Opinion
C076447
01-09-2020
STATE DEPARTMENT OF STATE HOSPITALS, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN JOAQUIN COUNTY, Respondent; STACY LYNN PERKINS, Real Party in Interest.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. Nos. STKCRFE20130007981, SF125246A)
Respondent trial court found petitioner State Department of State Hospitals (the Department) guilty of contempt for disobeying the court's order to admit real party in interest Stacy Lynn Perkins, found by the court to be mentally incompetent to stand trial. Welfare and Institutions Code section 7200.06 at the time capped the number of Penal Code placements Napa State Hospital could accept at 980. The evidence was uncontradicted that Napa State Hospital was at the cap and had a waiting list.
Welfare and Institutions Code section 7200.06, subdivision (a), provided: "Of the 1,362 licensed beds at Napa State Hospital, at least 20 percent of these beds shall be available in any given fiscal year for use by counties for contracted services. Of the remaining beds, in no case shall the population of patients whose placement has been required pursuant to the Penal Code exceed 980." In 2016 the Legislature deleted the cap on Penal Code placements. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 7200.06, subd. (a), as amended by Stats. 2016, ch. 33, § 53.) Unless otherwise designated, all statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
The court's order was an injunction that prevented the executive director and admissions supervisor of Napa State Hospital from complying with section 7200.06. An order preventing public officials from executing a valid statute is in excess of the court's jurisdiction. (Code Civ. Proc., § 526, subd. (b)(4); Civ. Code, § 3423, subd. (d).) There is an exception to this rule for a statute found to be unconstitutional. The court did not find the statute unconstitutional when it ordered petitioner to admit Perkins and did not take this step until the contempt hearing months later.
Disobedience of an order in excess of the court's jurisdiction cannot produce a valid contempt judgment. The judgment of contempt is reversed and annulled.
BACKGROUND
The January 7, 2014 Order to Napa State Hospital to Admit Perkins
Perkins was charged with assault with a deadly weapon, elder abuse, criminal threats, cruelty to a child, and resisting a peace officer. The court appointed two doctors to evaluate Perkins' mental competence. Based on the doctors' evaluation, the trial court found Perkins not competent to stand trial.
On October 31, 2013, the court ordered Perkins committed to Napa State Hospital. The court ordered the county sheriff to deliver Perkins to Napa State Hospital and redeliver her to the court upon receiving a certificate from the hospital that she was restored to competence.
Perkins, however, remained in San Joaquin County Jail. On December 19, 2013, the trial court issued an order to show cause why the Napa State Hospital executive director and admissions supervisor should not be judged guilty of contempt for failure to comply with the trial court's order to admit Perkins.
The Department responded that Napa State Hospital was at "full capacity," "all beds are currently occupied," and the hospital "cannot receive and treat additional patients at this time." In addition, Napa State Hospital "is currently getting more orders to receive and treat patients than beds are being vacated - creating a waitlist."
On January 2, 2014, the court conducted a hearing on the order to show cause. Perkins' counsel argued that based on Perkins' commitment date of October 31, 2013, it would be 96 days later before the Department would accept her. Counsel for the Department confirmed that Napa State Hospital would admit Perkins on February 4, 2014.
We granted a motion to augment the record to include the transcript of the January 2, 2014 hearing. The transcript filed does not include any mention of section 7200.06. In its subsequent contempt order, however, the trial court referred to a colloquy at the hearing with counsel for the Department, in which counsel asserted that Perkins could not be accepted at Napa State Hospital, because, pursuant to section 7200.06, the hospital was at capacity for persons committed under the Penal Code. The court recounted that it had inquired whether counsel could provide any authority that section 7200.06 "was sufficient to deny Ms. Perkins . . . [her] constitutional rights," a question counsel answered in the negative. The contempt order stated that "[a]t the conclusion of the hearing, the court found Welfare and Institutions Code section 7200.06(a) to be insufficient to deny Ms. Perkins' rights; ordered Ms. Perkins transported to Napa State Hospital; and ordered Napa State Hospital to admit her." The exchange described in the contempt order and the court's conclusion do not appear in the transcript of the January 2, 2014 hearing filed with this court.
