Samantha Adams was ineligible for death benefits as being a dependent of John G. Adams (the "decedent"), and issue an order finding that Samantha Adams is decedent's dependent.
{¶ 2} Pursuant to Civ.R. 53 and Loc.R. 13(M) of the Tenth District Court of Appeals, this matter was referred to a magistrate. The magistrate considered the action on its merits and issued a decision, including findings of fact and conclusions of law, which is appended hereto. The magistrate concluded that the commission did not abuse its discretion when it found that Samantha Adams was not a dependent-in-fact pursuant to R.C. 4123.59, and Samantha Adams had failed to meet her burden of showing she was entitled to the writ requested. Accordingly, the magistrate recommended this court deny Samantha Adams' request for a writ of mandamus.
{¶ 3} No objections have been filed to the magistrate's decision.
{¶ 4} Upon review, we have found no error in the magistrate's findings of fact or conclusions of law. However, we modify the magistrate's decision in one respect. In the first paragraph of his decision, the magistrate incorrectly indicates relators "have filed this original action requesting that this court issue a writ of mandamus ordering respondent Industrial Commission of Ohio * * * to vacate its order finding that Samantha was eligible for death benefits[.]". (Emphasis added.) We modify the word "eligible" to read "ineligible" to correct this misstatement.
{¶ 5} Therefore, we adopt the magistrate's decision as our own as modified above, including the findings of fact and the conclusions of law therein, and conclude that Samantha Adams failed to demonstrate she was entitled to a writ of mandamus. In accordance with the magistrate's decision, the requested writ of mandamus is denied.
Writ of mandamus denied.
DORRIAN and MENTEL, JJ., concur.
APPENDIX
MAGISTRATE'S DECISION
THOMAS W. SCHOLL III MAGISTRATE
{¶ 5} Relators Samantha A. Adams (individually "Samantha"), Daniel Adams, Arianna Adams (sometimes spelled "Airianna" in the record), Michael Adams (referred to as "Micah" in the record), and Gregory Adams have filed this original action requesting that this court issue a writ of mandamus ordering respondent Industrial Commission of Ohio ("commission") to vacate its order finding that Samantha was eligible for death benefits as being a dependent of John G. Adams ("decedent"), and issue an order finding that Samantha is a dependent of decedent.
Findings of Fact:
{¶ 6} 1. On November 11, 2015, decedent, while in the course of and arising from his employment with respondent U.S. Well Services, LLC ("the employer") was injured in a motor vehicle accident. Decedent passed away due to his injuries on November 14, 2015.
{¶ 7} 2. Samantha is decedent's adult daughter, born on October 24, 1983. She has three minor children: Arianna, Michael, and Gregory. From the record, Daniel Adams appears to be decedent's brother but is not otherwise mentioned in any of the pleadings filed in this matter.
{¶ 8} 3. In 2015, Samantha lived with her significant other, Michael S. Rickerd. In his original 2015 tax return, Rickerd indicated he was head of the household with four dependents, claiming personal exemptions for Samantha and her children. In an amended 2015 tax return, he changed his status to single, with Samantha and her children listed as dependents. The 2015 tax return shows Rickerd had an adjusted gross income of $12,616. Rickerd was also receiving Social Security Disability Income for a learning disability intermittently through 2015.
{¶ 9} 4. In early 2015, Rickerd, Samantha, and her three children lived rent-free for two months at the house belonging to Rickerd's parents. Thereafter, the five rented a house, paying rent of $350 per month. They were evicted in August 2015 due to nonpayment of rent, among other reasons.
