The bequest of the use and income to Sarah and Mattie created a tenancy in common. Ordinarily in such a case it is presumed that the testator intended that each of the tenants in common should take an equal share and that the share of one should not pass to the other by way of survivorship. Allen v. Almy, 87 Conn. 517, 525, 89 A. 205. This, of course, is particularly true where there is a direction that the amount of the bequest be divided equally among the cotenants or that the beneficiaries shall take share and share alike, or an equivalent expression. Union New Haven Trust Co. v. Sellek, 128 Conn. 566, 568, 24 A.2d 485; State Bank Trust Co. v. Nolan, 103 Conn. 308, 317, 130 A. 483; Houghton v. Brantingham, 86 Conn. 630, 639, 86 A. 664. Whether the survivor of two beneficiaries to whom a common bequest has been made will take the whole fund bequeathed depends, however, on the intent of the testator, and if from the will as a whole it appears that it is his intent that the survivor shall take, then he does so, not by right of survivorship as in a joint tenancy, but rather by reason of a limitation over of a remainder interest. Blodgett v. Union New Haven Trust Co., 111 Conn. 165, 167, 149 A. 790; Bolles v. Smith, 39 Conn. 217, 219. Under such circumstances the tenants in common take interests sometimes called cross remainders.

We never have looked with favor upon such a tenancy in this State, and while one could perhaps be created where a clear intent to do so is evidenced by a proper instrument, we seek to avoid the result wherever it can be done without doing violence to the plain intent of the parties. State Bank Trust Co. v. Nolan, 103 Conn. 308, 317, 130 A. 483; Allen v. Almy, 87 Conn. 517, 524, 89 A. 205. Thus a gift to A and B, the survivor to take the whole absolutely, will be construed to give A and B estates in common with a right in the survivor to take the whole as a remainder interest. Houghton v. Brantingham, 86 Conn. 630, 636, 86 A. 664. Such estates are the most that the husband can claim in the bonds.

"* * * Whatever may be the rule in other cases in which a conveyancer employs only such words as `joint owners' or `joint tenants' without adding `and to the survivor' or equivalent words, there can be no question in the case at bar for here the donor employed express words which unequivocally described the right of survivorship and he thereby avoided the constructional preference in favor of a tenancy in common. We need not decide whether the words `joint owners' or `joint tenants' are words of art which, when employed without more in a conveyance, would be deemed to have `expressly declared' that the right of survivorship should exist, for that question is not before us, but see In re Hutchison's Estate [ 120 Ohio St. 542, 166 N.E. 687], and State Bankand Trust Co. v. Nolan, 103 Conn. 308, 130 A. 483." 174 Or at 129-30.

In Harriet T. Forrest's will item 12 is located in just such a position. In State Bank Trust Co. v. Nolan, 103 Conn. 308, 328, 130 A. 483, 490, the court held: "In most cases a residuary clause, where there are other definite and important bequests, cannot be taken as the primary and principal factor determinative of testamentary intent; it is a catch-all, a refuse group; a provision which operates after the operation of the other provisions of a given will; its logical position is the same as its local position, at the end of the testamentary process, not at the beginning."

Whittlesey v. Fuller, 11 Conn. 337, 341. Under our law the legal effect of such a conveyance is as though the grantees were unrelated. Ibid.; New York, N.H. H.R. Co. v. Russell, 83 Conn. 581, 591, 78 A. 324. Even when a joint tenancy is created by express language, there is no implied right of survivorship inherent in it. Whittlesey v. Fuller, supra, 340; State Bank Trust Co. v. Nolan, 103 Conn. 308, 317, 130 A. 483; Hughes v. Fairfield Lumber Supply Co., 143 Conn. 427, 430, 123 A.2d 195. But a right of survivorship may be created by appropriate language employed in either a deed or a will. Id., 430 (deed); Peyton v. Wehrhane, 125 Conn. 420, 436, 6 A.2d 313 (will).

