June 13, 1977.John W. Williams, Esq., of Williams and Williams, Columbia, for Appellant, cites: As to the Trial Judge's havingerred in a capital case by giving an instruction which wasinapplicable to the evidence and constituted a charge on thefacts: 137 S.C. 75, 134 S.E. 514; 208 S.C. 462, 38 S.E.2d 492; 178 S.C. 78, 182 S.E. 159; 87 S.C. 532, 70 S.E. 306; 209 S.C. 439, 40 S.E.2d 634; 151 S.C. 379, 149 S.E. 108; 155 Or. 556, 64 P.2d 536; 23A C.J.S., Criminal Law § 1312 at n. 93; 73 S.C. 60, 52 S.E. 793; 137 S.C. 75, 134 S.E. 514; 72 S.C. 1, 51 S.E. 443; 187 S.C. 58, 196 S.E. 371; 237 S.C. 248, 116 S.E.2d 854; 85 S.C. 265, 67 S.E. 453; 264 S.C. 417, 215 S.E.2d 883; 246 S.C. 502, 144 S.E.2d 481; 239 S.C. 280, 122 S.E.2d 633; 255 S.C. 579, 180 S.E.2d 341; 186 S.C. 221. As to the Trial Judge's having erred in acapital case by allowing the Solicitor to open the closingargument on the facts: S.C. Cir. R. 58; 246 S.C. 502, 144 S.E.2d 481.
As to consideration ofevidence and inferences therefrom on motion for directedverdict: 125 S.C. 303, 118 S.E., 613; 166 S.C. 393, 164 S.E., 893. As to statements not constituting a confession: 103 S.C. 437, 443, 88 S.E., 21; 188 Iowa, 655, 176 N.W., 674; 137 S.C. 75, 134 S.E., 514; 173 S.C. 161, 175 S.E., 277. As to the State having submitted competentevidence reasonably tending to sustain the charge: 16 C.J., 935; 205 S.C. 514, 32 S.E.2d 825; 138 S.C. 293, 136 S.E., 215; 127 S.C. 392, 121 S.E., 258; 126 S.C. 499, 120 S.E., 359.
As to it being the clear intendment of the statute to give thejury the right to indicate to the Court its own view of whentime for due and thorough deliberation had elapsed: 126 S.C. 437, 120 S.E. 230. Messrs. Robert B. Wallace, Solicitor, and A. ArthurRosenblum, Assistant Solicitor, of Charleston, for Respondent, cite: As to it not being error to admit evidence, involvingthe Defendant's activities over a period of time, whichincluded criminal activity: 118 S.E. 803, 125 S.C. 406; 134 S.E. 514, 137 S.C. 75; 40 C.J.S., Homicide, 1152; 156 S.E. 169, 159 S.C. 75; 56 P.2d 211, 6 Cal.2d 14; 112 P.2d 174, 71 Okla. Cr. 373; 195 S.E. 72, 213 N.C. 79; 134 S.E. 514, 137 S.C. 75. As to Defendant not beingprejudiced by testimony indicating that he had taken a liedetector test: 164 S.E.2d 439, 251 S.C. 556; 373 U.S. 83, 10 L.Ed.2d 215, 83 S.Ct. 1194.