{¶ 10} 5. Samantha, Rickerd, and the three children then lived in a car for three days, until Samantha contacted decedent and told him their housing situation. Decedent offered to let the five move into his house until they were able to figure out what they were going to do and got back on their feet. In August 2015, Rickerd, Samantha, and the three children moved into decedent's house. Samantha testified that while she lived with decedent, decedent paid all of her expenses (electric, gas, groceries), did not require her to pay rent, did not place a limit on how long they could live with him, and said he would take care of her. Affidavits from DeWayne Siebert, Samantha's best friend, averred that decedent paid for rent, utilities, and food, and Samantha was welcome to live with decedent as long as needed. Alice Siebert, DeWayne Siebert's mother, averred that decedent was Samantha's primary source of support, and there was no time limit imposed for Samantha to live with decedent. Samantha testified that she and Rickerd provided school lunches for the children until they qualified for free lunches. Samantha's children enrolled in school in the school district in which decedent's house was located, and Samantha changed the address on her driver's license to decedent's address. The school-enrollment paperwork indicated that Rickerd was employed. Several days after decedent died, the five were forced to move from decedent's home because he had been renting it. Samantha testified that if decedent had not died, she would have continued living with him. Although Samantha had been receiving government subsidies prior to moving in with decedent, she did not reapply for such subsidies while living with decedent.
{¶ 11} 6. As a child, Samantha and her siblings had lived with her mother until she was around eight years old, when the state removed them from her custody and placed them in foster care. Decedent was granted custody of the children on and off from the time she was 9 years old to 11 years old, but the state eventually permanently removed them from his custody, and they became wards of the state. An order was put in place allowing decedent to have no contact with his children until the youngest child turned 18 years old.
{¶ 12} 7. In the present case, a workers' compensation claim was filed, and the Ohio Bureau of Workers' Compensation ("BWC") granted a death claim for payment of medical bills only by order mailed June 28, 2016. No appeal was filed.
{¶ 13} 8. On December 13, 2016, decedent's estate filed a C-86 motion requesting a scheduled-loss award for the loss of use of decedent's bilateral upper extremities and lower extremities, as well as the functional use of both eyes and ears. On March 29, 2017, the BWC granted the requested scheduled-loss award with regard to the upper and lower extremities and denied it with regard to the loss of both eyes and ears, with compensation to be paid November 11 through November 13, 2015. Both parties appealed.
{¶ 14} 9. On May 3, 2017, Samantha filed a C-5 application for death benefits and/or funeral expenses on behalf of herself and her three minor children. The matter was referred to the BWC for a determination of dependency.
{¶ 15} 10. On August 29, 2017, the BWC issued an order denying the claim for death benefits and found there was insufficient evidence to determine dependency. Samantha appealed.
{¶ 16} 11. A district hearing officer ("DHO") held a hearing on the loss-of-use claim and dependency. In a November 22, 2017, order, the DHO found the following, in pertinent part: (1) the BWC's August 29, 2017, order is vacated, as the BWC lacked jurisdiction over that issue because the June 28, 2016, order was a final order recognizing decedent's death as having been caused by a compensable work injury; (2) the March 29, 2017, BWC order is vacated to the extent that ongoing benefits for loss of use are payable beyond decedent's death to a surviving dependent; (3) Samantha was not decedent's dependent at the time of his death; (4) Samantha testified that decedent agreed that her family could stay in his home until they got on their feet; (5) the school enrollment paperwork indicates that Rickerd resided with decedent and was employed; (6) Samantha has submitted no evidence, such as tax returns or applications for government benefits, to establish her financial status; (7) Samantha testified that she and Rickerd contributed to the cost of food while living with decedent; (8) Samantha was a ward of the state from 8 to 18 years old; (9) unlike Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Morates, 120 Ohio App. 315 (7th Dist.1963), Samantha has not introduced any evidence to establish that she was being supported by decedent other than she resided with him for less than six months; (10) Samantha's testimony establishes that the arrangement was not intended to continue, but that it was to last until she got on her feet; (11) Samantha was receiving government subsidies until she changed counties; and (12) until three months prior to decedent's death she was not living with him and had not lived with him since she was 8 years old. Both parties appealed the order.
