When conflicting evidence is presented at a hearing on a motion for new trial, the trial court must resolve the conflict. Stanton v. State, 747 S.W.2d 914, 926 (Tex.App. — Dallas 1988, pet. ref'd). An appellate court will not disturb the trial court's findings absent an abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion will be found only "when the trial judge's decision was so clearly wrong as to lie outside that zone within which reasonable persons might disagree."
The Sneed test differentiates between those cases where common knowledge "manifests itself in an open expression or discussion of parole possibilities" from those harmful cases where jurors are unduly influenced by assertions made by someone who claims special knowledge. Sneed at 265; see Keady at 758-759 (even though juror believed statements about parole to be factual because of the specificity of the assertions, none of the jurors professed to know the law); Stanton v. State, 747 S.W.2d 914, 924 (Tex.App. — Dallas 1988, pet. ref'd) (no new trial even though juror related during deliberations that he had friend who received a long sentence and served only a short time); Gilliam v. State, 746 S.W.2d 323 (Tex.App. — Eastland 1988, no pet.) (discussion of parole which failed to meet Sneed test); McGlothlin v. State, 705 S.W.2d 851, 861-862 (Tex.App. — Fort Worth 1986) (no finding of jury misconduct under Sneed when "they said he would serve a third or a half of what the sentence was"), rev'd on other grounds, 749 S.W.2d 856 (Tex.Cr.App. 1988); Kopanski v. State, 713 S.W.2d 188, 191 (Tex.App. — Corpus Christi 1986, no pet.) (no finding of reversible error under Sneed where jury discussed notion that if given 30 years, defendant would be released in 15); Rassner v. State, 705 S.W.2d 798, 801-802 (Tex.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, pet. ref'd) (no reversible error under Sneed even though several jurors showed their knowledge of parole during deliberations).
Furthermore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the guilty verdict was decided in a manner that was a fair expression of opinion by the jurors. See, e.g., Stanton v. State, 747 S.W.2d 914 at 925 (Tex.App. — Dallas 1988, pet'n ref'd). Appellant's point of error is overruled.
The appellant could only inquire as to the prospective juror's ability to consider the maximum for the worst aggravated robbery imaginable, inquiry into whether the prospective juror could consider the maximum in the case of a repeat offender was improper. It would not have rehabilitated the prospective juror on the issue of whether he could follow the law in regard to the range of punishment for aggravated robbery with no enhancement. The prospective juror in question was properly struck for cause because he made it clear that he could not follow the law on the range of punishment. Moore v. State, 542 S.W.2d 664, 669 (Tex.Crim.App. 1976) cert. denied, 431 U.S. 949, 97 S.Ct. 2666, 53 L.Ed.2d 266 (1977); Stanton v. State, 747 S.W.2d 914, 921 (Tex.App. — Dallas 1988, pet. ref'd). We find no error in the trial court's ruling and overrule the first point of error.