Opinion
G052363
05-09-2017
JEROME DUNBAR STARK, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. ORANGE COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT et al., Defendants and Respondents.
Bryant & Bryant and Kenneth A. Bryant for Plaintiff and Appellant. Koeller, Nebeker, Carlson & Haluck, William L. Haluck, John P. Donovan and Michael J. Rossiter for Defendants and Respondents.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2014-00706060) OPINION Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Mary Fingal Schulte, Judge. Affirmed in part and reversed in part. Bryant & Bryant and Kenneth A. Bryant for Plaintiff and Appellant. Koeller, Nebeker, Carlson & Haluck, William L. Haluck, John P. Donovan and Michael J. Rossiter for Defendants and Respondents.
* * *
This case arises out of criminal and professional disciplinary proceedings brought against Plaintiff Jerome Dunbar Stark (Stark), a practicing attorney, which Stark alleges were the result of a conspiracy by law enforcement to falsify and destroy evidence. Stark appeals from an order granting summary judgment on statute of limitations grounds to defendants County of Orange (County), Orange County Sheriff's Department (OCSD), Officer Richard Moree (Officer Moree), Officer Olivia Sanchez (Officer Sanchez) and Officer James Porras (Officer Porras) (collectively, defendants), and dismissing Stark's complaint in its entirety. He contends that the two causes of action in his complaint — one state, one federal — accrued at a much later time than that found by the trial court, and that applying a two-year statute of limitations from the proper accrual date necessarily yields the conclusion that his causes of action are not time-barred.
Although we do not agree with Stark's precise reasoning, we agree that it was error for the trial court to grant summary judgment in favor of defendants. Stark's state law cause of action, which we construe as one for conspiracy to intentionally inflict emotional distress, is not time-barred as against the County and OCSD because Stark timely filed his lawsuit after the County rejected his claim for damages under the California Government Claims Act (Govt. Code, § 900 et seq.; Government Claims Act). As against the individual defendants, there is a question of material fact as to when Stark's state law cause of action accrued, which precludes a finding at this stage that it is time-barred.
Notwithstanding our conclusion that summary judgment was improper, we find that summary adjudication, which defendants urged in the alternative, would have been proper. Stark's federal civil rights cause of action, brought under title 42 United States Code section 1983 (section 1983), is time-barred as against all defendants, except Officer Porras, because his lawsuit was filed more than two-years from the accrual date — the time at which he was arrested and criminally charged. Officer Porras was not a moving party to the summary judgment/adjudication motion, so it was improper to provide him with any relief.
I
FACTS
On the evening of September 21, 2011, Stark drove to John Wayne Airport to pick up his son, who was scheduled to arrive on an inbound flight. During his first pass by the curb area outside the baggage claim where arriving passengers wait for transportation, Stark did not see his son. He continued on the internal public airport roadways, "loop[ing]" back around to the arrivals level in anticipation of his son's arrival. On the fourth loop around, Stark spotted his son. Stark pulled up and stopped his vehicle parallel to another vehicle that was parked adjacent to the curb where his son was waiting. His son opened the back door, put his luggage inside and got into the front passenger seat.
As his son got into the vehicle, a bright light flashed first into Stark's eyes, then into his son's eyes and then back into Stark's. The light was coming from a flashlight held by a man in a dark green jacket who appeared to Stark to be standing a distance away from the front of Stark's vehicle and in the immediately adjacent lane. Stark drove forward, allegedly stopped the vehicle next to the man with the flashlight, and directed an obscenity at, and made an obscene gesture towards, the man. Stark drove off, and as he did, he heard a loud sound coming from the direction of the back of his vehicle, which was later determined to be caused by the man in the green jacket hitting Stark's vehicle. As he continued to drive, he saw the man with the flashlight chasing him. Prior to exiting airport grounds, Stark drove through a red light located at a pedestrian crosswalk.
Later that night, four OCSD deputies went to Stark's house to speak with him about what had transpired at the airport. Stark voluntarily spoke with Investigator T. Nguyen while the other three deputies waited. During their conversation, Investigator Nguyen relayed to Stark that the man with the flashlight and dark green jacket was an OCSD officer, Officer Moree, and that there was an independent witness to the events. Stark stated that he did not observe the man wearing a uniform, traffic vest or anything else indicating he was an officer, and asked Investigator Nguyen what any video tapes of the incident showed — a question to which Stark claims Investigator Nguyen did not respond. Before leaving, Investigator Nguyen also spoke with Stark's son.