{¶ 17} 12. A hearing was held before a staff hearing officer ("SHO"), who affirmed the DHO's order, finding the following: (1) the March 29 and August 29, 2017, BWC orders are vacated, based upon the same reasoning given by the DHO; (2) Samantha was not decedent's dependent at the time of his death; (3) Samantha testified that her family could stay at his house until they got on their feet; (4) the school enrollment form for Samantha's children indicated that Rickerd was employed; (5) at the SHO hearing, Samantha testified that Rickerd was employed at the time of decedent's death and was receiving social security benefits due to a learning disability; (6) Rickerd did not have regular work hours; (7) although Rickerd did not earn significant income, he earned enough to warrant filing a federal income tax return; (8) Rickerd's initial 2015 federal tax return indicated that he was head of the household, had four dependents, and claimed personal exemptions for Samantha and the three children; (9) in Rickerd's amended 2015 federal tax return, he changed his status from head of household to single, although Samantha and her children were still listed as being dependents; (10) to claim a dependent for federal tax purposes, an individual must contribute more than 50 percent of the funds necessary for their support; (11) Samantha testified that she and Rickerd contributed to the cost of food while living with decedent; (12) at the SHO hearing, Samantha testified that she and Rickerd provided for the children's school lunches until they qualified for the free lunch program; (13) Samantha lived with decedent for two years, until she was 12 years old, at which time she was prevented from having contact with him under a court order; when the court order ended, she resumed contact with him and had a good relationship; (14) the present case is distinguishable from Wheeling, in that, in the present case, Samantha had only been living with decedent for three months, the arrangement was to continue until such time that she and Rickerd got back on their feet, and Samantha had been receiving public assistance until she moved in with decedent; (15) it is clear from the facts that Samantha's living arrangements were intended to be temporary, and no evidence has been offered indicating that Samantha was being supported by decedent at the time of his passing; and (16) Samantha was not dependent upon decedent for support at the time of his passing and, therefore, decedent had no dependents.
{¶ 18} 13. On November 11, 2021, relators filed a complaint for writ of mandamus, requesting this court issue a writ of mandamus ordering the commission to vacate its order finding that Samantha was not decedent's dependent at the time of his death, and issue an order finding that Samantha is decedent's dependent.
Conclusions of Law and Discussion:
{¶ 19} The magistrate recommends that this court deny relators' writ of mandamus.
{¶ 20} In order for this court to issue a writ of mandamus, a relator must ordinarily show a clear legal right to the relief sought, a clear legal duty on the part of the respondent to provide such relief, and the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. State ex rel. Pressley v. Indus. Comm., 11 Ohio St.2d 141 (1967). A clear legal right to a writ of mandamus exists where the relator shows that the commission abused its discretion by entering an order which is not supported by any evidence in the record. State ex rel. Elliott v. Indus. Comm., 26 Ohio St.3d 76 (1986). On the other hand, where the record contains some evidence to support the commission's findings, there has been no abuse of discretion and mandamus is not appropriate. State ex rel. Lewis v. Diamond Foundry Co., 29 Ohio St.3d 56 (1987). Furthermore, questions of credibility and the weight to be given evidence are clearly within the discretion of the commission as fact finder. State ex rel. Teece v. Indus. Comm., 68 Ohio St.2d 165 (1981).
{¶ 21} R.C. 4123.59 governs the commission's determination of a claimant's entitlement to death benefits. R.C. 4123.59(B) provides for death benefits payable to "wholly dependent persons at the time of the death," and R.C. 4123.59(C) provides for death benefits payable to "partly dependent persons at the time of the death."
R.C. 4123.59(D) provides:
The following persons are presumed to be wholly dependent for their support upon a deceased employee:
(1)A surviving spouse who was living with the employee at the time of death or a surviving spouse who was separated from the employee at the time of death because of the aggression of the employee;
(2) A child under the age of eighteen years, or twenty-five years if pursuing a full-time educational program while enrolled in an accredited educational institution and program, or over said age if physically or mentally incapacitated from earning, upon only the one parent who is contributing more than one-half of the support for such child and with whom the child is living at the time of the death of such parent, or for whose maintenance such parent was legally liable at the time of the parent's death.