Observing that "Ms. Perkins is . . . way beyond the timeframe," the court stated that "January 29th is when the 90-day report is due. I'm [going to] order them to transport her tomorrow, the 3rd, to Napa State Hospital. I'm [going to] order Napa State Hospital to receive her at Napa State Hospital." The court set a further hearing for January 9 "to deal with any issues regarding sheriff's transportation. I'll call and let them know what orders I've made." The trial court did not state that it found section 7200.06 unconstitutional or that the court had found it unconstitutional as applied to Perkins.
On January 7, 2014, the trial court issued a written order to the sheriff to transport Perkins to Napa State Hospital on January 9, 2014, and release her into the custody of the hospital for treatment pursuant to Penal Code section 1370. At the same time, the court issued an order to Napa State Hospital, and the executive director and hospital administrator of the hospital to accept Perkins for admission on January 9, 2014. The order likewise did not state that section 7200.06 was unconstitutional or that the court had found it unconstitutional as applied to Perkins.
Penal Code section 1370, subdivision (a)(1)(B)(i), at the time provided in relevant part: "[T]he court shall order that the mentally incompetent defendant be delivered by the sheriff to a state hospital for the care and treatment of the mentally disordered, or to any other available public or private treatment facility, including a local county jail treatment facility, approved by the community program director that will promote the defendant's speedy restoration to mental competence . . . ." The Legislature subsequently revised Penal Code section 1370, subdivision (a)(1)(B)(i), several times, including in 2017 to delete the reference to "county jail treatment facility." (Penal Code, § 1370, subd. (a)(1)(B)(i), as amended by Stats. 2017, ch. 17, § 30.)
On January 9, 2014, a sheriff's deputy transported Perkins to Napa State Hospital, even though the hospital had already informed the sheriff's transportation supervisor that there was no bed available. The deputy took Perkins to the hospital nonetheless in the hope that there would be another bed available when they arrived; there was not. The deputy brought Perkins back to the county jail. Napa State Hospital admitted Perkins on January 16, 2014.
The Contempt Order
On January 31, 2014, the trial court noticed a hearing on an order to show cause why the court should not find the Napa State Hospital, and the executive director and hospital administrator of the hospital, guilty of contempt for willfully disobeying the court's January 7, 2014 order. In response, the Department asserted that it was unable to comply with the court's order because Napa State Hospital must adhere to occupancy limits or it would be in violation of section 7200.06. The Department argued that it was not able to comply with the court's order to admit Perkins by January 8, 2014, because its "population is capped by statute," and, accordingly, its actions were not willfully disobedient.
The trial court conducted a hearing on February 11, 2014, and another on February 25, 2014, on the order to show cause. At the February 11 hearing, the court observed, "I tried to make it as clear as I could to the department the first time around -- but the Welfare and Institutions Code section is clearly not a sufficient reason to do it. I understand it's a Welfare and Institution[s] Code section but there is an individual's Constitutional right on the other side of the [equation]. When the statute violates, comes into conflict with somebody's Constitutional rights, the statute has to be found unconstitutional. So I keep getting this Welfare and Institution [sic] Code section . . . and every time I get that I ask the question what about that section authorizes violating an individual's Constitutional rights . . . ?" At the next hearing on February 25, the court repeated these questions to counsel for the Department: "What is it about those restrictions that [justify depriving an individual] of their Constitutional rights? Do you have any authority that says these restrictions justify depriving an individual of their Constitutional rights?"
At the February 11 hearing, the trial court provided counsel for the Department with an order issued on January 9, 2014, by another judge of the same court on a petition for writ of habeas corpus by defendant Nick Delato and seven other defendants. The order required the Department to admit defendants committed under Penal Code section 1370 within 30 days of commitment. This court reversed the order with directions to the trial court to reconsider it in light of intervening changes to Penal Code section 1370. (People v. Delato (Oct. 23, 2015, C075940) [nonpub. opn.].)
At the February 25 hearing, the trial court and counsel for Perkins questioned the Napa State Hospital admissions supervisor regarding the section 7200.06 cap. The supervisor testified that the 980-bed cap refers to the secure treatment area for patient placements under Penal Code section 1370 (incompetent to stand trial), Penal Code section 1026 (not guilty by reason of insanity), and Penal Code section 2972 (mentally disordered offender), as well as for placements by the Department of Juvenile Justice and for parolees. The supervisor also testified that the hospital was not able to move others to make room for Perkins on January 9: "There was nobody to move. There was no wiggle room. There was nothing we could do that day. But a week later we were able to accommodate her." The admissions supervisor further testified that there were empty beds outside the secure unit, but Napa State Hospital was prevented by the cap from using them for Penal Code placements. The supervisor confirmed that the hospital was currently at the 980-bed cap.
