Opinion
Civ. No. 98-3799 (DRD).
April 12, 1999.
John Stasicky, New Brunswick, New Jersey, Pro Se Plaintiff.
Stephen D. Holtzman, Esq., John J. Tambascia, Jr., Esq., Lally, Holtzman, Gilligan, Duffin Quasti, P.C., Linwood, New Jersey, Attorneys for Defendant Correctional Medical Services, Inc.
O P I N I O N
Plaintiff, John Stasicky, instituted this action for alleged violations of his civil rights, specifically his Eighth, Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendment rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendant Correctional Medical Services, Inc. ("CMS"), incorrectly designated in the Complaint as Middlesex County Adult Correctional Center Medical Department Doctors and Nurses, moves to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) or, in the alternative, for summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. Stasicky has not opposed the motion. For the reasons set forth below, the motion to dismiss the Complaint will be granted.
BACKGROUND
Stasicky is an inmate of the New Jersey State Prison system and is currently incarcerated at Middlesex County Adult Correctional Center ("MCACC") in North Brunswick, New Jersey. CMS provided medical services at MCACC at all times relevant to this action.
Stasicky filed his Complaint on September 28, 1998 seeking compensatory and punitive damages against the defendants. Stasicky is proceeding in forma pauperis pursuant to an order of the same date. In the Complaint Stasicky alleges that on July 2, 1998 he was assaulted in his cell by several corrections officers and that other officers stood outside his cell watching the assault without doing anything to assist him. He also claims that although he was sent to the medical unit after the alleged assault he should have been sent to a hospital for x-rays. According to the Complaint Stasicky was treated by a nurse following the alleged assault and was looked over by a doctor the next morning.
DISMISSAL PURSUANT TO RULE 12(b)(6)
A complaint must be dismissed pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if the court finds "beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). In analyzing motions to dismiss, all allegations set forth in the complaint must be accepted as true and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in the plaintiff's favor. Schrob v. Catterson, 948 F.2d 1402, 1405 (3d Cir. 1991). A court should allow a plaintiff to amend the complaint instead of dismissing it where "a more carefully drafted complaint might state a claim upon which relief could be granted." Friedlander v. Nims, 755 F.2d 810, 813 (11th Cir. 1985);see Howze v. Jones Laughlin Steel Corp., 750 F.2d 1208, 1212 (3d Cir. 1984).
A motion to dismiss which presents the court with matters outside the pleading which are not excluded is to be treated as a motion for summary judgment and analyzed pursuant to Rule 56. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12. In such circumstances, "all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56." Id. However, an undisputedly authentic document attached to a motion to dismiss may be considered without converting it to a motion for summary judgment if plaintiff's claims are based upon that document. Pension Ben. Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1042 (1994).
STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR PRO S.E. SUBMISSIONS
It is recognized that pro se submissions "must be held to `less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.'" Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976), reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 1066 (1977) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, supra, 355 U.S. at 45-46); see also Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, reh'g denied, 405 U.S. 948 (1972); United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 42 (3d Cir. 1992); Lewis v. Attorney Gen. of the United States, 878 F.2d 714, 722 (3d Cir. 1989). When reviewing apro se complaint, a court must construe a plaintiff's factual allegations and his or her claim liberally. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n. 9 (1989); Haines, supra, 404 U.S. at 520; Roman v. Jeffes, 904 F.2d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1990).
ANALYSIS
CMS asserts that dismissal of the Complaint is proper because 1) it did not act with deliberate indifference to Stasicky's medical needs and 2) it was not personally involved with Stasicky's medical care and cannot be held liable under a theory of respondeat superior.
Section 1983 provides in relevant part that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. . . .42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 does not itself create substantive rights, but provides a method for obtaining relief for a violation of rights conferred elsewhere. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989). In order to recover under this section, "a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law." West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (citations omitted).
In Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976), the Supreme Court held that in order for a prisoner to state a claim for cruel and unusual punishment based on inadequate medical care, the prisoner must demonstrate that prison officials exhibited deliberate indifference to serious medical needs constituting the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. The Court stated:
In order to state a cognizable claim, a prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. It is only such indifference that can offend evolving standards of decency in violation of the Eighth Amendment.Id. at 106 (internal quotation marks omitted).
In determining what constitutes deliberate indifference, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that mere allegations of malpractice do not raise issues of constitutional import. Monmouth County Correctional Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 346 (3d Cir. 1987). Rather, only unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain or deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of a prisoner are sufficiently egregious to rise to the level of a constitutional violation. White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 1990). Indeed, this court has held that in order to rise to the level of cruel and unusual punishment in this context, there must be acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious needs, including intentional interference with professionally prescribed care or treatment. Negligent diagnosis, incorrect treatment, or other circumstances that do not amount to more than professional malpractice, will not suffice. Lewandowski v. Fauver, 531 F. Supp. 53, 54 (D.N.J. 1981).
In this case, even construing Stasicky's allegations as true as they must be in this motion to dismiss, the treatment complained of simply does not rise to the level of cruel and unusual punishment. By his own admission, Stasicky was provided medical attention by a nurse following the alleged assault and he was seen by a doctor the next morning. The thrust of his charge against CMS appears to be that he should have been sent to a hospital instead of being treated at MCACC and x-rays should have been taken. "Methods of diagnosis and choice of treatment of an inmate are . . . not subject to judicial review." Peterson v. Davis, 551 F. Supp. 137, 146 (D.Md. 1982), aff'd, 729 F.2d 1453 (4th Cir. 1984). Thus, Stasicky's allegations cannot give rise to the inference that CMS was deliberately indifferent to his medical needs.
In light of the foregoing, the Complaint against CMS must fail. Moreover, the Supreme Court has ruled that in Section 1983 actions persons can be held responsible only for their own conduct and not under a theory of respondeat superior. Monell v. New York City Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). In order for a supervisory official to be found liable under Section 1983, the official must have been personally involved in the challenged incident, or there must be a causal connection between an act of the official and the alleged violation.Skevofilax v. Quigley, 586 F. Supp. 532, 543 (D.N.J. 1984). Such a causal connection can be shown by establishing an affirmative link between the incident and an official plan, policy or act explicitly or implicitly authorizing the violative conduct. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-376 (1976).
Stasicky has failed to allege any such causal connection between CMS and the complained of acts. As a result, under Monell CMS cannot be held vicariously liable for the alleged deprivation of Stasicky's constitutional rights and the Complaint will be dismissed in its entirety as to CMS.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, CMS's motion to dismiss the Complaint will be granted and the Complaint will be dismissed as to CMS. An appropriate order follows.
O R D E R
This matter having been opened to the Court by Stephen D. Holtzman, Esq. of Lally, Holtzman, Gilligan, Duffin Quasti, P.C., attorneys for defendant Correctional Medical Services, Inc. ("CMS"), on a motion to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6); and there being no opposition to the motion; and the Court having considered CMS's submissions pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 78; for good cause shown, and for the reasons set forth in the Court's opinion of even date,
IT IS, this day of April, 1999, ORDERED that CMS's motion is granted and the Complaint against CMS is dismissed with prejudice.