In addition each photograph indicates the date and time of the exposure. Thus this case is more akin to the recent case of Stark v. State (1986), Ind., 489 N.E.2d 43, where the defendant was found guilty of robbery by way of fraudulent use of an automatic teller machine. There was an automatic camera photograph of the transaction.
A trial judge may consider uncharged crimes as part of a defendant's criminal history, which is a statutory aggravating circumstance. Stark v. State (1986), Ind., 489 N.E.2d 43. In the present case, the trial judge could properly consider the defendant's involvement in the Darlington matter as evidence of being a criminal accessory after the fact, a violation of Ind. Code § 35-1-29-3 (repealed 1977; replaced by Ind. Code § 35-44-3-2).
Burgess v. State (1984), Ind., 461 N.E.2d 1094, 1097 (attempted murder is a specific intent crime and conviction will not stand absent some evidence the crime was committed intentionally); Anthony v. State (1980), 274 Ind. 206, 409 N.E.2d 632, 636 (requirement of culpability within meaning of this section means that there must be an intent to commit the crime). No intent to inflict the serious bodily injury is required to elevate robbery to a Class A felony. Stark v. State (1986), Ind., 489 N.E.2d 43, 48 (proof that defendant intentionally caused bodily injury is not required to elevate robbery to Class A; if any injury arises as a consequence of the robbery, the offense is Class A). The serious bodily injury need not afflict the robbery victim herself. Bailey v. State (1980), 274 Ind. 318, 412 N.E.2d 56, 59 (where injury to any person other than a defendant is a consequence of accused's conduct in committing a robbery, offense is properly regarded as a Class A felony). The bodily injury need not be life threatening to be considered serious.
The state argues that a non-victim need suffer only "bodily injury" in order for the robbery charge to be elevated to a class A felony. The state relies on Stark v. State (1986), Ind., 489 N.E.2d 43, and Bailey v. State (1980), 274 Ind. 318, 412 N.E.2d 56, as support for this argument. In Stark, the supreme court stated that, "[u]nder the applicable statute, robbery is a Class A felony if it results in bodily injury."
The trial court thus erred by allowing the reports into evidence. Cases from the Indiana Supreme Court and Court of Appeals reveal that evidence held as admissible include: arrest records and arrest reports, including fingerprint cards (Boarman v. State, 509 N.E.2d 177 (Ind. 1987); Lyons v. State, 506 N.E.2d 813 (Ind. 1987); Prentice v. State, 474 N.E.2d 496 (Ind. 1985); Landers v. State, 464 N.E.2d 912 (Ind. 1984); McBrady v. State, 459 N.E.2d 719 (Ind. 1984); Belcher v. State, 453 N.E.2d 214 (Ind. 1983); Pitts v. State, 439 N.E.2d 1140 (Ind. 1982); Underhill v. State, 428 N.E.2d 759 (Ind. 1981); Jennings v. State, 723 N.E.2d 970 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000); Payne v. State, 658 N.E.2d 635 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995); Knuckles v. State, 549 N.E.2d 85 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990)); ATM photos and audit sheets (Stark v. State, 489 N.E.2d 43 (Ind. 1986)); autopsy reports (Thompson v. State, 270 Ind. 442, 386 N.E.2d 682 (1979)); blood alcohol test results (Reeves v. Boyd Sons, 654 N.E.2d 864 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995)); blood and DNA test results (Fowler v. Napier, 663 N.E.2d 1197 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996); Humbert v. Smith, 655 N.E.2d 602 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995); Burp v. State, 612 N.E.2d 169 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993)); certifications of mailing (Collins v. State, 567 N.E.2d 798 (Ind. 1991)); check vouchers and deposit slips (McDonough v. State, 242 Ind. 376, 175 N.E.2d 418 (1961); Cobb v. State, 585 N.E.2d 40 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992)); commitment orders (Funk v. State, 427 N.E.2d 1081 (Ind. 1981)); financial statements (Williams v. Hittle, 629 N.E.2d 944 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994)); insurance policies (Willoughby v. State, 660 N.E.2d 570 (Ind. 1996)); inventory records (Schneider v. State, 220 Ind. 28, 40 N.E.2d 322 (1942)); job logs tracking performance (Brant Constr. Co. v. Lumen Constr., 515 N.E.2d 868 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987)); log sheets of police evidence (P
Moreover, this Court has held that criminal charges pending at the time of sentencing may be considered aggravating circumstances. Dillon v. State (1986), Ind., 492 N.E.2d 661; Stark v. State (1986), Ind., 489 N.E.2d 43, 48. Presumably, such aggravators are entitled to modest weight. The trial judge probably saw it that way, mentioning only briefly in his sentencing order that "the offense pending in Delaware County Superior Court No. 1 occurred subsequent to the current offense."
Ricks v. State (1983), Ind. App., 446 N.E.2d 648. He also cites Indiana cases interpreting the aforementioned statutes and finds that in situations similar to this, the evidence has been held sufficient to sustain a finding of serious bodily injury, e.g., Hawkins v. State (1987), Ind., 514 N.E.2d 1255. Taking note of the evidence that Guiden's leg was splinted for five weeks and that he needed crutches and missed work for four weeks, we also "do not find that the injuries in the present case differ substantially in kind and extent from those in the cases" cited by the Court of Appeals. Minniefield, supra, 569 N.E.2d at 736. Appellant maintains it violates due process of law to impose strict liability for serious bodily injury resulting from a robbery and asks we revisit our decision in Stark v. State (1986), Ind., 489 N.E.2d 43, which holds the State need not prove the defendant knowingly or intentionally caused the injury to elevate the offense to a Class A felony. As the Court of Appeals noted, Stark involved enhancement under the pre-1984 version of Ind. Code § 35-42-5-1 which required only "bodily injury" to enhance robbery to Class A felony status.
This Court has also held that criminal charges which are pending at the time of a defendant's sentencing hearing may properly be considered as an aggravating circumstance. Dillon, 492 N.E.2d 661; Stark v. State (1986), Ind., 489 N.E.2d 43. Pending charges, like arrests, do not establish the historical fact that the defendant committed the crime alleged, but, like arrests, are relevant and may be considered by a sentencing court as being reflective of the defendant's character and as indicative of the risk that he will commit other crimes in the future. As noted above, the sentencing statement at issue here makes it clear that the court inferred that appellant actually committed the crimes for which he was arrested, and this inference constitutes error.
However, there is no duty on the trial court to make an affirmative finding expressly negating each potentially mitigating circumstance. Stout v. State (1988), Ind., 528 N.E.2d 476; Stark v. State (1986), Ind., 489 N.E.2d 43. In Hammons v. State (1986), Ind., 493 N.E.2d 1250, 1254-55, we observed:
Aggravation by reason of resulting injury does not depend upon when a crime begins or ends, but rather depends upon the causation of the injury. Indiana Code § 35-42-5-1 states that robbery is "a Class A felony if it results in serious bodily injury to any person other than a defendant." Regardless of the intent of the perpetrator, if the injury occurs as a consequence of the conduct of the accused, the offense is regarded as a Class A felony. Stark v. State (1986), Ind., 489 N.E.2d 43. The injuries here resulted from the victim's escape from the robbers; but for the robbery, there clearly would have been no injury. The evidence was sufficient to support the conviction of robbery as a Class A felony.