In ruling on contempt, the trial court acknowledged that "the Department of State Hospitals has been put in a very, very difficult position by the legislature and by the budget. They are put in this position where, because of 7200.06 of the Welfare and Institutions Code and the budgets, they are put in this position of either staying within Welfare and Institutions Code, limiting [the] number and turning people away, or accepting people, [providing] the treatment for the people who are at risk."
The court continued, "[h]owever, one thing that is clear to me at least based on what I have heard, is that Welfare and Institutions Code Section 7200.06 is unconstitutional. And I find it to be unconstitutional. . . . As it's used to deny admittance to somebody pas[t] 30 days, the statute is unconstitutional." The court further explained, "I understand the argument that 7200.06 is out there and I understand the argument that there is a regulation out there. But I do find the [hospital] has the ability to comply. I do. The only reason the Department isn't complying is because of an unconstitutional statute." "I told the Department the statute wasn't enough. I told the Department they were ordered to take her, and the Department still decided to be more powerful than the Judge . . . ."
Finally, the trial court observed that, "Ms. Perkins was put on fair notice, you know, in the oral argument on the first OSC. The Department is now certainly on fair notice with the Court having found the Welfare and Institutions Code unconstitutional, that the code is not good cause to not accept somebody within the time parameters." "[W]ith the Court just finding the statute unconstitutional, it's going to be a separate act of contempt of court if you continue to not accept them." "And in Ms. Perkins' case, I'm not going to defer judgment on Ms. Perkins' case. Because of the argument we had, the prior hearing we had, the ruling the Court made, and the Department's file."
On February 25, 2014, the court found the Napa State Hospital in contempt of court and imposed the maximum fine of $1,000, and on March 11, 2014, issued a written order to that effect.
The Department appealed from the contempt order, which is reviewable by writ petition, not appeal. (Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a)(1); People v. Gonzalez (1996) 12 Cal.4th 804, 816 (Gonzalez).) This court exercised its authority to address the merits of the appeal as if a writ had been issued. (In re M.R. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 49, 65; Van v. LanguageLine Solutions (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 73, 79 (Van).)
DISCUSSION
Unreasonable Delay in Delivering an Incompetent Defendant to a State Mental Hospital
In People v. Brewer (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 122, 129-132 (Brewer), we determined that the time limits on delivering individuals found incompetent to stand trial to a state mental hospital or other approved facility for treatment are found in a statute and three cases.
Penal Code section 1370 provides that the court shall order a criminal defendant found incompetent to stand trial to be delivered to a state mental hospital or other approved treatment facility to be restored to mental competence. (Pen. Code, § 1370, subd. (a)(1)(B)(i); Brewer, supra, 235 Cal.App.4th at p. 129.) Within 90 days of commitment the hospital must provide a report concerning the defendant's progress in recovering mental competence. (Pen. Code, § 1370, subd. (b)(1); Brewer, supra, at pp. 129-130, 137.)
While Penal Code section 1370 has been much amended, the present version of the statutory timeline for admission of defendants found incompetent to stand trial and the 90-day reporting requirement is unchanged from the version of the statute in force in 2014. (Brewer, supra, 235 Cal.App.4th at pp. 129-130; In re Loveton (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1025, 1043-1044 (Loveton); In re Taitano (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 233, 242 (Taitano).)
In Jackson v. Indiana (1972) 406 U.S. 715, 738 [32 L.Ed.2d 435, 451], the United States Supreme Court held that, under principles of equal protection and due process, a person lacking mental capacity to proceed to trial cannot be held indefinitely or for "more than the reasonable period of time necessary to determine whether there is a substantial probability that he will attain that capacity in the foreseeable future." (Brewer, supra, 235 Cal.App.4th at p. 130; Loveton, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1036-1037; Taitano, supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 241.)
In In re Davis (1973) 8 Cal.3d 798, 801, the California Supreme Court adopted the rule in Jackson v. Indiana to assure that defendants lacking mental capacity for trial "do not face an indefinite commitment without regard to the likelihood that they will eventually regain their competence, for such an indefinite commitment has been held to offend constitutional principles of equal protection and due process." (See also Brewer, supra, 235 Cal.App.4th at p. 130; Loveton, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at p. 1037; Taitano, supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 241.)