* * *
In all other cases, the question of dependency, in whole or in part, shall be determined in accordance with the facts in each particular case existing at the time of the injury resulting in the death of such employee, but no person shall be considered as dependent unless such person is a member of the family of the deceased employee, or bears to the deceased employee the relation of surviving spouse, lineal descendant, ancestor, or brother or sister.
{¶ 22} Thus, it is within the discretion of the commission to determine whether a claimant is dependent upon the decedent at the time of death. State ex rel. Maglis v. Indus. Comm., 10th Dist. No. 15AP-648, 2016-Ohio-4644, ¶ 8. See also State ex rel. Tweed vs. Columbus Parcel Servs., Inc., 69 Ohio St.2d 331 (1982). Therefore, "once the commission has made a determination on whether a claimant is wholly or partially dependent, this finding can be disturbed only if '* * * that order constitutes an abuse of discretion * * *.'" Tweed at 333, citing State ex rel. City Iron Works, Inc. vs. Indus. Comm., 52 Ohio St.2d 1 (1977). Stated in other words," 'the degree of dependency is a question of fact to be determined by the Industrial Commission from the proof before it, and when it has assumed jurisdiction of a claim and has made a determination upon the evidence, such determination is final, unless a gross abuse of discretion is clearly indicated, or an unlawful procedure has been followed.'" Id., quoting State ex rel. Pivk v. Indus. Comm., 130 Ohio St. 208, 212 (1935).
{¶ 23} In the present matter, Samantha argues that the commission abused its discretion when it found she was not a dependent-in-fact pursuant to R.C. 4123.59. Samantha claims that the facts in Wheeling are similar to those in the present case, and that case supports her claim that she was an adult dependent of decedent. Samantha contends that "dependent" should be defined as relying on someone else for support with an intent to continue. She points to the following facts to claim she fits this definition: (1) she, Rickerd, and the children had a sporadic lifestyle in 2015; (2) she and Rickerd did not pay any rent during the two-month stay at the home of Rickerd's parents; (3) Rickerd earned only $12,616 in 2015, his work was sporadic and not dependable, and he collected social security income for a learning disability since he was a child; (4) due to limited funds, Samantha, Rickerd, and her family were evicted from their rental home in August 2015, and were homeless for three days; (5) decedent offered to allow them to stay in his house rent-free for as long as needed; (6) decedent paid for all food and utilities; (7) Samantha changed the address on her driver's license to reflect decedent's address, and she enrolled the children in decedent's local school district; (8) at the time of decedent's death, Samantha had no foreseeable plans to move from decedent's house; (9) Samantha testified that she could stay in decedent's house for as long as she wanted; (10) Alice Siebert averred that decedent did not impose a time limit for Samantha to stay at his home; (11) DeWayne Siebert averred that decedent paid for rent, utilities, and food, and Samantha was allowed to stay with decedent as long as needed; (12) Samantha had no means of support to leave decedent's care; and (13) currently, Samantha depends on government assistance, and she used the funds from decedent's life insurance benefits to pay for the house she currently lives in.
{¶ 24} In the present mandamus action, Samantha has difficult legal standards to meet. The commission is the ultimate factfinder and determines the weight to be accorded the evidence. Thus, in order to successfully contest the commission's factual determinations, Samantha must show the commission abused its discretion when it found she was not a dependent and that its finding was not supported by some evidence. Samantha has failed to overcome these significant hurdles in this mandamus action. Her argument rests entirely on challenging the weight the commission accorded the evidence. Above, the magistrate has recited the SHO's findings of fact in support of finding Samantha was not dependent upon decedent, and the magistrate finds that these factual findings were supported by the evidence in the record, as cited by the SHO. The magistrate will not endeavor to repeat every one of the SHO's factual findings, but, in summary, the SHO found that the evidence showed that decedent did not intend to provide housing and financial assistance to Samantha indefinitely but that is was a temporary arrangement; Samantha and Rickerd earned enough income through employment and government assistance programs to support their family; Samantha and Rickerd had been functioning without decedent's financial assistance up and until they moved in with decedent; Samantha had only lived with decedent for three months before his death; and Samantha had no contact with decedent through nearly half her childhood. Although there was also evidence that decedent provided some financial assistance to Samantha in the three months prior to his death, this evidence was counterweighed by the evidence above. In other words, the commission was tasked with weighing the evidence, and it found the weight of the evidence favored a finding that Samantha was not dependent upon decedent.