struct the jury on the defense of consent and theburden of proof incumbent upon the State in establishing thenecessity of and kind of resistance needed to prove non-consent: 44 Am. Jur. 905; 52 S.C. 488, 30 S.E. 408; 228 S.C. 244, 89 S.E.2d 701; 101 Ga. 547, 29 S.E. 424; 37 Ga. App. 121, 138 S.E. 921; 57 S.C. 483, 35 S.E. 729. Messrs. James R. Mann, Solicitor, and Clarence A. Cappell, of Greenville, for Respondent, cite: As to refusal ofmotion for continuance being proper exercise of TrialJudge's discretion: 230 S.C. 405, 95 S.E.2d 857; 223 S.C. 1, 73 S.E.2d 850. As to refusal to ask question,concerning racial prejudice, of prospective jurors, beingproper exercise of Trial Judge's discretion: 131 S.C. 32, 126 S.E. 757; 86 S.C. 143, 67 S.E. 466; 69 S.C. 297, 48 S.E. 25; 93 S.C. 195, 75 S.E. 281. As to exceptions togeneral rule concerning inadmissibility of evidence of commissionof other crime: 88 S.C. 239, 70 S.E. 729; 70 S.E. 417; 70 S.E. 402; 168 N.Y. 293, 61 N.E. 294, 62 L.R.A. 240; 137 S.C. 75, 134 S.E. 514; 57 S.E.2d 194; 88 S.E. 563. As to charge of Trial Judge being clear, completeand proper: 57 S.C. 483, 35 S.E. 729; 106 S.C. 437, 91 S.E. 382. As to Trial Judge properly admitting testimonyconcerning statements made by Defendant: 137 S.E. 75; 134 S.E. 514; 125 S.E. 406; 118 S.E. 803. November 9, 1959.
December 5, 1955.S. Morgan, Esq., of Orangeburg, for Appellant, cites: Asto error on part of Trial Judge in failing to quash indictment: 77 S.C. 478; 26 S.C. 198. As to Trial Judge erring in refusingmotion for new trial on the grounds of after discoveredevidence: 201 S.C. 170; 137 S.C. 75; 127 S.C. 340. Julian S. Wolfe, Esq., Solicitor, of Orangeburg, for Respondent, cites: As to appeal not being noticed or perfectedwithin statutory time limit and therefore of no effect: 30 S. C. 607; 121 S.C. 266, 113 S.E. 483; 154 S.C. 262, 151 S.E. 470; 156 S.C. 73, 154 S.E. 815; 171 S.C. 99, 171 S.E. 477; 107 S.C. 93, 92 S.E. 23; 216 S.C. 79, 56 S.E.2d 744; (S.C.), 88 S.E.2d 254. As to Trial Judgeproperly refusing Motion for new trial on the grounds ofafter discovered evidence: 201 S.C. 170, 22 S.E.2d 417; 137 S.C. 75, 134 S.E. 514; 185 S.C. 274, 194 S.E. 11; 223 S.C. 128, 74 S.E.2d 582; 225 S.C. 89, 80 S.E.2d 918. As to Trial Judge properly instructing the jurythat there was no issue as to the sanity of the defendant to beconsidered: 88 S.C. 401, 71 S.E. 29. As to the Trial Judgeproperly refusing defendant's motion for a change of venueor for a continuance: 168 S.C. 221, 167 S.E. 396; 184 S.C. 290, 192 S.E. 365; 125 S.C. 281, 118 S.E. 620; 120 S.C. 526, 113 S.E. 335; 65 S.C. 321,
Messrs. Harold Major, of Anderson, and R.B. Hildebrand, of York, for Appellant, cite: As to appellant beingentitled to new trial on ground of after-discovered evidence: 126 S.E. 759, 131 S.C. 21; 134 S.E. 514, 137 S.C. 75; 143 S.E. 811, 146 S.C. 255. As to Trial Judge erring bycharging jury with respect to matter of fact: 15 S.C. 381; 27 S.C. 609, 4 S.E. 567; 187 S.C. 58, 196 S.E. 371; 192 S.C. 382, 6 S.E.2d 903; 210 S.C. 242, 42 S.E.2d 240; 32 S.C. 519, 11 S.E. 204; 209 S.C. 531; 41 S.E.2d 217; 185 S.C. 78, 193 S.E. 199; 39 S.E. 758; 27 S.E. 659, 49 S.C. 481; 25 S.E. 797. As to charge of trialjudge having effect of coercing jury: 90 S.E. 596, 106 S.C. 150; 126 S.C. 437, 120 S.E. 