Opinion
06-11-1913
STAPLER et al. v. HOLLISTER et al.
William E. Blackman, of Trenton, for complainants.
Suit by Sarah Stapler and another against Helen S. Hollister and another for partition of lands. Lands partible and commissioners to make partition appointed on application therefor.
William E. Blackman, of Trenton, for complainants.
WALKER, Ch. This bill is filed for a partition of the lands whereof John T. Stapler died seised, of which the parties are tenants in common. Title is derived under his inartistically drawn and somewhat peculiar will, which provides: (1) That after the payment of his debts (2) he gives the income of all his estate, real, personal, and mixed, to his wife, Sarah, waiving her right of dower, as long as she remains his widow, upon her remarriage or death one-half of the whole estate to go to his children, and they also to have the income of the other half for life, when it shall go to his grandchildren, if any; if none, then to his nearest blood heirs, as also all his estate, if he should have child or children or grandchildren living at the marriage or death of his wife; upon condition that if his wife is unmarried when the children become of age, they are each to have $10,000, which is to be taken from the one-half of the estate which they shall inherit; none of his property to be sold at private sale for less than cost of same, without its being first fairly offered at public sale; (3) his wife to have charge of the children and have them reared and educated from the income of his estate as long as she remains his widow; upon remarriage all her interest in the estate to cease, and also so far as any interest in his children goes that shall also cease, and the same (that is, both interests) to be carried to his other executors; (4) appoints his wife, Sarah Stapler, his brother, Harry Stapler, and his friend, William H. Skirm, executrix and executors.
The parties to this suit are his widow (who has conveyed her interest in the estate to Mary E. Stapler and Helen S. Hollister, wife of Charles G. Hollister, the daughters of herself and the testator, her late husband, John T. Stapler), and also Mary E. Stapler, Helen S. Hollister, and Charles G. Hollister, her husband.
Upon the death or remarriage of the widow, the two named children are each entitled to an estate in fee simple in the equal undivided half of all the lands and real estate whereof the father died seised. When the children became of age, they, if the widow be living and unmarried, were to have $10,000 each, to be taken from the half so given to them. The two children are also, at the death or remarriage of their mother, to have the income of the other half of the estate for life, after which it shall go to his grandchildren, if any, or, if none, then to his dearest blood heirs, as shall all his estate if he should have no child, children, or grandchildren living upon the marriage or death of the widow.
The real estate sought to be partitioned consists of the following four several tracts of land (called three in the bill of complaint), namely: (1) A lot situate upon the easterly side of Stuyvesant avenue in the city of Trenton at the southeasterly corner of Laurel street, fronting 100 feet on Stuyvesant avenue and extending in an easterly direction 897 feet to the line of land of the Delaware & Bound Brook Railroad Company; (2) lot No. 19 on the plan of lots of the Hamilton Land Association situate on the north side of South Broad street, fronting 25 feet on Broad street and extending northerly at right angles to Broad street 147 feet to a 12-foot wide alley; (3) lot No. 20 on the same plan of lots, adjoining lot No. 19, and of the same dimensions and of like description; (4) lot No. 68 on the same plan of lots situate on the south side of Genesee street, fronting 25 feet on Genesee street and extending at right angles thereto 116 feet in depth to a 12-foot wide alley. These lots are unimproved, vacant lots and are unproductive of income.
The master to whom this matter was referred was, among other things, directed to ascertain and report the nature, circumstances, and situation of the property, and whether the lands are so situate that a partition thereof can be made without great prejudice to the owners thereof, and to state the facts upon which his opinion is founded, and also to ascertain and report whether the interests of the owners require or would be promoted by a sale of the lands, and the reasons upon which such opinion is founded. He has reported, inter alia, as follows: "I find and report that the said lands cannot be partitioned or divided amongst the said owners thereof without great prejudice to their respective interests; and my principal reason therefor is the great uncertainty that beclouds the title at present because of the limitations upon the same by the creation of the said estate in remainder or expectancy, as well as by other reasons hereinafter mentioned. I also find and report that the interest of the owners of said land require and will be greatly promoted by a sale thereof for the following reasons: The said lands are all unimproved and unproductive city lots, yielding no income whatever, but subject to heavy assessments for taxes and for the erection of sewers and pavement of streets and the like—and, from a consideration of all the facts and circumstances connected with and surrounding these lands, there is no reasonable probability that they will improvein value in their present state at all, in comparison with the interests which would accrue to the owners thereof in case of a sale, so that they could have a free and unincumbered title."
