State Construction Co. v. Johnson

10 Citing cases

  1. Gleaton v. Apac-Ga

    228 Ga. App. 52 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997)   Cited 8 times

    [Cits.]" State Construction Co. v. Johnson, 82 Ga. App. 698, 701 ( 62 S.E.2d 413) (1950). Here, the allegations of negligence involve the failure to inspect and discover the fallen barrel.

  2. Hardin v. Barrett

    176 S.E.2d 455 (Ga. Ct. App. 1970)   Cited 1 times

    Held: 1. The plaintiff relies for recovery primarily upon Trammell v. Matthews, 86 Ga. App. 661 ( 72 S.E.2d 132) and State Construction Co. v. Johnson, 82 Ga. App. 698 ( 62 S.E.2d 413). These cases hold that a contractor must exercise ordinary care, by the erection of barricades or other precautions, to prevent persons lawfully using the highway from being injured by the work in progress. A slightly different question is presented here where the negligence alleged is that the defendant failed to provide a safe alternate method of travel for the plaintiff after the work area was securely barricaded.

  3. Turkett v. Central of Georgia R. Co.

    161 S.E.2d 362 (Ga. Ct. App. 1968)   Cited 4 times
    Holding that court erred in dismissing petition alleging negligence when plaintiff collided with warning device placed in roadway by defendant while traveling in the dark, in the rain, and under circumstances of poor visibility; and obstruction was unlighted, obscured from plaintiff's vision by its placement, and could not be seen until within 10 feet

    Mathis v. Nelson, 79 Ga. App. 639, 642 ( 54 S.E.2d 710)." State Constr. Co. v. Johnson, 82 Ga. App. 698, 701 ( 62 S.E.2d 413). Where he has no knowledge of the obstruction, whether he has himself exercised the care required of him under the circumstances to avoid injury to himself is a jury question. Powell v. Barker, 96 Ga. App. 592, 600 ( 101 S.E.2d 113), and see Doby v. W. L. Florence Constr. Co., 71 Ga. App. 888 (4, 6) ( 32 S.E.2d 527); Rogers v. Johnson, 94 Ga. App. 666, 678 ( 96 S.E.2d 285); Trammell v. Matthews, 84 Ga. App. 332, 337 ( 66 S.E.2d 183). "A plaintiff is not necessarily guilty of such negligence as would bar a recovery for injuries sustained as the result of his running into an obstruction in a highway, as against one negligently obstructing the highway or street, by reason of the mere fact that he operates his automobile along such highway or street at night and at such a speed as would render it impossible for him to stop within the distance illuminated by his headlights."

  4. Abercrombie v. Ledbetter-Johnson Co.

    116 Ga. App. 376 (Ga. Ct. App. 1967)   Cited 28 times
    In Johnson, supra, this court held only that "we find no reason to conclude that where it is proved that a defendant is negligent, he should be relieved of liability as a matter of law merely because the defective work was approved by someone else."

    It is the settled law of this State that a contractor engaged in public work under contract with the State or one of its political subdivisions is not immune to liability for injuries caused by its negligence while performing the contract. State Constr. Co. v. Johnson, 82 Ga. App. 698 ( 62 S.E.2d 413); Davis v. Smiley, 33 Ga. App. 508 ( 126 S.E. 904). This is in accord with the weight of authority in other jurisdictions which do not excuse a contractor for injuries resulting from negligence or a wilful tort. See annotation, 9 ALR3d 382.

  5. Ed Smith & Sons, Inc. v. Mathis

    103 Ga. App. 661 (Ga. Ct. App. 1961)   Cited 3 times

    And it would seem especially true in the light of the principle that "a motorist upon the public highways of this State has a right to assume that the road ahead of him is clear." Mathis v. Nelson, 79 Ga. App. 639, 642 ( 54 S.E.2d 710); State Construction Co. v. Johnson, 82 Ga. App. 698, 701 ( 62 S.E.2d 413); Brown v. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 96 Ga. App. 771, 777 ( 101 S.E.2d 603). If the law affords to a motorist such as the plaintiff here, the right to such an assumption, it must, by virtue of so doing, place upon the operator of an earth moving machine, under circumstances such as are here alleged, a duty to observe and to see approaching traffic upon the highway.