Based on information presented by Investigator Nguyen, the Orange County District Attorney's Office approved an arrest warrant for Stark. Stark was arrested that same night and charged with felony assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (c)). He posted bail and was released from jail the next morning. Because Stark is a licensed attorney, the district attorney's office notified the Office of the State Bar of California (State Bar) of the pendency of his case, in accordance with Business and Professions Code section 6101.
Business and Professions Code section 6101, subdivision (b), provides: "The district attorney, city attorney, or other prosecuting agency shall notify the Office of the State Bar of California of the pendency of an action against an attorney charging a felony or misdemeanor immediately upon obtaining information that the defendant is an attorney. The notice shall identify the attorney and describe the crimes charged and the alleged facts. The prosecuting agency shall also notify the clerk of the court in which the action is pending that the defendant is an attorney, and the clerk shall record prominently in the file that the defendant is an attorney."
On February 2, 2012, Stark pled guilty to one misdemeanor count of reckless driving (Veh. Code, § 23103, subd. (a)), and the district attorney's office dismissed the felony count alleging assault with a deadly weapon. Prior to entering his plea, Stark contacted the State Bar to inquire what effect, if any, a guilty plea to a charge of reckless driving would have on his license to practice law. He received a response prior to entering his plea.
The State Bar was notified of Stark's plea on February 8, 2012, and it commenced disciplinary proceedings against him in May 2012. In connection with his defense, Stark served on the County a subpoena for production of business records which requested a copy of any video recordings of the lower roadway area of the airport around the time the incident took place on September 21, 2011. The County responded, indicating that the requested records would not be produced because they contained information protected by the constitutional right to privacy and because Stark had failed to serve a purportedly required consumer notice.
The California State Bar Court (State Bar Court) hearing concerning potential discipline against Stark based on his guilty plea began on September 27, 2012. The State Bar attempted to show that Stark assaulted Officer Moree with a deadly weapon — his car. Among those who testified were Officer Moree and Investigator Nguyen, and among the evidence produced were photos of Officer Moree and another officer that were supposedly taken following the incident in question. No video was introduced.
After considering all testimony and evidence, the State Bar Court judge concluded the State Bar did not meet its burden of showing (1) that Stark "intended to run over Officer Moree"; and (2) that Stark knew, or had reason to know, that Officer Moree was a police officer. In his 31-page detailed decision, the judge found Officer Moree lacked credibility because his testimony contradicted his previous statements about what had occurred. He also found it troublesome that the County and the State Bar did not appear to make an effort to determine whether any video of the incident existed.
Despite his conclusion concerning assault with a deadly weapon, the State Bar Court judge determined that Stark's actions warranted discipline because of "the risk of serious harm to others that [his] misconduct created." The judge noted Stark's "lapse of good judgement prompted by road rage, his failure to make any effort to determine whether the person pointing a flashlight at him at the terminal was an authorized law enforcement officer seeking to control traffic and promote the safety of others, his decision to drive his SUV out of the busy terminal at speeds that all have described as unsafe (even though they were within the posted limit), and his decision not to stop for the traffic signal governing the flow of traffic through a pedestrian crosswalk at the busy [airport] terminal." Stark received a private reproval, and was ordered to comply with certain conditions for a one-year period following the effective date of the reproval.
The State Bar Court decision was issued on November 2, 2012, and Stark did not take any action to challenge it. Pursuant to the State Bar Court's procedural rules, the decision is public and available on the State Bar's Web site. (Rules Proc. of State Bar, rule 5.127.)
On June 7, 2013, pursuant to the Government Claims Act, Stark filed a written "Claim for Money or Damages" with the County alleging $560,000 in damages. In the claim, he described the circumstances that caused the alleged damage as: "Officers, Detectives and employees of the Sheriff's Department, County of Orange, conspired and fabricated evidence alleging assault with a deadly weapon on a law enforcement officer, Richard Curtis Moree, which resulted in a three and a half day Trial of Claimant by the State Bar of California." The County rejected Stark's claim in writing on August 21, 2013.