The evidence taken before the master, and upon which he bases his report, shows the unimproved, unincumbered, and unproductive condition of the several tracts; that yearly taxes are assessed upon them; that sewer assessments and assessments for street paving as to the two South Broad street lots have been levied; and that the parties cannot make a good and marketable title to the lands. As to the Stuyvesant avenue tract, Mrs. Stapler testifies that her husband died in 1891; that in the first year after his death the taxes upon the tract were $48; and that in 1910 they had increased to about $187. As to the other three properties, she testifies that the taxes have also increased (she does not say how much), but not to such an extent as those on the Stuyvesant avenue tract; that the Stuyvesant avenue tract is favorably located and has been recently nearly surrounded with new buildings. She adds: "I think that by selling the properties now there could be a good profit made for the heirs." She expresses a preference for a sale rather than a partition and says: "The reason that I don't want partition is because we would be no better oft" than we are now, since under the will we could convey no property." The only further testimony is that of real estate dealers, who testified substantially and in practically the same terms, that the interests of the owners require and will be promoted by a sale of the properties. The reasons they give for this opinion are: (1) That the lands are unimproved and there is no profit arising from them; (2) there are yearly charges in the way of taxes and may be in the way of sewer, street, and other improvements; (3) the impossibility of the present owners making a good title to the lands in case of a division among them; (4) there would be no inducement for them to build or make any improvements, since by the chance of death, without heirs to take under the will, all investments in these properties would be forfeited; (5) the character and style of houses in the neighborhood has been fixed by the erection of inexpensive dwellings, and that the lands are not likely to appreciate in value in a ratio to the interest, taxes, and other expenses incident to holding them; (6) in case of a division and the separate owners desired to sell, no one would buy for any reasonable price because the owner could convey no good title. I cannot agree with the master, whose opinion I do not think is justified by the proofs. I am of opinion that these lands are partible and that no condition or circumstance that would make a division inequitable is shown to exist. The law governing the case is fixed by the statute and repeated adjudications.
The act concerning partition (Comp. Stat. p. 3903, § 16) provides that, if it shall appear by satisfactory proof that the land or real estate cannot be partitioned among the owners without great prejudice to their interests, it may be ordered to be sold. It is obvious that these lands are susceptible of actual partition. Whether such division will greatly prejudice the interests of the owners is the only question for adjudication. This is purely a question of fact and must be determined upon the facts conceded and established by the evidence.
It has been held that the circumstances which will render a partition injurious must usually relate to the land itself, and that the mere complication of the owners' interests does not necessarily render partition injurious to the owners or any of them. Freeman Cot. & Part. § 537, citing Vesper v. Farnsworth, 40 Wis. 361, in which the court observed: "So far as we can perceive, the order rests entirely upon the fact that there is an outstanding life estate in a portion of the premises. But for that circumstance it seems, so far as it yet appears, that an actual partition of the land is entirely practicable. If partition could be made in that case without great injury to the owners, it is not very apparent how a change in the relative interests and rights of the owners can render an actual partition so disastrous to them. To illustrate: A., B., and C. own a farm in common, and actual partition can be made between them without injury to either. But A., in addition to his one-third interest in the farm, acquires a life estate in one-half of the interests of B. and C. How can that circumstance alone render an actual partition of the farm injurious to the owners or either of them? The same difficulty in making partition in the latter case would arise in making division of the proceeds, should the farm be sold. It seems to us that the circumstances which will render a partition injurious must usually relate in some way to the land itself, its location, condition, quantity, and the like, and that mere complication of the owners' interests, having no relation to these, does not necessarily render partition injurious to the owners or any of them."