  6. Brown v. Atlanta Gas Light Co.

    96 Ga. App. 771 (Ga. Ct. App. 1957)   Cited 8 times
    Finding driver failed to exercise ordinary care where he continued to drive 300 feet at speed of 25 miles per hour after being blinded by sun shining in his eyes

    Mathis v. Nelson, 79 Ga. App. 639, 642 ( 54 S.E.2d 710)." State Construction Co. v. Johnson, 82 Ga. App. 698, 701 ( 62 S.E.2d 413). 3. The petition sufficiently alleged the negligence of the defendant, but set forth no cause of action because it affirmatively revealed that the deceased did not exercise ordinary care to avoid such negligence after the same could have been discovered by the exercise of ordinary care on his part.

  7. Holland v. Phillips

    94 S.E.2d 503 (Ga. Ct. App. 1956)   Cited 10 times

    "A contractor constructing a bridge owes a duty to the public to exercise ordinary care to protect the public from injuries arising by reason of said construction." Trammell v. Matthews, 84 Ga. App. 332, 338 ( 66 S.E.2d 183); State Construction Co. v. Johnson, 82 Ga. App. 698, 700 ( 62 S.E.2d 413). Where the prime contractor in its contract with the State Highway Department undertakes to assume control of the area for the purpose of putting up barricades or other warnings, this obligation inures to the benefit of the public, and it is liable for the failure to exercise ordinary care to warn travelers of the dangers incident to the construction. State Construction Co. v. Johnson, 88 Ga. App. 651, 656 ( 77 S.E.2d 240). Where one company enters into a contract with the State Highway Department to do construction work on the public highways of this State and lets out a part of the contract to another company, the work to be under the direction and supervision of the former, the relation of contractor and subcontractor exists between the two and they may be jointly liable for injury resulting from negligence.

  8. James v. Smith

    88 S.E.2d 179 (Ga. Ct. App. 1955)   Cited 2 times

    This is true regardless of whether or not the defendants were negligent in the performance of their duties. No such question or facts are presented in Havird v. Richmond County. Our attention is called by counsel for the plaintiff to State Construction Co. v. Johnson, 82 Ga. App. 698 ( 62 S.E.2d 413). We find no applicability of the decision in that case under its facts, in relation to the instant case under the allegations of fact and the law herein involved.

  9. State Construction Co. v. Johnson

    77 S.E.2d 240 (Ga. Ct. App. 1953)   Cited 13 times
    In State Constr. Co. v. Johnson, 88 Ga. App. 651 (3) (77 S.E.2d 240) it was held: "The court erred in instructing the jury in effect that they should look to the contract between the defendant and the State Highway Department for the purpose of ascertaining the degree of care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff and the public under the facts of this case.

    For a more detailed statement of the allegations of the petition and of the contentions of the plaintiff, see the report of this case on its former appearance before this court. State Construction Co. v. Johnson, 82 Ga. App. 698 ( 62 S.E.2d 413). On that appearance of the case this court held, in considering questions raised by the defendant's demurrers, that a "contractor working on public highways and bridges of the State under contract with the State or a political subdivision thereof is not immune to liability for injuries caused by its negligence in the prosecution of the work contracted for"; and held that the petition stated a cause of action based on the defendant's duty to the public to exercise ordinary care to protect it from injuries arising by reason of its construction of the bridge.

  10. Trammell v. Matthews

    66 S.E.2d 183 (Ga. Ct. App. 1951)   Cited 14 times
    Holding that there was a question for the jury as to negligence when plaintiff alleged, inter alia , “that had the defendant placed proper warnings at the point where the detour went around the place where the bridge was out, the driver of the car ... would not have passed the detour and gone through the partial road block and then into the place where the bridge was out,” and when it appeared from the plaintiff's petition “that the way ahead of the driver of this car was not clear, that it was yet dark, and the road was not straight as one approached this partial road block from the [s]outh; that the detour was the same color as the paved road; that the partial road block was not sufficient and adequate to prevent one from assuming that the road could be used”

    " Applying this principle to the case at bar, a jury would be authorized, under the petition, as amended, in finding that the defendant contractor failed to give the proper warning to persons approaching this partial road block and detour where the bridge was out and a new one being constructed, and that the plaintiff's injuries resulted from this failure. In State Construction Company v. Johnson, 82 Ga. App. 698 ( 62 S.E.2d 413), this court held to the effect that a contractor constructing a bridge owes a duty to the public to exercise ordinary care to protect the public from injuries arising by reason of said construction. A breach by a road contractor defendant of his duty to erect proper barriers and signs constitutes actionable negligence.