In In re Mille (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 635 (Mille), the court held that a defendant must be transferred from the jail to the hospital within a reasonable time, as measured by the 90-day deadline for the report required by Penal Code section 1370, subdivision (b)(1), and constitutional principles that prohibit the defendant being held more than a reasonable time to determine whether the defendant will be restored to mental competence. (Mille, supra, at pp. 649-650; Brewer, supra, 235 Cal.App.4th at p. 131; Loveton, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1037-1039.) Mille did not prescribe a particular time limit but noted that 30 days after the commitment order the petitioner filed a habeas petition, which should have been granted, because there needed to be sufficient time for the defendant to be evaluated and benefit from the prescribed treatment within the 90-day deadline. (Mille, supra, at pp. 649-650; Brewer, supra, at pp. 131-132; Loveton, supra, at pp. 1037-1039.)
Contempt
" 'As a general rule, the elements of contempt include (1) a valid order, (2) knowledge of the order, (3) ability to comply with the order, and (4) willful failure to comply with the order. [Citations.]' " (Wanke, Industrial, Commercial, Residential, Inc. v. Keck (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1151, 1168 (Wanke); In re Ivey (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 793, 798; Anderson v. Superior Court (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1240, 1245.)
Willful refusal to obey a court order is an act of contempt. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1209, subd. (a)(5); Gonzalez, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 816.) However, disobedience of a court order may be punished as contempt only if the underlying order is valid. (Gonzalez, supra, at pp. 816-817; Wilson v. Superior Court (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 1259, 1268 (Wilson) ["an invalid order will not support a contempt adjudication"].)
Violation of an order in excess of the court's jurisdiction cannot produce a valid judgment of contempt. (Gonzalez, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 817; In re Berry (1968) 68 Cal.2d 137, 147; Wanke, supra, 209 Cal.App.4th at p. 1172.) Any acts that exceed the power of the court defined by constitution, statute or rules developed by courts are in excess of jurisdiction. (Gonzalez, supra, at p. 818; In re Berry, supra, at p. 147.)
The validity of an injunction may be challenged during a contempt proceeding, even if the injunction was not challenged at the time it was issued. (Gonzalez, supra, 12 Cal.4th at pp. 818-819; In re Berry, supra, 68 Cal.2d at pp. 148-149.)
Standard of Review of Contempt Judgment
A contempt proceeding "is considered quasi-criminal, and the defendant possesses some of the rights of a criminal defendant." (Gonzalez, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 816.) Guilt must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. (Koehler v. Superior Court (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1153, 1159; Mitchell v. Superior Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1230, 1256.) There is no presumption of regularity in contempt proceedings and nothing can be implied in support of a contempt adjudication. (Koehler, supra, at pp. 1166-1167.) In review of a contempt proceeding, " ' "the evidence, the findings, and the judgment are all to be strictly construed in favor of the accused [citation], and no intendments or presumptions can be indulged in aid of their sufficiency. [Citation.] If the record of the proceedings, reviewed in light of the foregoing rules, fails to show affirmatively upon its face the existence of all the necessary facts upon which jurisdiction depended, the order must be annulled." [Citation.]' " (Id. at p. 1166; Hotaling v. Superior Court (1923) 191 Cal. 501, 506; Mitchell, supra, at p. 1256; Van, supra, 8 Cal.App.5th at p. 81.) A contempt proceeding is punitive and " 'it is for this reason that every "i" must be dotted and "t" crossed.' " (Van, supra, at p. 81, quoting Cedars-Sinai Imaging Medical Group v. Superior Court (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1287.)
To support a finding of contempt, the underlying order "must be clear, specific, and unequivocal." (In re Marcus (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1009, 1014 (Marcus); Wilson, supra, 194 Cal.App.3d at p. 1273.) " 'Specificity is an essential prerequisite of a contempt citation.' " (Marcus, supra, at p. 1016; Wilson, supra, at p. 1273.) " 'Any ambiguity in a decree or order must be resolved in favor of an alleged contemnor.' " (Marcus, supra, at p. 1015; In re Blaze (1969) 271 Cal.App.2d 210, 212.)
