Accordingly, this court has construed Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-9-101 to mean that actions by boards or commissions that are not final orders or judgments are not subject to judicial review under the common law writ of certiorari. See State Dept. of Commerce v. FirstTrust, 931 S.W.2d 226, 228-229 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that a subpoena duces tecum issued in conjunction with the Insurance Commissioner's Order of Investigation does not amount to a final order subject to judicial review); Isom v. Knox County Retirement Pension Board and Knox County, Tennessee, No. 03A01-9708-CH-00333, 1998 WL 136556, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. March 27, 1998) (no Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed) (holding that employee's claim for refund of offsets he had previously paid was governed by Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-9-101 and, finding that the retirement and pension board had not yet acted on the employee's claim, dismissing the common law writ of certiorari action since no final order or judgment by the board had been entered). The language "final order or judgment" in Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-9-101 must also be construed in the context of Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-8-101, which creates another requirement for the writ, by providing that,

A decision or action by a board or commission that is not final is "not subject to judicial review under the common law writ of certiorari." Id. (citing State Dep't. of Commerce v. FirstTrust Money Servs., 931 S.W.2d 226, 228-29 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996)). Rather, such decisions or actions are merely advisory in nature.

Accordingly, this court has construed [section] 27-9-101 to mean that actions by boards or commissions that are not final orders or judgments are not subject to judicial review under the common law writ of certiorari." Id. at *9 (citing State Dept. of Commerce v. FirstTrust, 931 S.W.2d 226, 228-229 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that a subpoena duces tecum issued in conjunction with an order of investigation does not amount to a final order subject to judicial review); Isom v. Knox County Retirement & Pension Board and Knox County, Tennessee, No. 03A01-9708-CH-00333, 1998 WL 136556, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. March 27, 1998) (dismissing the common law writ of certiorari action since no final order or judgment by the board had been entered)). Finally, this Court noted that to qualify for review by writ of certiorari, "a board's decision must be the result of its exercise of judicial functions[.]"Walker, 2009 WL 5178435, at *9 (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-8-101 ("The writ of certiorari may be granted whenever authorized by law, and also in all cases where an inferior tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions has exceeded the jurisdiction conferred, or is acting illegally, when, in the judgment of the court, there is no other plain, speedy, or adequate remedy.") (emphasis added)).

" A decision or action by a board or commission that is not final is "not subject to judicial review under the common law writ of certiorari." Walker v. Metro. Bd. of Parks and Recreation, No. M2007-01701-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 5178435, *9 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 30, 2009) (citing State Dep't. of Commerce v. FirstTrust Money Servs., 931 S.W.2d 226, 228-29 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996). We begin by examining the procedure for the council's consideration of zoning ordinances as set forth in the Metropolitan Charter and the Metropolitan Code.

The granting or denying of a protective order relative to discovery procedures rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. Tenn. Dep't of Commerce and Ins. v. FirstTrust Money Servs., Inc., 931 S.W.2d 226, 230 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1996). Such a discretionary decision is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

The scope of discovery is within the sound discretion of the trial court. State Dept. of Commerce Ins. v. Firsttrust Money Serv. Inc., 931 S.W.2d 226, 230 (Tenn.App. 1996). The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for production of documents as premature. At the time discovery was sought, there was pending a motion which would have disposed on the complaint as a matter of law.

See Marcus v. Marcus, 993 S.W.2d 596, 601 (Tenn. 1999); State, Dep't of Commerce and Ins. v. FirstTrust Money Serv., Inc., 931 S.W.2d 226, 230 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1996). Therefore, we will not reverse a trial court's decision regarding discovery matters unless it "`affirmatively appears that the trial court's decision was against logic or reasoning, and caused an injustice or injury to the party complaining.'"

As previously indicated, the trial court granted Dr. Gowder a protective order, thereby preventing Conger from deposing Dr. Gowder and Dr. Weight while the defendant's motion for summary judgment was pending. A grant of a protective order relative to discovery is a matter that addresses the sound discretion of the trial court, and we will not reverse a trial court's decision absent an abuse of that discretion. SeeState, Dep't of Commerceand Ins. v. FirstTrust Money Servs., Inc., 931 S.W.2d 226, 230 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1996). However, the trial court's grant of a protective order is not immune from appellate review merely because it is a discretionary matter:

The injury to the general public, which would ultimately result from the exercise of this jurisdiction, would be greater than that to individuals when left to their remedies in courts of law. The rule has been recognized and followed as late as 1996, when the Court of Appeals held in State v. First Trust Money Services, Inc., 931 S.W.2d 226, 229 (Tenn.App. 1996), without discussion, that a counterclaim brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 did not bestow jurisdiction on courts of equity in this state to enjoin enforcement of state criminal laws. See also Spoone v. Mayor Aldermen of Morristown, 185 Tenn. 454, 206 S.W.2d 422 (1947); Windrow v. Stephens, 20 Tenn. App. 647, 103 S.W.2d 584, 586 (1937); Brackner v. Estes, 698 S.W.2d 637, 639 (Tenn.App. 1985).

The scope of discovery is within the "sound discretion of the trial court." State, Dept. of Commerce Ins. v. FirsttrustMoney Services, Inc., 931 S.W.2d 226, 230 (Tenn.App. 1996); Loveall v. American Honda Motor Co., 694 S.W.2d 937, 939 (Tenn. 1985). In Bell v. Godinez, 92 C 8447, 1995 WL 519970 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 30, 1995), an Ohio district court considered a discovery request by a prose inmate plaintiff to conduct oral depositions of prison officials.