We arrive at this conclusion because Minn.R.P.Juv.Ct. 27.02 is analogous to Minn.R.Crim.P. 6.06. In State v. Curtis, 393 N.W.2d 10, 12 (Minn.Ct.App. 1986), we concluded that the sixty day period prescribed in Rule 6.06 is "presumptive only."Length of Delay
The sixty-day period prescribed in Rule 6.06 is "presumptive only"; the Barker factors "should still be considered." State v. Curtis, 393 N.W.2d 10, 12 (Minn.Ct.App. 1986). a. Length of delay
This court has held that a defendant's acceptance of a trial date set beyond the 60-day deadline acts as a waiver of the right to a speedy trial. See State v. Curtis, 393 N.W.2d 10, 12 (Minn. App. 1986) (holding that "[b]y acceptance of the trial date set at the pretrial conference without objection, [the defendant] in effect waived his right to strict compliance with the 60-day rule"). Appellant claims that he reasserted his right on August 4, but the state argues that he did not reassert the right until October 19.
Thus, the length of delay is not sufficient to trigger further inquiry, and appellant is not entitled to relief on this ground. See State, City of Oakdale v. Curtis, 393 N.W.2d 10, 12 (Minn. App. 1986) (concluding that delay of approximately two months past the presumptive 60-day limit was sufficient to trigger further inquiry). III.
The record does not reflect a reason for the delay to April 2, 2007, but appellant did not object to this postponement. See State v. Curtis, 393 N.W.2d 10, 12 (Minn.App. 1986) (concluding that defendant's acceptance without objection of a trial date waived "strict compliance with the 60 day rule"). Finally, a week of the delay was attributable to appellant's nonappearance for trial on April 2, 2007.
Id. In State, City of Oakdale v. Curtis, 393 N.W.2d 10, 12 (Minn.App. 1986), a defendant's assertion of his speedy-trial right weighed against him where he asserted it once, did not object when his trial date was scheduled, and then never reasserted his demand. In the DAC-IPS case, the only demand for a speedy trial was made by appellant on May 26, 2006.
But without a further record, it is unknown whether appellant renewed his demand for a speedy trial or either objected or agreed to this scheduling. See State, City of Oakdale v. Curtis, 339 N.W.2d 10, 12 (Minn.App. 1986) (concluding that defendant's acceptance without objection of a trial date waived "strict compliance with the 60 day rule"). Thus, this factor weighs heavily against appellant for the period after September 26, which was appellant's last appearance before trial was finally conducted on January 12, 2007.
The failure to object to a trial date beyond the sixty-day limit may function as a waiver of strict compliance with the sixty-day limit. State v. Curtis, 393 N.W.2d 10, 12 (Minn.App. 1986). The record establishes two primary reasons for the delay of Rodriguez's trial beyond the sixty-day limit.
Second, Beaulieu's attorney consented to having his trial during the first week of February. See State v. Curtis, 393 N.W.2d 10, 12 (Minn.App. 1986) (stating that when a defendant has accepted without objection a trial date that is more than sixty days from the date of the speedy-trial demand, the defendant has waived his right to strict compliance with the sixty-day rule). Under these circumstances, we conclude that Beaulieu's constitutional right to a speedy trial was not violated.
The purpose of the rules is to make procedures readily ascertainable, settled and predictable. State v. Curtis, 393 N.W.2d 10, 12-13 (Minn.App. 1986); see Lundgren, 592 N.W.2d at 890 ("Service of process `must accord strictly with statutory requirements.'") (quoting Berryhill v. Sepp., 106 Minn. 458 , 459, 119 N.W. 404, 404 (1909)).