Perkins contends the validity of the trial court's January 7, 2014 order is not reviewable because (1) a writ petition was not filed within 60 days of that order, and (2) the Department did not provide an adequate record to overcome the presumption that the order is correct. Perkins relies on authority (e.g., Chico Feminist Women's Health Center v. Scully (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 230, 251-252) that did not involve a contempt order where, as shown, the principles of review are essentially the opposite: (1) the underlying order can be challenged on a timely petition from the contempt order, and (2) a contempt order is not presumed correct and must affirmatively shown to be so by evidence that is strictly construed in favor of the contemnor.
The January 7, 2014 Order Was an Invalid Injunction
In Brewer, we held that an order directing the sheriff to deliver defendants found incompetent to stand trial to the state hospital within a certain time is an injunction. (Brewer, supra, 235 Cal.App.4th at p. 135.) An injunction may be defined " 'as a writ or order commanding a person either to perform or to refrain from performing a particular act. [Citation.]' " (Ibid, quoting McDowell v. Watson (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1155, 1160.)
An injunction, however, may not be granted "[t]o prevent the execution of a public statute by officers of the law for the public benefit." (Code Civ. Proc., § 526, subd. (b)(4); Civ. Code, § 3423, subd. (d) [same]; Jamison v. Department of Transportation (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 356, 363-364; 6 Witkin, California Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Provisional Remedies, § 331, p. 275.) An injunction prohibiting a public officer from enforcing a valid law is in excess of the court's jurisdiction. (People v. Superior Court (1967) 248 Cal.App.2d 276, 282 [protective order prohibiting Commissioner of Corporations from enforcing Corporations Code provision was in excess of the court's jurisdiction]; Manchel v. County of Los Angeles (1966) 245 Cal.App.2d 501, 506.)
The parties did not directly address the application of Code of Civil Procedure section 526, subdivision (b)(4), and Civil Code section 3423, subdivision (d), in their briefs. We requested and received supplemental briefing on this issue, as well as granting the motion to augment the appellate record previously mentioned. (Gov. Code, § 68081.)
The court's order to admit Perkins required public officials, the executive director and admissions administrator of Napa State Hospital, to violate former section 7200.06, subdivision (a), a statute promulgated for the public benefit. The evidence was uncontradicted that this section imposed a cap of 980 on placements under the Penal Code, the hospital was at the cap, and there was a waiting list. The contempt order stated that "there are beds at Napa State Hospital beyond the 980 limit of Welfare and Institutions Code section 7200.06" that could be used to facilitate her admission. Indeed, as the statute indicated, there were additional beds at Napa State Hospital, but only 980 beds for Penal Code placements. The court's order required the hospital to use beds not allocated for Penal Code placements, in violation of the statute. The population cap in section 7200.06 existed for the public benefit, e.g., to limit the potential for escapes and walkaways from a population of individuals who pose a threat to themselves and others. (In re Cirino (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 1009, 1015, fn. 1.)
The rule against enjoining the execution of a public statute is subject to four judicially recognized exceptions: (1) where the statute is unconstitutional and irreparable injury is shown; (2) where the statute is valid but enforced in an unconstitutional manner; (3) where the statute is valid but does not apply to the party enjoined; and (4) where the public official's action exceeds his or her authority. (Jamison v. Department of Transportation, supra, 4 Cal.App.5th at pp. 363-364; Alfaro v. Terhune (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 492, 501.)
Here, the potentially applicable exception alluded to by the trial court is that section 7200.06 is unconstitutional as applied to defendants found incompetent to stand trial, whose admission to Napa State Hospital is unreasonably delayed by the statute. (See Brock v. Superior Court (1939) 12 Cal.2d 605, 610 ["a statute valid upon its face may be unconstitutionally applied"]; Alfaro v. Terhune, supra, 98 Cal.App.4th at pp. 501-505 [rejecting contention that statute was unconstitutionally vague as applied in the absence of implementing regulations]; but see O'Connell v. Superior Court (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1452, 1477-1478 [appellate court rejected unconstitutional statute exception, because "while plaintiffs raise equal protection and due process claims relating to the denial of their fundamental right to a public education, they do not allege that the statute . . . is itself unconstitutional[, but] only sought to enjoin the enforcement of that statute as applied to them, because they were unconstitutionally denied the ability to learn the skills needed to pass [the statutory high school exit exam requirement]"].)