{¶ 25} As for the applicability of Wheeling, the magistrate agrees with the SHO that the circumstances in that case are easily distinguishable from the present circumstances. In Wheeling, the claimant, an adult daughter, attempted to prove factual dependency. She presented evidence that she was being supported by her father at the time of his injury and death, she was keeping house for him, she had no income of her own, and she and her father were both satisfied with this arrangement and intended for it to continue. The commission found that the claimant was entitled to participate in the fund as a person wholly dependent upon decedent at the time of his death, and the court of appeals agreed. The appellate court cited Webster's Dictionary as providing the following meanings for the word "dependent": (1) relying on or subject to someone else for support, and; (2) unable to exist or sustain oneself without support or aid. The court found that, under the first definition and the admitted facts, the claimant qualified as a dependent, but under the second definition, she did not. The court concluded that, because it was required to construe the workers' compensation statute liberally in favor of claimants, it must follow the first definition. The court also cited other states that have defined a dependent as being one who is sustained by another or who relies wholly or in part upon a workman for the reasonable necessities of life. The court further relied upon 2 Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law, 109, which found a type of adult-dependent case in which the claimant's abilities were not a resource reasonably available for independent self-support, such as the case of the adult daughter who stays home all her life and takes care of her father. In such a case, the daughter's ability to work is not an available source of independent income, since it is committed to the task of housekeeping for a parent, and case law uniformly permits a finding of dependency on such facts, even when the daughter has given up an income-producing job to take care of her father or mother.
{¶ 26} Although the magistrate first notes that Wheeling is a decision from the Seventh District Court of Appeals and is not binding upon this court, regardless, the facts in Wheeling are decidedly different than those here. Unlike Wheeling, in which the daughter was performing housekeeping chores for decedent, the daughter had no income of her own, and the daughter and her father were both satisfied with this arrangement and intended for it to continue, in the present case, there was no evidence that Samantha was maintaining decedent's house or providing care for him; there was evidence that she and Rickerd were managing, though somewhat struggling, to support their family on Rickerd's employment and social security income prior to moving in with decedent; and the evidence showed that decedent's intent was to help Samantha financially only as long as necessary until she got back on her feet. Although the court in Wheeling chose to use the Webster's Dictionary to define "dependent" as relying on or subject to someone else for support, even if this court were to accept this definition, several facts here militate against Samantha's falling squarely within this definition, such as that she and Rickerd were earning income through employment and social security, she and Rickerd had been living independently under the same financial conditions prior to moving in with decedent, Samantha had qualified for and had been receiving public assistance prior to moving in with decedent but had not reapplied for such after moving in with decedent, and she and Rickerd paid for some food and the children's school lunches while living with decedent. Thus, although the record shows that decedent may have been temporarily assisting Samantha financially for three months prior to his death, and Samantha was accepting such assistance, it does not appear that Samantha and Rickerd were incapable of supporting their family, as they had been doing until just a few months prior to decedent's death. For these reasons, the magistrate finds that there was some evidence to support the commission's decision that Samantha was not decedent's dependent, as that term is used in R.C. 4123.59, and the commission did not abuse its discretion when it found such.
{¶ 27} Accordingly, it is the magistrate's recommendation that this court should deny relators' complaint for writ of mandamus.
NOTICE TO THE PARTIES
Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(a)(iii) provides that a party shall not assign as error on appeal the court's adoption of any factual finding or legal conclusion, whether or not specifically designated as a finding of fact or conclusion of law under Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(a)(ii), unless the party timely and specifically objects to that factual finding or legal conclusion as required by Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b).