230. As to it being necessarythat indictment for burglary state ownership of premisesbroken and entered: 9 Am. Jur. 263, Sec. 48. Messrs. Rufas Fant, Solicitor, and John C. Watkins, of Anderson, for Respondent, cite: As to appellant not beingentitled to new trial on ground of after-discovered evidence: 201 S.C. 170, 22 S.E.2d 417; 185 S.C. 274, 194 S.E. 11. As to there being sufficient evidence to sustain verdictin instant case: 69 S.C. 295, 48 S.E. 251; 197 S.C. 371, 15 S.E.2d 669; 129 S.C. 43, 123 S.E. 765; 126 S.C. 499, 120
imes: 191 S.C. 212, 4 S.E.2d 1; 218 S.C. 106, 62 S.E.2d 100; 3 Strob. 517; 169 F.2d 386; 168 N.Y. 264, 61 N.E. 286, 293, 62 L.R.A. 194. As to error on part of TrialJudge in failing to charge law of circumstantial evidence: 137 S.C. 391, 135 S.E. 361; 208 S.C. 414, 38 S.E.2d 238; 212 S.C. 70, 46 S.E.2d 549; 208 S.C. 195, 37 S.E.2d 525. Mr. Robert W. Hemphill, Solicitor, of Chester, for Respondent, cites: As to Trial Judge properly admitting competentevidence concerning statements of other conspirators: (S.C.) 80 S.E. 482; 4 Strob. 311, 35 S.C.L. 211; 2 Strob. 273, 33 S.C.L. 273; 112 S.C. 95, 98 S.E. 845; 101 S.E. 568, 113 S.C. 103; 152 S.E. 825, 156 S.C. 63; 67 S.E. 316, 85 S.C. 278; 23 S.E.2d 244, 201 S.C. 387. As toevidence of a crime which logically tends to prove facts necessaryor pertinent to the commission of the crime chargedbeing properly admitted: 70 S.E. 729, 88 S.C. 239; 70 S.E. 417, 88 S.C. 204; 57 S.E. 859, 77 S.C. 236; 153 S.E. 480, 156 S.C. 509; 14 S.E. 766, 35 S.C. 340; 134 S.E. 514, 137 S.C. 75; 62 S.E.2d 100, 218 S.C. 106. As to trial judge properly refraining from charging the lawof circumstantial evidence: (S.C.) 41 S.E.2d 628; 44 S.E.2d 741, 211 S.C. 276; 46 S.E.2d 549, 212 S.C. 70. November 14, 1951.
Messrs. C.T. Graydon and Augustus T. Graydon, of Columbia, for Appellant, cite: As to trial judge abusing his discretionin not granting a continuance on grounds of Defendant'spoor health: 126 S.C. 149, 119 S.E. 774; 138 S.C. 24, 135 S.E. 651; 152 S.C. 17, 149 S.E. 17; 160 S.C. 301, 158 S.E. 685; 163 S.C. 213, 161 S.E. 449. As toduty on trial judge to excuse a juror, who has formed orexpressed an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the Defendant,from participating in trial: 65 Fed. 297; 161 S.C. 362, 159 S.E. 838; 207 S.C. 478, 36 S.E.2d 742; 50 C.J., Juries, 967, Sec. 226 and 980, Sec. 232. As to the Defendantbeing placed in double jeopardy: 22 C.J.S., Criminal Law, 400-401, Sec. 263 and 402, Sec. 268; 68 Cal.App. 645; 20 S.C. 392; 16 Utah 212; 65 S.C. 187, 43 S.E. 513; 73 S.C. 318, 53 S.E. 487; 59 A.L.R. 1160; 214 S.C. 1, 51 S.E.2d 91. As to error on part of trial judgein allowing introduction of testimony from former trial: 137 S.C. 75, 134 S.E. 514; 22 C.J.S., Criminal Law, 371-2 Sec. 1002; 15 A.L.R. 495; 59 Okla. Cr. 245, 57 P.2d 882; 101 S.C. 280, 85 S.E. 536. As to error onpart of trial judge in admitting testimony clearly implyingthat defendant was guilty of another crime prior to crimespecified in indictment: 88 S.C. 239, 70 S.E. 729; 168 N.Y. 254, 61 N.E. 286, 62 L.R.A. 193; 105 N.Y.S. 741, 120 App. Div. 786; 124 S.C. 220, 117 S.E. 536; 125 S.C. 406, 118 S.E. 803; 137 S.C. 75, 134 S.E. 514; 132 S.C. 362, 128 S.E. 709; 138 S.C. 58, 135 S.E. 635; 191 S.C. 212, 4 S.E.2d 1. As to telephone conversations purportedlymade with Defendant being inadmissible when notproperly identified: 31 C.J.S., Evidence, 909, Sec. 188; 193 N.C. 386, 137 S.E. 151; 71 A.L.R. 6 et seq.; 137 S.C. 145, 134 S.E. 885; 194 S.C. 533, 9 S.E.2d 222; 100 S.C. 359, 84 S.E. 864. As to the recording of a telephoneconversation being improperly admitted in evidence: 136 Va. 382, 118 S.E. 225; 60 S.Ct. 269, 308 U.S. 321, 84 L.Ed. 298; 62 S.Ct. 993, 316 U.S. 129,