However, the trial court did not issue a "clear, specific and unequivocal" order that section 7200.06 was unconstitutional prior to the contempt hearing. Perkins concedes that, at the January 2, 2014 hearing on the order to show cause, the court simply ordered Napa State Hospital to accept Perkins forthwith. The January 7, 2014 written order likewise commands that Perkins be admitted and does not mention section 7200.06. Even if the court engaged in an oral colloquy with counsel for the Department as described in the contempt order, the court did not therein make a finding that section 7200.06 was unconstitutional, facially or as applied.
In addition, a contempt adjudication must be based on a violation of a written order or set forth in detail in the court's minutes, because an oral ruling is inherently uncertain and equivocal. (Marcus, supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 1016; Wilson, supra, 194 Cal.App.3d at p. 1273.) Prior to the March 11, 2014 order, there was never a written order directing hospital officials not to enforce section 7200.06 as unconstitutional, nor is there any reference to constitutionality in the January 2, 2014 hearing minutes.
As Perkins also concedes, the court did not find former section 7200.06 unconstitutional until the contempt hearing on February 25, 2014, and in the written contempt order issued on March 11, 2014. On February 25, the court stated, "based on what I have heard . . . Welfare and Institutions Code Section 7200.06 is unconstitutional," and "I find it to be unconstitutional." The contempt order similarly states, "the court finds that Welfare and Institutions Code section 7200.06(a) as applied by Napa State Hospital to deny admission to Ms. Perkins and others similarly situated who have been found incompetent to stand trial under Penal Code Section 1370; lawfully committed to Napa State Hospital; and held in county jail beyond thirty days awaiting transportation and treatment is clearly unconstitutional . . . ." The court made clear it had not found the statute unconstitutional previously at the February 25 hearing, observing that "with the Court just finding the statute unconstitutional," the Department would be on notice that any further failure to accept patients as ordered by the court would be an act of contempt. There was no such finding on January 2 or January 7, 2014, when the court ordered the Department to admit Perkins. The trial court never issued such an order until February 25 (orally) and March 11 (in writing).
A statute duly enacted is presumed to be constitutional. Unconstitutionality must be clearly shown and doubts resolved in favor of the statute's validity. (Lockyer v. City and County of San Francisco (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1055, 1086; 7 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (11th ed. 2017) Constitutional Law, § 89, p. 186.) At the January 2 hearing on the order to show cause, the trial court may have raised a doubt about the constitutionality of section 7200.06, but the record does not reflect a "clear, specific and unequivocal" order to the Department, Napa State Hospital and their officials not to enforce the statute because it has been clearly shown to be unconstitutional.
In supplemental briefing, Perkins contends that nothing in the court's order "required [hospital administrators] to violate section 7200.06, only that they find a way to admit Ms. Perkins." Given the undisputed evidence that Napa State Hospital was at the cap and had a waiting list, this argument begs the question how hospital administrators could have admitted Perkins on January 9, 2014, without violating section 7200.06. Indeed, the trial court acknowledged at the contempt hearing on February 25, 2014, that the Napa State Hospital had the ability to comply with its order to admit Perkins only if section 7200.06 was disregarded: "But I do find the [hospital] has the ability to comply. I do. The only reason the Department isn't complying is because of an unconstitutional statute." The court's orders of January 2 and January 7 to admit Perkins to Napa State Hospital by January 9 were orders that required hospital administrators to violate section 7200.06, a statute that the court declared unconstitutional only after the fact.
In addition, since the Department continued to be bound by section 7200.06 after the trial court ordered Perkins admitted, an essential element of a valid contempt order, i.e., the contemnor's ability to comply with the underlying order, was not established, furnishing another basis to reverse and annul the contempt order. (Anderson v. Superior Court, supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1245-1246 [annulling contempt order where statute rendered Director of the State Department of Social Service unable to comply with the trial court's order].)
The trial court issued an injunction in excess of its authority when it ordered the Department to admit Perkins in violation of section 7200.06, without a clear, written order that the statute was unconstitutional. Therefore, the court's contempt order was not supported by a valid underlying order.
Because we reverse on this basis, we need not address the other issues raised by petitioner. (In re C.M. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 376, 389, fn. 5.)
DISPOSITION
The order of the superior court dated March 11, 2014, finding Napa State Hospital in contempt of court is reversed and annulled. The superior court is directed to issue an order that any fine paid by petitioner in connection with the contempt order be returned to petitioner.
/s/_________
RAYE, P. J. We concur: /s/_________
BLEASE, J. /s/_________
MURRAY, J.