In November 2013, Stark was pulled over by unknown OCSD officers for making an illegal lane change while driving. The officers advised Stark that there was an outstanding warrant out on the vehicle. Stark was let go without being cited. He was later told by an OCSD employee that he would need to go to court to get the warrant issue resolved; Stark never took steps to do so.
On February 20, 2014, Stark filed a lawsuit against defendants seeking general and special damages. The original complaint named the state, the County, the OCSD, Officer Moree, Officer Sanchez and Investigator Nguyen as defendants. Stark subsequently made amendments to the complaint to remove the state as a defendant and add Officer Porras as a defendant.
The complaint contains two causes of action — one titled "Conspiracy to Harass" and the other titled "Violation of Plaintiffs' [sic] Civil Rights." Defendants filed answers to the complaint and later, with leave of the court, amended their answers to add a statute of limitations affirmative defense.
Following initial discovery, including a deposition of Stark, defendants moved for summary judgment, or alternatively for summary adjudication, largely based on statute of limitations grounds. Stark opposed the motion, and a hearing was held. The trial court granted defendants' motion, finding that both Stark's claims were time-barred by a two-year statute of limitations. In the order granting summary judgment, the trial court ordered the complaint "dismissed with prejudice as to all parties, served and unserved." Stark timely appealed.
The trial court never executed a judgment based on its summary judgment ruling. Stark appeals from the signed and filed an order granting summary judgment and dismissing the complaint in its entirety with prejudice. Such an order of dismissal is treated as a final appealable judgment. (Code Civ. Proc., § 581d; Cox v. Superior Court of Amador County (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 855, 858.)
II
DISCUSSION
"A trial court properly grants summary judgment where no triable issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. [Citation.] We review the trial court's decision de novo, considering all of the evidence the parties offered in connection with the motion (except that which the court properly excluded) and the uncontradicted inferences the evidence reasonably supports. [Citation.] In the trial court, once a moving defendant has 'shown that one or more elements of the cause of action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established,' the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show the existence of a triable issue; to meet that burden, the plaintiff 'may not rely upon the mere allegations or denials of its pleadings . . . but, instead, shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to that cause of action. . . .'" (Merrill v. Navegar, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 465, 476-477.)
"The affidavits in support of and in opposition to the motion must be made on personal knowledge and must set forth admissible evidence as to which the affiant is competent to testify. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c.) The affidavits of the moving party are strictly construed, while those of the party opposing the motion are liberally construed, and doubts as to the propriety of granting the motion must be resolved in favor of the party opposing the motion." (Miller v. Bechtel Corp. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 868, 874.) "While resolution of the statute of limitations issue is normally a question of fact, where the uncontradicted facts established through discovery are susceptible of only one legitimate inference, summary judgment is proper. [Citation.]" (Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1103, 1112.)
Stark argues that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment based on the statute of limitations. His challenge does not focus on the length of the limitations period, but instead the date on which his causes of action accrued. He claims that his causes of action did not accrue until the State Bar Court decision became final, and thus his complaint was timely filed within the limitations period. For the reasons we explain below, we conclude that Stark's state law claim, titled "Conspiracy to Harass," was timely filed as to the public entity defendants, and there is a question of material fact as to whether it was timely filed against the individual defendants. In addition, we conclude that Stark's federal cause of action for violation of his civil rights is time-barred. A. Rulings on Evidentiary Objections
Before we turn to the core of Stark's appeal, we first address his contention that the trial court improperly declined to consider two pieces of evidence — the final State Bar Court decision concerning discipline against Stark and an OCSD airport police services "Control Center Log." "'[T]he decision of the judge not to take judicial notice will be upheld on appeal unless the reviewing court determines that the party furnished information to the judge that was so persuasive that no reasonable judge would have refused to take judicial notice of the matter.'" (Willis v. State of California (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 287, 291; see CREED-21 v. City of San Diego (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 488, 520 [abuse of discretion standard].)
