To satisfy this burden, the State must show: (1) that proper Miranda warnings were given before any questioning by the police and (2) that the statement was voluntary, i.e., that it was not procured through coercion or improper inducement. See Stariks v. State, 572 So.2d 1301, 1304 (Ala.Crim.App. 1990); McLeod v. State, 718 So.2d 727, 729 (Ala. 1998). The initial determination of admissibility is made by the trial court, and the trial court's determination will not be disturbed unless it is contrary to the great weight of the evidence or is manifestly wrong.

See Fisher v. State, 587 So.2d 1027 (Ala.Cr.App. 1991), cert. denied, 587 So.2d 1039 (Ala. 1991) (Maddox, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 941, 112 S.Ct. 1486, 117 L.Ed.2d 628 (1992); Dysart v. State, 581 So.2d 541 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 581 So.2d 545 (Ala. 1991) (Maddox, J., dissenting, joined by Adams, J.). For other Alabama cases in which the issue of gender-based strikes was discussed, see Ex parte Bankhead, 625 So.2d 1146 (Ala. 1993); Huntley v. State, 627 So.2d 1013 (Ala. 1992); Williams v. State, 607 So.2d 321 (Ala.Cr.App. 1992) (Montiel, J., dissenting); Ex parte Murphy, 596 So.2d 45 (Ala. 1992) (Maddox, J., dissenting); Mims v. State, 591 So.2d 120 (Ala.Cr.App. 1991); and Stariks v. State, 572 So.2d 1301 (Ala.Cr.App. 1990). The frustration with Batson probably resulted from what, as I mentioned earlier, appeared to be one of the basic foundation stones of the Batson decision: the right of citizens to serve on a jury and not be excluded solely for a reason unrelated to the case to be tried, so that the public's confidence in the integrity of the jury system would be preserved, a goal established by the Court in Batson.

The law currently states that Batson does not extend to gender-based strikes. Fisher v. State, 587 So.2d 1027 (Ala.Crim.App. 1991), writ denied, 587 So.2d 1039 (Ala. 1991); Daniels v. State, 581 So.2d 536 (Ala.Crim.App. 1990), writ denied, 581 So.2d 541 (Ala. 1991); Dysart v. State, 581 So.2d 541 (Ala.Crim.App. 1990), cert. denied, 581 So.2d 545 (Ala. 1991); Stariks v. State, 572 So.2d 1301 (Ala.Crim.App. 1990)."

"(1) that proper Miranda warnings were given before any questioning by the police and (2) that the statement was voluntary, i.e., that it was not procured through coercion or improper inducement. See Stariks v. State, 572 So.2d 1301, 1304 (Ala.Crim.App. 1990); McLeod v. State, 718 So.2d 727, 729 (Ala. 1998).

The determination of voluntariness of a statement and its admissibility is left to the trial court's discretion, and the court's exercise of that discretion will not be disturbed on appeal unless the judgment is palpably contrary to the great weight of the evidence. Uber v. State, 596 So.2d 608, 612 (Ala.Crim.App. 1991); Stariks v. State, 572 So.2d 1301, 1304 (Ala.Crim.App. 1990). The trial court listened to the tape-recorded statement and determined that the appellant was not so intoxicated that his statement was involuntary and that he was not coerced into making the statement.

The determination as to whether a statement is voluntary rests within the sound discretion of the trial court and that determination will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is palpably contrary to the great weight of the evidence. Uber v. State, 596 So.2d 608, 612 (Ala.Crim.App. 1991); Stariks v. State, 572 So.2d 1301, 1304 (Ala.Crim.App. 1990). Whether a statement was voluntary is to be determined under the totality of the circumstances.

The determination whether a statement was voluntary and therefore admissible is left to the trial court's discretion and its decision will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is palpably contrary to the great weight of the evidence. Uber v. State, 596 So.2d 608, 612 (Ala.Crim.App. 1991); Stariks v. State, 572 So.2d 1301, 1304 (Ala.Crim.App. 1990). The State correctly argues that confronting the accused with a codefendant's confession implicating the accused is not necessarily unfair or coercive.

The determination of a statement's voluntariness and its admissibility is left to the discretion of trial court and its exercise of that decision will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is contrary to the great weight of the evidence. Uber v. State, 596 So.2d 608, 612 (Ala.Crim.App. 1991); Stariks v. State, 572 So.2d 1301, 1304 (Ala.Crim.App. 1990). The trial court, after listening to the tape-recorded statement, found that the appellant was not intoxicated or coerced into making the statement.

A majority of this court has repeatedly held that Batson does not extend to gender-based strikes. Fisher v. State, 587 So.2d 1027 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 587 So.2d 1039 (Ala. 1991), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 1486, 117 L.Ed.2d 628 (1992); Daniels v. State, 581 So.2d 536 (Ala.Cr.App.) (Bowen, J., dissenting), writ denied, 581 So.2d 541 (Ala.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 315, 116 L.Ed.2d 257 (1991); Dysart v. State, 581 So.2d 541 (Ala.Cr.App. 1990), cert. denied, 581 So.2d 545 (Ala. 1991) (Bowen, J., dissenting); Stariks v. State, 572 So.2d 1301 (Ala.Cr.App. 1990). See also Parker v. State, 587 So.2d 1072 (Ala.Cr.App. 1991) (Bowen, J., noting the majority's position on gender-based strikes); Bankhead v. State, 625 So.2d 1141 (Ala.Cr.App. 1992) (Bowen and Montiel, JJ., dissenting). Age, however, may be a valid race-neutral reason for striking a potential juror.

Contra: United States v. Hamilton (4th Cir. 1988), 850 F.2d 1038, 1042-43 (exclusion of women because they were female, rather than because they were black, avoided Batson); State v. Adams (La. App. 1988), 533 So.2d 1060, 1063 (declining to extend Batson beyond purposeful racial discrimination); State v. Clay (Mo. App. 1989), 779 S.W.2d 673, 676 ( Batson not extended to peremptory challenges of women); State v. Culver (1989), 233 Neb. 228, 233, 444 N.W.2d 662, 666 (refusing to extend Batson to gender-based discrimination). To the same effect are Stariks v. State (Ala. Crim. App. 1990), 572 So.2d 1301, 1302-03; Hannan v.Commonwealth (Ky. App. 1989), 774 S.W.2d 462, 463-65; and State v. Oliviera (R.I. 1987), 534 A.2d 867, 869-70. See Morehead, Exploring the Frontiers of Batson v. Kentucky: Should the Safeguards of Equal Protection Extend to Gender?, 14 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 289 (1990); Puiszis, Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.: Will The Peremptory Challenge Survive Its Battle with the Equal Protection Clause?, 25 J. Marshall L. Rev. 37, 51 (1991); Note, Reconstruction of The Peremptory Challenge System: A Look At Gender-Based Peremptory Challenges, 22 Pac. L.J. 1305 (1991).