The fact that the panel is completely autonomous and is comprised of members who are not either a part of or acting on behalf of the department persuades us that an arbitration panel is not a "committee" of a state agency. In State Board of Labor Relations v. Freedom of Information Commission, 244 Conn. 487, 500, 709 A.2d 1129 (1998), in considering General Statutes § 31-100, we recognized the importance of privacy in the arbitration process. We observed that "[i]t is not disputed that arbitration conducted with private arbitrators may be closed to the public.
The fact that the panel is completely autonomous and is comprised of members who are not either a part of or acting on behalf of the department persuades us that an arbitration panel is not a “committee” of a state agency. In State Board of Labor Relations v. Freedom of Information Commission, 244 Conn. 487, 500, 709 A.2d 1129 (1998), in considering General Statutes § 31–100, we recognized the importance of privacy in the arbitration process. We observed that “[i]t is not disputed that arbitration conducted with private arbitrators may be closed to the public.
This court has also recognized that "[i]t is unlikely that the legislature would have intended for two similarly situated offenders to receive . . . disparate treatment solely on the fortuity of when their cases came to trial." Johnson v. Commissioner of Correction, 258 Conn. 804, 829, 786 A.2d 1091 (2002); cf. State Board of Labor Relations v. Freedom of Information Commission, 244 Conn. 487, 499-500, 709 A.2d 1129 (1998) (if two constructions of statute are possible and one alternative produces likelihood of untenable or irrational results, more reasonable interpretation should be adopted). Accordingly, the defendant's vengeance argument has no merit.
This court has also recognized that “[i]t is unlikely that the legislature would have intended for two similarly situatedoffenders to receive ... disparate treatment solely on the fortuity of when their cases came to trial.” Johnson v. Commissioner of Correction, 258 Conn. 804, 829, 786 A.2d 1091 (2002) ; cf. State Board of Labor Relations v. Freedom of Information Commission, 244 Conn. 487, 499–500, 709 A.2d 1129 (1998) (if two constructions of statute are possible and one alternative produces likelihood of untenable or irrational results, more reasonable interpretation should be adopted). Accordingly, the defendant's vengeance argument has no merit.
New Haven v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, 774.'" Cadlerock Properties Joint Venture, L.P. v. Commissioner of Environmental Protection, 253 Conn. 661, 668-69, 757 A.2d 1 (2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1148, 121 S. Ct. 1089, 148 L. Ed. 2d 963 (2001), quoting State Board of Labor Relations v. Freedom of Information Commission, 244 Conn. 487, 493-94, 709 A.2d 1129 (1998). Courts grant an agency particular deference when it has expertise in a given area and a history of determining factual and legal questions similar to those at issue. MacDermid, Inc. v. Dept. of Environmental Protection, 257 Conn. 128, 137, 778 A.2d 7 (2001).
¶30 Airtouch alternatively argues that since confidentiality provisions are routinely included in arbitration agreements, such provisions cannot be substantively unconscionable. See State Bd. of Labor Relations v. Freedom of Info. Comm'n, 244 Conn. 487, 500, 709 A.2d 1129 (1998) (holding that arbitration proceedings before a public mediation board could be confidential); Lloyd v. Hovensa LLC, 243 F. Supp. 2d 346, 351-52 (D.V.I. 2003) (noting that AAA rules provide that arbitrations can be confidential), overruled on other grounds by 369 F.3d 263 (3d Cir. 2004). Indeed, this court has acknowledged that arbitrations are often confidential.
On the other hand, offender B is ineligible for parole until he serves 85 percent of his sentence because he was convicted after the effective date of P.A. 95-255, § 1. It is unlikely that the legislature would have intended for two similarly situated offenders to receive such disparate treatment based solely on the fortuity of when their cases came to trial. See, e.g., State Board of Labor Relations v. Freedom of Information Commission, 244 Conn. 487, 499-500, 709 A.2d 1129 (1998) (if two constructions of statute are possible and one alternative produces likelihood of untenable or irrational results, more reasonable interpretation should be adopted). For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the respondents have failed to establish that the legislature intended P.A. 95-255, § 1, to have retroactive effect.
" (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State Board of Labor Relations v. Freedom of Information Commission, 244 Conn. 487, 493-94, 709 A.2d 1129 (1998). We also have held that an exception is made "when a state agency's determination of a question of law has not previously been subject to judicial scrutiny . . . the agency is not entitled to special deference."
General Statutes § 19a-17b (d); see Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Public Health and Safety, Pt. 1, 1976 Sess., pp. 284-85; 23 H.R. Proc., Pt. 24, 1980 Sess., p. 7098 (1980 amendment). Although the statute does not define "proceedings," that term, as construed in accordance with its common usage; see State Board of Labor Relations v. Freedom of Information Commission, 244 Conn. 487, 497, 709 A.2d 1129 (1998); refers to "an official record of things said or done." Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (10th Ed. 1995).
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State Board of Labor Relations v. Freedom of Information Commission, 244 Conn. 487, 494, 709 A.2d 1129 (1998). Simply put, the "time-tested agency interpretations" must stand.