With respect to the Control Center Log, Stark requested that the trial court take permissive judicial notice of it "under the provisions of Evidence Code, sections 452 and 453." The request, however, was entirely devoid of any explanation as to why the court should exercise its discretion to take such notice. (Evid. Code, § 453 [party requesting permissive judicial notice must provide "the court with sufficient information to enable it to take judicial notice of the matter"].) Stark has not demonstrated error. (Willis v. State of California, supra, 22 Cal.App.4th at p. 291.)
As for the State Bar Court decision, Stark fails to identify where in the record it shows he submitted it as evidence or requested that the trial court take judicial notice of it, and where it shows the trial court declined to consider it. His failure to cite to the record waives his argument. (Schubert v. Reynolds (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 100, 109.) B. Alleged Procedural Errors
We next turn to Stark's two alleged procedural errors. First, Stark contends that it was error to grant summary judgment because defendants' original answers did not allege a statute of limitations defense. However, defendants obtained leave of the court to amend their answers to include such a defense, and those amended answers were operative at the time the trial court granted summary judgment. (Bostrom v. County of San Bernardino (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1654, 1663-1664 [any party may seek leave to amend its pleading so court may consider previously unpled issue in connection with summary judgment motion].)
Second, Stark argues that it was improper for the trial court to grant summary judgment as to Officer Porras because he was not a moving party. We agree. Officer Porras was not a named defendant at the time the rest of the defendants filed their summary judgment motion, and Officer Porras never filed any papers with respect to the motion. Thus, it was improper to provide him with any relief as a result of the motion. (See Frazee v. Seely (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 627, 636.) C. First Cause of Action
Stark's first cause of action, labeled "Conspiracy to Harass," alleges that "[a]s a direct and proximate result of the harassment [described in the complaint], Plaintiff was charged with a felony which was pled down to a reckless driving[,]" and that the felony allegations led to the State Bar Court's private reproval against him. Though the complaint is far from a model of clarity, the harassment alleged appears to be that OCSD officers fabricated evidence to support Officer Moree's initial statement that Stark assaulted him with a deadly weapon, and that the fabricated evidence led to the overlooking of video evidence which would have otherwise been discovered and supported Stark's version of the airport incident. No statutory or constitutional basis is alleged.
Based on these allegations, and because no common law cause of action for harassment exists and conspiracy is not itself a tort (Applied Equipment Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia, Ltd. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 503, 510-511), we construe Stark's first cause of action to be one for intentional infliction of emotional distress. (See Murphy v. Allstate Ins. Co. (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 38, 51.)
1. Government Entity Defendants
The Government Claims Act "establishes certain conditions precedent to the filing of a lawsuit against a public entity." (State of California v. Superior Court (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1234, 1237.) Before suing a public entity for money or damages, a plaintiff must present a timely written claim to the entity. (Gov. Code, § 911.2.) Failure to do so bars bringing suit against the entity. (Gov. Code, § 945.4.) When a claim is filed, the public entity has 45 days within which to act or the claim is deemed denied. (Gov. Code, § 911.6.) If written notice of rejection is provided by the public entity, a plaintiff has six months from the date of the notice to file a lawsuit. (Gov. Code, § 945.6.) This six-month statute of limitations supplants the statute of limitations that would normally apply if the same cause of action were brought against a nonpublic entity. (See Shirk v. Vista Unified School Dist. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 201, 209.)
Before suing the County, Stark presented a written claim for damages to it. The County provided a written notice of rejection on August 21, 2013, and Stark filed his lawsuit just within the six-month limit, on February 20, 2014. Thus, his suit against the County was timely and should not have been dismissed on statute of limitations grounds.
Defendants argued below that Stark's claim was not timely presented to the County. (See Gov. Code, § 911.2 [claim for damages due to personal injury must be presented within one year of accrual of cause of action].) They have abandoned this argument, as they do not discuss the issue even though Stark's opening brief discussed timeliness of his claim and waiver of a timeliness defense. (See also Gov. Code, § 911.3 [failure to assert in response to claim that claim is rejected due to late presentation waives defense of untimeliness of claim].) --------
2. Individual Defendants
Civil "[c]onspiracy is not a cause of action, but a legal doctrine that imposes liability on persons who, although not actually committing a tort themselves, share with the immediate tortfeasors a common plan or design . . . ." (Applied Equipment Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia, Ltd., supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 510-511.) The elements of a civil conspiracy are: (1) the formation and operation of the conspiracy; (2) wrongful conduct in furtherance of the conspiracy; and (3) damages arising from the wrongful conduct. (Ibid.) Because civil conspiracy is not an independent tort, there is no civil action unless an underlying wrongful act is committed (Richard B. LeVine, Inc. v. Higashi (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 566, 574), and the applicable statute of limitations is that which applies to the underlying wrong (Bedolla v. Logan & Frazer (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 118, 136).
