Id. at 139, 493 S.E.2d 532. The second Georgia case that raises questions about the requirement of intent is State Automobile Insurance Co. v. Thomson, 180 Ga.App. 90, 348 S.E.2d 507 (1986). In Thomson the insured was a landlord who wrongfully evicted a tenant and moved the tenant's furniture out to the street.
Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Hart, 162 Ga. App. 333, 335 (2) ( 291 S.E.2d 410) (1982), is authority for the proposition that there is a distinction between intentional acts and the intentional consequences or results. See State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Thomson, 180 Ga. App. 90 ( 348 S.E.2d 507) (1986). "[A]n exclusion as to injury caused intentionally by the insured does not exclude coverage where there is an intentional act but not an intentionally caused injury."
See also Stein v. Mass. Bay Ins. Co., 172 Ga. App. 811 ( 324 S.E.2d 510) (1984). Compare State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Thomson, 180 Ga. App. 90 ( 348 S.E.2d 507) (1986). I would reverse the judgment of the trial court and, therefore, I dissent.