Appeal from Calhoun Circuit Court, Allen L. Garbrecht, J. Court of Appeals, Fitzgerald, P.J., and Doctoroff and White, JJ., 237 Mich. App. 366 (1999) (Docket No. 205614). Harold Schuitmaker [181 W. Michigan Avenue, Paw Paw, MI 49079] [616.657.3177], for the plaintiffs-appellants.
Although it is true that the motor vehicle exception to governmental immunity must be narrowly construed, the majority's reading of the term "operation" is unnecessarily and inappropriately narrow. Stanton v. Battle Creek, 237 Mich. App. 366; 603 N.W.2d 285 (1999), aff'd 466 Mich. 611 (2002). The statute in question makes a governmental agency, such as defendant, liable for its negligent operation of a motor vehicle it owns.
Typically, a genuine issue of material fact regarding gross negligence may be raised through evidence of a disregard of a known danger, or proceeding in the same manner as before when an injury occurred. See, e.g., id; LaMeau v Royal Oak, 289 Mich App 153, 180; 796 NW2d 106 (2010) (because defendants were warned about dangerous condition and failed to subsequently act, a question of fact existed); Staton v Battle Creek, 237 Mich App 366, 375; 603 NW2d 285 (1999) aff'd 466 Mich 611 (2002) (although defendant knew of occasional problems with the forklift brakes before the accident, defendant took appropriate action to notify the department and was otherwise qualified to operate the forklift, no gross negligence). In looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, plaintiff has failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether defendant's conduct was grossly negligent.
Relevant to the disposition of this action, "[s]ummary disposition is precluded where reasonable jurors honestly could have reached different conclusions with respect to whether a defendant's conduct amounted to gross negligence." Stanton v. Battle Creek, 237 Mich App 366, 375; 603 NW2d 285 (1999), aff'd 466 Mich 611 (2002). The definition of "gross negligence" is now found at MCL 691.1407(7)(a) following amendment by 2004 PA 428.
However, apparently plain statutory language can be rendered ambiguous by its interaction with other statutes. Stanton v. Battle Creek, 237 Mich App 366, 371; 603 NW2d 285 (1999), aff'd 466 Mich 611 (2002). In this case, we find no ambiguity in the statutes, and we agree with the conclusion reached by the WCAC.
However, apparently plain statutory language can be rendered ambiguous by its interaction with other statutes. Stanton v. Battle Creek, 237 Mich App 366, 371; 603 NW2d 285 (1999), affirmed 466 Mich 611; 647 NW2d 508 (2002). In this case, we find no ambiguity in the statutes, and agree with the conclusion reached by the WCAC.
Moreover, this Court reviews issues of statutory construction, as well as a trial court's grant of summary disposition, de novo. Stevenson v Reese, 239 Mich. App. 513, 516; 609 N.W.2d 195 (2000); Stanton v Battle Creek, 237 Mich. App. 366, 368; 603 N.W.2d 285 (1999). III.
Adrian School Dist v Michigan Public School Employees' Retirement System, 458 Mich. 326, 337; 582 N.W.2d 767 (1998); Faulhaber, supra at 167. Moreover, the general rule of prospectivity does not apply to statutes or amendments that are remedial or procedural. Stanton v Battle Creek, 237 Mich. App. 366, 373; 603 N.W.2d 285 (1999); Faulhaber, supra at 166. A statute is remedial or procedural if it is designed to correct an existing oversight in the law, to redress an existing grievance, or to introduce regulations conducive to the public good, or if it is intended to reform or extend existing rights.
"Summary disposition is precluded where reasonable jurors honestly could have reached different conclusions with respect to whether a defendant's conduct amounted to gross negligence." Stanton v. City of Battle Creek, 603 N.W.2d 285, 289 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999), aff'd, 647 N.W.2d 508 (Mich. 2002).
See, e.g., Vanderwagen v. J.C. Penney Life Ins. Co., 202 F.3d 283, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 37762 (10th Cir. Dec. 23, 1999) (unpublished) (analyzing same language in contract governed by Illinois law).See, e.g., Stanton v. City of Battle Creek, 603 N.W.2d 285, 290 (Mich.Ct.App. 1999). In summary, although the policy definition of "land motor vehicle" is not plainly unambiguous, the only reasonable construction is that the requirements of customary use in transportation and operator licensing are mandatory and not merely illustrative.