The parties agree, as do we, that the statute of limitations on Stark's state law cause of action against the individual defendants is two years from the date his cause of action accrued. (Code Civ. Proc., § 335.1; Pugliese v. Superior Court (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1444, 1450.) They dispute the date of accrual. Stark asserts his cause of action did not accrue until the State Bar Court decision became final. Defendants assert it accrued much earlier, on the date Stark pled guilty to reckless driving and the felony assault with a deadly weapon charge was dismissed. We find that a triable issue of fact exists as to when Stark's state law claim accrued.
"A cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress accrues, and the statute of limitations begins to run, once the plaintiff suffers severe emotional distress as a result of outrageous conduct on the part of the defendant." (Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 857, 889.) The wrongful conduct asserted by Stark is four-fold: (1) falsifying evidence, including photographs and police reports; (2) destroying video of the airport incident; (3) failing to transmit the complete police report to the State Bar Court; and (4) testifying falsely during the State Bar Court proceedings. Though some of these alleged acts may have occurred prior to February 20, 2012 — the "cutoff" date for Stark's cause of action to fall within the two-year statute of limitations — we cannot say with certainty when, if at all, Stark first suffered emotional distress and when, if at all, it became sufficiently severe to support recovery. (See Kiseskey v. Carpenters' Trust For So. California (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 222, 232-233 [determining time at which plaintiff's emotional distress becomes sufficiently severe is question of fact for trier of fact].) Stark has stated, for example, that he first saw the photographs, which he claims were fabricated when they were introduced by the State Bar during the State Bar Court proceedings. On this record, we cannot say at the summary judgment stage that Stark's state law claim against the individual defendants is time-barred. (See Murphy v. Allstate Ins. Co., supra, 83 Cal.App.3d at p. 51.) D. Section 1983
Stark's second cause of action seeks general and special damages allegedly resulting from defendants' knowing, willful and malicious violation of his federal civil rights. The Government Claims Act claim presentation requirement does not apply to section 1983 causes of action (Williams v. Horvath (1976) 16 Cal.3d 834, 842), thus we collectively discuss Stark's federal claim as it relates to all defendants.
Because section 1983 does not contain a statute of limitations, the state statute of limitations for personal injury claims applies — two years in California. (Code Civ. Proc., § 335.1; City of Huntington Park v. Superior Court (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1293, 1297, citing Wilson v. Garcia (1985) 471 U.S. 261, 280, superseded on other grounds by statute in Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co. (2004) 541 U.S. 369, 379-380.) While state law also governs tolling (Hardin v. Straub (1989) 490 U.S. 536, 537-539), federal law governs when the limitations period accrues (Wallace v. Kato (2007) 549 U.S. 384, 388 (Wallace)). For purposes of federal law, "a claim accrues 'when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action.'" (Lukovsky v. City & County of San Francisco (9th Cir. 2008) 535 F.3d 1044, 1048.) In California, the limitations period on a section 1983 action is tolled while criminal charges are pending if the civil claim is based on the officer's conduct relating to the offense for which the accused is charged. (Gov. Code, § 945.3; Schmidlin v. City of Palo Alto (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 728, 748.)