In Smith v. Trustees, etc., 36 App. Div 387, 388, 55 N. Y. Supp. 371, the court refused an application for an order for sale and said: "We see no difficulty in an actual partition of the property. It can be divided in any direction into two equal parts, or, if the values of different sections of the bay are unequal, it can be divided into more than two parts, so that an equitable partition is comparatively easy. In Chittenden v. Gates, 18 App. Div. 169 , we affirmed a judgment directing an actual partition of a long, narrow beach or tongue of sand, lying between the ocean and Jamaica Bay, on the ground that it was difficult to see how any property was more susceptible of divisionthan property of this character. The reasoning of that opinion applies with equal force to the premises in question."
In Clason v. Clason, 6 Paige (N. T.) 547, Chancellor Walworth says: "The true question to be decided by the master, under the statute, is whether the whole property, taken together, will be greatly injured or diminished in value if separated into three parts, in the hands of three different persons, according to their several rights or interests in the whole; in other words, whether the aggregate value of the several parts, when held by different individuals in severalty, would be materially less than the whole value of the property if owned by one person."
The objects of a partition are to avoid the inconvenience that results from a joint or common and united possession, and to enable the persons entitled to take possession of and improve their respective shares. Stevens v. Enders, 13 N. J. Law, 271, 275.
The only facts established by the testimony taken before the master are: (1) That the lands are subject to the payment of taxes and other municipal liens, as are all lands; that they are unimproved and yield no income to the owners; that the title of the owners is an estate for life limited over. That latter fact, it is alleged, makes it undesirable and unattractive for the owners to improve the lands so as to make them yield an income, as such investment would be lost to them upon the termination of their life estates, and that, being unable to convey a clear title, the lands could not be sold for a reasonable price. It is said that the lands are not likely to appreciate in value; but the evidence discloses a steady growth in value since the death of Mr. Stapler. There appears nothing relating to the land itself, its location, condition, or quantity, of a character that would cause a partition to prejudicially affect the interests of the owners. The complication arising from the estates created by the will is given prominence as a reason for a sale of the lands. All three of the witnesses seem to have based their opinions upon the assumption that by a sale of the land a purchaser would acquire a title thereto in fee simple, discharged of the limitations created by the testator.
Campbell v. Cole, 71 N. J. Eq. 327, 64 Atl. 461, is cited as authority for a sale in lieu of an actual partition in this case. In Campbell v. Cole it is said that sale may be made notwithstanding a share held by a tenant in common is less than a fee, whenever it shall appear that the land is so situated that partition cannot be made without prejudice to the persons interested; and Chancellor Magie held that the court had power to order a sale, the master having reported, upon evidence that was clearly competent and conclusive, that the lands were incapable of being actually partitioned. That case, therefore, does not apply.
I cannot see that the status of the parties to this suit will be appreciably changed by either a division or sale of these lands. If they are partitioned, they will retain the same title to their respective shares as they now have in the undivided whole; and the purchaser or purchasers thereof, if sold, would acquire no better title. Partition produces no effect upon or alteration in the estate of the respective parties, although it severs the possession; and each party thereafter, instead of being seised of an undivided interest, becomes seised in entirety of his share, and the occupation and estate which before were in common become several and distinct. Den ex dem. Howell v. Howell, 20 N. J. Law, 411, 416. The fact that the parties hold an estate in these lands for life, limited over to persons who may not now be in esse (although, by the statute, this court, under proper conditions can order their partition or sale), furnishes no valid or effective reason for sale in this proceeding.
My conclusion is that the land is partible and that no great prejudice to the interests of the owners will result from a partition. 1 will appoint commissioners to make an actual partition if application shall be made therefor.