Messrs. C.S. Bowen and Williams Henry of Greenville, for Appellant, cite: As to primary or ordinary meaningof word "any" not meaning "all": Webster's New International Dictionary, 1928; 9 S.C. 156; 18 S.C. 306; 173 S.C. 256, 175 S.E. 256; 207 S.C. 468, 36 S.E.2d 588; 82 Or. 541, 162 P. 498; 180 Ky. 833, 203 S.W. 724; 103 Conn. 308, 130A.483; 293 Ill. 553, 127 N.E. 877. As to there being no intent on part of testator to puthis widow on starvation basis after his death: 90 S.C. 20, 72 S.E. 545; 215 S.C. 34, 53 S.E.2d 876. As to willlimiting the rights of the remaindermen: 36 S.C. 1, 14 S.E. 959; 142 Ky. 96, 134 S.W. 153. As to the sale ofthe farm revoking Item IV of the will: 16 S.C. 40. As tothe conversion of proceeds of sale of farm presumptivelyrevoking Item VI of the will: 15 S.C. 337; 67 S.C. 168, 45 S.E. 176. As to testator's real property, other than thefarm, passing as intestate property: 220 S.C. 47, 66 S.E.2d 421. As to rule that a widow can take under the willof her deceased husband, and also elect to take a distributiveshare of her husband's intestate property: 142 S.C. 359, 140 S.E. 801. Messrs. W.E. Bowen, J.G. Leatherwood and L.F.Simpson, Jr., of Greenville, for Respondents, cite: As toword "all" being equivalent or interchangeable, or synonymouswith "any": 207 S.C. 468, 36 S.E.2d 588; 3 C.J.S. 868; 195

On the contrary, we have frequently approved the right of a grantor to annex the provision to a joint tenancy. State Bank Trust Co. v. Nolan, 103 Conn. 308, 317, 130 A. 483; Mahoney v. Mahoney, 98 Conn. 525, 531, 120 A. 342; White v. Smith, 87 Conn. 663, 676, 89 A. 272; Allen v. Almy 87 Conn. 517, 524, 89 A. 205. When the grantor has properly expressed himself, we have always recognized the right of survivorship, not as an incident of the estate created, but solely by virtue of the conveyance.

"In most cases a residuary clause, where there are other definite and important bequests, cannot be taken as the primary and principal factor determinative of testamentary intent; it is a catch-all, a refuse group, a provision which operates after the operation of the other provisions of a given will; its logical position is the same as its local position; at the end of the testamentary process, not at the beginning." State Bank Trust Co. v. Nolan, 103 Conn. 308, 328, 130 A. 483. The clearly expressed intent of the testator was that one-half of his residuary estate should be added to the principal of the trust fund set up under the provisions of article twelfth of the will as modified by article VI of the codicil and that the total fund so created should be administered as one fund, the income and principal thereof to be distributed as directed in that article twelfth as modified. A second power of disposition by will in Caroline L. McChesney, in addition to and separate from her power of disposition by will over $100,000 of the trust under article twelfth of the will as modified by article VI of the codicil, was not created.

We must construe what she said, and we must construe it in the light of the recognized rules of construction, and not by speculation as to what she would have intended had she foreseen the present situation." See also State Bank Trust Co. v. Nolan, 103 Conn. 308, 328, 130 A. 483; New Britain Trust Co. v. Stoddard, 120 Conn. 123, 126, 179 A. 642; Rogers v. English, 130 Conn. 332, 340, 33 A.2d 540. Nor can we give effect to the testatrix' general plan for equality in the treatment of her grandchildren, whether born before or after her death, when to do so would necessarily require us to set aside her clearly expressed intent as to the method to be used to accomplish that purpose. Rogers v. English, supra.

Whatever may be the rule in other cases in which a conveyancer employs only such words as "joint owners" or "joint tenants" without adding "and to the survivor" or equivalent words, there can be no question in the case at bar for here the donor employed express words which unequivocally described the right of survivorship and he thereby avoided the constructional preference in favor of a tenancy in common. We need not decide whether the words "joint owners" or "joint tenants" are words of art which, when employed without more in a conveyance, would be deemed to have "expressly declared" that the right of survivorship should exist, for that question is not before us, but see In re Hutchison's Estate, supra, and State Bank and Trust Co. v. Nolan, 103 Conn. 308, 130 A. 483. In Stout v. Van Zante, 109 Or. 430, 219 P. 804; 220 P. 414, this court held that the statutes (O.C.L.A. 70-108 and O.C.L.A. 70-205) which were construed in the Erickson case apply to personal property as well as real. This conclusion was certainly not reached by mere inspection of those statutes, both of which expressly refer to real property. The court also cited and relied upon cases which held "that the rules governing estates or interests in lands, whether founded upon statutes or upon general principles of law, should, as far as practicable, be applied to estates or interest of a like character in personal property."