Turning to Stark's allegations, part of the injury described in his section 1983 cause of action is being "incarcerated for an additional (6) hours, [posting] bail for One Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000), [and being] reported to the State Bar." He knew of these injuries at the time he was arrested and charged with assault with a deadly weapon on a police officer. And, given his version of what occurred at the airport, he had reason to suspect wrongdoing, such as the alleged falsification of evidence and destruction of surveillance video, as of that time as well. Thus, his section 1983 cause of action accrued in September 2011. (See Wallace, supra, 549 U.S. at pp. 388-390 [false arrest claim generally accrues at time of arrest and malicious prosecution claim accrues at time charges initiated]; Compton v. Ide (9th Cir. 1984) 732 F.2d 1429, 1433 [if person "has notice of wrongful conduct," cause of action accrues even though he or she does not "have knowledge of all the details or all of the persons involved"], abrogated on another ground in Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc. (1987) 483 U.S. 143, 148-149.) The two-year limitations period was tolled during the pendency of Stark's criminal case, but that tolling period ended on February 2, 2012 when he pled guilty to reckless driving and the assault with a deadly weapon charge was dismissed. (Schmidlin v. City of Palo Alto, supra, 157 Cal.App.4th at p. 748.) Given that more than two years elapsed between such time and the filing of this suit, Stark's section 1983 claim is time-barred.
Stark attempts to keep his federal cause of action alive by asserting that the alleged wrongdoing was a "continuing and ongoing" violation of his rights. He argues that because some of the alleged wrongful acts occurred within the two years prior to him filing suit, the entire series of wrongful acts are actionable. We reject this argument.
The continuing violation doctrine is invoked in limited situations typically involving repeated sexual harassment or discriminatory employment practices (see National Railroad Passenger Corporation v. Morgan (2002) 536 U.S. 101, 114-118; Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe v. United States (9th Cir. 1990) 895 F.2d 588, 597; Green v. Los Angeles County Superintendent of Schools (9th Cir. 1989) 883 F.2d 1472, 1480), and Stark had cited no authority indicating it may be invoked in a case such as the one before us. Even if it were a potentially viable doctrine, it "is of no assistance or applicability [in this case], because mere 'continuing impact from past violations is not actionable.'" (Williams v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. (9th Cir. 1982) 665 F.2d 918, 924; see Knox v. Davis (9th Cir. 2001) 260 F.3d 1009, 1013 ["[T]his court has repeatedly held that a 'mere "continuing impact from past violations is not actionable"'"]; Del. State College v. Ricks (1980) 449 U.S. 250, 258 [under continuing violation theory, "'[the] proper focus is upon the time of the discriminatory acts, not upon the time at which the consequences of the acts became most painful'"].) "Were it otherwise, the statute would begin to run only after a plaintiff became satisfied that he had been harmed enough, placing the supposed statute of repose in the sole hands of the party seeking relief." (Wallace, supra, 549 U.S. at p. 391.)
The State Bar Court proceedings arose out of the original criminal charge filed against Stark and his subsequent guilty plea. The same is true about the supposed warrant concerning his vehicle. Thus, Stark's involvement in the State Bar Court proceedings and the vehicle stop related to the warrant were, at best, continuing impacts from the alleged initial wrongful conduct. They do not alter the accrual date.
Stark points to the purported false testimony given by Officer Moree and others during the State Bar Court proceedings to evidence the continuing wrong. However, as defendants correctly note, those who testified have "absolute immunity" from liability for claims based on their testimony, even if they committed perjury and their statements were made with malice. (Briscoe v. LaHue (1983) 460 U.S. 325, 326; see Rehberg v. Paulk (2012) 566 U.S. 356, 366-374; Lisker v. City of Los Angeles (9th Cir. 2015) 780 F.3d 1237, 1241-1242.) "Broad witness immunity facilitates the substantial public interest in eliciting the truth, even though it occasionally protects witnesses who knowingly give false testimony." (Paine v. City of Lompoc (9th Cir. 2001) 265 F.3d 975, 982.) Such absolute immunity precludes such acts from being actionable, whether individually or as part of continuing wrongful conduct. (Briscoe v. LaHue, supra, 460 U.S. at p. 326.)
Because we conclude Stark's section 1983 cause of action is time-barred by the statute of limitations, we do not address defendants' other contentions, including that it is time-barred by the principles set forth in Heck v. Humphrey (1994) 512 U.S. 477.
III
DISPOSITION
The summary judgment in favor of defendants is reversed. The trial court is directed to vacate its order granting summary judgment in favor of all defendants and dismissing Stark's complaint, and enter a new and different order granting summary adjudication in favor of defendants, except Officer Porras, as to Stark's second cause of action for violation of his civil rights. The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.
MOORE, J. WE CONCUR: BEDSWORTH, ACTING P. J. THOMPSON, J.