Opinion
F075359
03-15-2018
STATE DEPARTMENT OF STATE HOSPITALS, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. A.M., Defendant and Appellant.
Linda J. Zachritz, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Julie Weng-Gutierrez, Assistant Attorney General, Ismael A. Castro and Judy Wong, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 16CRAD683547)
OPINION
THE COURT APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno County. Kimberly A. Gaab, Judge. Linda J. Zachritz, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Julie Weng-Gutierrez, Assistant Attorney General, Ismael A. Castro and Judy Wong, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Before Poochigian, Acting P.J., Detjen, J. and Peña, J.
-ooOoo-
A.M. is an adjudicated sexually violent predator over whom the State Department of State Hospitals (SDSH) has custody pursuant to the Sexually Violent Predators Act (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600 et seq.). A.M. resides at a SDSH facility in Coalinga (SDSH-C), where he receives treatment for previously diagnosed mental disorders. He appeals from an order requiring him to submit to involuntary administration of psychotropic medication. The order in question was only valid for one year, however, and expired on February 27, 2018. Accordingly, and for the following reasons, we dismiss the appeal as moot.
The order is appealable as a special order made after final judgment in a civil action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a); see Gross v. Superior Court (1954) 42 Cal.2d 816, 820; People v. Christiana (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1040, 1046-1047; 6 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Appeal, § 64, p. 341.) --------
LEGAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The Sexually Violent Predators Act " 'provides a court process by which certain convicted violent sex offenders, whose current mental disorders make them likely to reoffend if free, may be committed, at the end of their prison terms, for successive two-year [now indeterminate] periods of state hospital confinement and treatment as long as the disorder-related danger persists.' [Citation.] . . . [T]he Legislature declared that the purpose of the Act is to confine and treat 'a small but extremely dangerous group of sexually violent predators that have diagnosable mental disorders' until 'they no longer present a threat to society.' " (In re Calhoun (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1323; see People v. Shazier (2014) 60 Cal.4th 109, 127, fn. 9.)
A competent adult has a common law and constitutional right to refuse medical treatment, including the administration of antipsychotic drugs. (In re Qawi (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1, 14.) However, an involuntarily committed patient may be forcibly treated with antipsychotic medication if a court has determined that he or she is not competent to refuse treatment. (Id. at pp. 15-16; In re Calhoun, supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at p. 1354.) A judicial determination of competency to refuse treatment involves consideration of three primary factors: (1) whether the patient is aware of his or her situation and acknowledges the existence of his or her condition; (2) whether he or she is able to understand the benefits and risks of, and alternatives to, treatment; and (3) whether he or she is able to understand and intelligently evaluate the information required to be given to patients whose informed consent is sought, and to participate in the treatment decision by rational thought processes. (Riese v. St. Mary's Hospital & Medical Center (1987) 209 Cal.App.3d 1303, 1322-1323.)
The superior court must determine competence to refuse treatment by clear and convincing evidence, "so clear as to leave no substantial doubt, [and] sufficiently strong to command the unhesitating assent of every reasonable mind." (Conservatorship of Waltz (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 722, 733 & fn. 14.) An order authorizing involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication is reviewed for substantial evidence. (People v. Fisher (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1006, 1016.)
A.M. was admitted to SDSH-C in March 2006. On February 1, 2016, SDSH obtained a court order compelling him to submit to involuntary treatment with psychotropic medication for a period not to exceed one year.
In December 2016, SDSH petitioned the Fresno County Superior Court for renewal of the order, so as to permit the involuntary administration of psychotropic medication to A.M. in accordance with Welfare and Institutions Code section 5300 and the holding of In re Calhoun, supra, 121 Cal.App.4th 1315. The petition was heard on February 27, 2017.
The proceedings focused on the issue of A.M.'s capacity to refuse treatment. Dr. Brown, a psychiatrist, testified on behalf of SDSH as an expert in the fields of psychiatry and the administration of psychotropic medication. Brown opined, based on two face-to-face interactions with A.M. within the two weeks preceding the hearing, a review of A.M.'s medical records, and a discussion with A.M.'s telepsychiatrist, Dr. Peng, that A.M. was "paranoid, delusional, and can be noted to be internally preoccupied, meaning responding to internal stimuli such as hallucinations." Brown further opined A.M. was unable to understand his mental illness and the benefits of psychotropic medication, and could not make an informed consent to or refusal of such medication. The court found A.M. was presently incompetent to make decisions regarding his medical treatment, and lacked capacity to refuse treatment. Accordingly, it issued an order authorizing involuntary administration of psychotropic medication for a period "not to exceed one year from the date of the order."
DISCUSSION
On appeal, A.M. claims: (1) Should the appeal become moot, he nevertheless should receive a decision from this court on the merits of his substantive issues, because those issues have recurred; (2) The determination of his competence to accept or reject psychotropic medication was primarily based on case-specific hearsay that should have been excluded pursuant to the California Supreme Court's holding in People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665 (Sanchez); and (3) To the extent defense counsel's failure to object to each instance of hearsay forfeited the claim for appeal, the lack of objection constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. The Attorney General disputes these arguments and submits the appeal must be dismissed as moot when the order under review expires. We agree with the latter contention, and express no opinion with respect to the remaining claims.
As a general rule, appellate review is limited to actual controversies; a case that involves " 'only abstract or academic questions of law cannot be maintained. [Citation.]' [Citation.]" (People v. DeLong (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 482, 486.) " ' "[A]n action that originally was based on a justiciable controversy cannot be maintained on appeal if all the questions have become moot by subsequent acts or events. A reversal in such a case would be without practical effect, and the appeal will therefore be dismissed." [Citation.]' [Citation.]" (Ibid.) In other words, "[a]n appeal should be dismissed as moot when the occurrence of events renders it impossible for the appellate court to grant appellant any effective relief. [Citation.]" (Cucamongans United for Reasonable Expansion v. City of Rancho Cucamonga (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 473, 479 (Cucamongans).) Here, since the order appealed from has expired, resolving the issues presented would not confer any effective relief to the parties.
There are three discretionary exceptions to the rule against adjudicating moot claims. A reviewing court may decide an appeal on the merits "(1) when the case presents an issue of broad public interest that is likely to recur [citation]; (2) when there may be a recurrence of the controversy between the parties [citation]; and (3) when a material question remains for the court's determination [citation]." (Cucamongans, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at pp. 479-480.)
A.M. says the second exception applies here. He points out that we have already dismissed as moot one appeal involving the same issues and the same parties, and says a decision on the merits is needed to ensure he does not repeatedly "have to face the continued use of wide ranging inadmissible hearsay."
We are aware of our discretionary authority, but decline to exercise it under the circumstances of this case. We will not presume, as A.M. essentially asks us to do, that because evidentiary errors allegedly occurred in the past, they are likely to recur in the future. Rather, we presume that, going forward, the court and counsel will be aware of Sanchez's reasoning and holding (Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 674-686), and the reach of the rules established therein (see, e.g., People v. Bona (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 511, 520; Conservatorship of K.W. (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 1274, 1285; People v. Jeffrey G. (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 501, 509-511; People v. Roa (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 428, 442-443, 446-453; People v. Burroughs (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 378, 404-407; People v. Stamps (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 988, 996).
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed as moot.