Summary
In Starner Tree Serv. Co. v City of New Rochelle (271 AD2d 681), the Court applied the 10-not 20-year period in a claim against a municipality (see, also, Greenman v City of Cortland, 141 AD2d 910; Almor Assoc. v Town of Skaneateles, 231 AD2d 863).
Summary of this case from Ammirati v. Van WicklenOpinion
Argued March 9, 2000.
April 24, 2000.
In an action to acquire title to real property by adverse possession, the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Donovan, J.), entered February 25, 1999, which, inter alia, denied its motion to dismiss the complaint.
Banks Gruen Shapiro Gettinger, LLP, Mount Kisco, N.Y. (Mona D. Shapiro of counsel), for appellant.
Donald S. Mazin, Larchmont, N.Y., for respondents.
FRED T. SANTUCCI, J.P., DANIEL W. JOY, THOMAS R. SULLIVAN, MYRIAM J. ALTMAN, JJ.
DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.
To acquire title to real property by adverse possession, the possessor must establish that the character of the possession is "`hostile and under a claim of right, actual, open and notorious, exclusive and continuous' for the statutory period of 10 years" (Ray v. Beacon Hudson Mtn. Corp., 88 N.Y.2d 154, 159, quoting Brand v. Prince, 35 N.Y.2d 634 ). Where lands are held by a municipality in its governmental capacity they may not be lost by adverse possession, but when held in its propriety capacity, there is no immunity against adverse possession (see, City of Tonawanda v. Ellicott Creek Homeowners Assn., 86 A.D.2d 118 ; Walsh's Inc. v. County of Oswego, 9 A.D.2d 393 ; Long Island Land Research Bureau, Inc. v. Town of Hempstead, 203 Misc. 619, aff'd 283 App. Div. 663, aff'd 308 N.Y. 818 ).
The Supreme Court properly found that the appellant held the subject property in its proprietary capacity and that there was a question of fact as to whether the plaintiffs have acquired title to the subject property by adverse possession (see generally, Ray v. Beacon Hudson Mtn. Corp., supra; Barnes v. Light, 116 N.Y. 34 ;Ramapo Mfg. Co. v. Mapes, 155 App. Div. 443 ).
The appellant's remaining contention is without merit.