rror on Part of Trial Judge in Discussingthe Case with State's Counsel in Absence of Defendants ortheir Attorneys: 127 S.E., 840, 131 S.C. 422; 123 S.E., 201, 128 S.C. 447; 9 S.E.2d 730, 194 S.C. 234. Messrs. Rufus Fant, Solicitor, and S. Eugene Haley, of Anderson, for Respondent, cite: As to Silence under Accusationof Crime being a Circumstance to go to the Jury onquestion of Guilt or Innocence: 70 S.C. 387, 50 S.E., 13. As to Absence at Time of Crime being Essential Element ofAccessory before the Fact: 190 S.C. 75, 1 S.E.2d 1912. As to Sufficient Evidence of Conspiracy: 12 S.E., 662, 34 S.C. 41; Whartons Crim. Ev. 9 Ed., par. 701; 134 S.E., 514, 130 S.C. 75. As to Admission of Evidence, Claimedto be Incompetent, not being Error, where no Objection orMotion to Strike was Made: 150 S.E., 614, 153 S.C. 175. As to Competency, of Statement Made by Accused if itThrows Light on the Subject being Tried, and also Testimonyas to Demeanor of Accused: 109 S.E., 119, 117 S.C. 170; 134 S.E., 514, 137 S.C. 75. As to StatementsRelevant to the Question Involved being Admissible whenMade by or to the Accused or in his Presence: 134 S.E., 514, 137 S.C. 75; 114 S.E., 317, 121 S.C. 230. As toWhole Statement being Required if Part is Given: 112 S.C. 95, 98 S.E., 845. As to Requirement that Error mustbe Prejudicial to Defendant to Warrant New Trial: 23 S.E.2d 820, 209 S.C. 9. As to Condition of Accused,whether Sober or Intoxicated, being a Circumstance to goto the Jury as Throwing Light on the Question Involved: 109 S.E., 119, 117 S.C. 470; 64 S.E., 595, 82 S.C. 288. As to Actions of Accused being Tantamount to Giving OralTestimony: 129 S.C. 200, 124 S.E., 81. As to Accusedhaving Received a Fair and Impartial Trial: 198 S.C. 519, 18 S.E.2d 369. As to Elements Objector must Show inthe Matter of Improper Remarks by Opposing Counsel tothe Jury: 160 S.C. 11, 158 S.E., 151; 205 S.C. 412, 32 S.E.2d 163. November 1, 1946.
The last requirement, to wit, that the after-discovered evidence must not be merely cumulative or impeaching is recognized and followed in many cases. And in the case of State v. Pittman, 137 S.C. 75, 134 S.E., 514, 518, it is stated that the well-established general rule is that newly discovered evidence which "merely impeaches or contradicts the testimony of a witness at the trial" affords no sufficient grounds for a new trial. Three of the affidavits relied on by the defendants here aver that the prosecuting witness, H.L. Chassereau, made certain statements to the affiants, and it is contended that these statements tend to contradict the testimony given by him at the trial; but reading these affidavits in the light of the testimony at the trial I do not think that they measure up to the requirement of materiality; nor do I think that such evidence would be at all likely to change the result if a new trial were granted.