Stanton v. City of Battle Creek

14 Citing cases

  1. Stanton v. Battle Creek

    466 Mich. 611 (Mich. 2002)   Cited 149 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that a forklift is not a motor vehicle because it is a piece of industrial construction equipment

    Appeal from Calhoun Circuit Court, Allen L. Garbrecht, J. Court of Appeals, Fitzgerald, P.J., and Doctoroff and White, JJ., 237 Mich. App. 366 (1999) (Docket No. 205614). Harold Schuitmaker [181 W. Michigan Avenue, Paw Paw, MI 49079] [616.657.3177], for the plaintiffs-appellants.

  2. Chandler v. Muskegon County

    467 Mich. 315 (Mich. 2002)   Cited 55 times
    In Chandler, supra at 321, we held that the phrase "operation... of a motor vehicle" in MCL 691.1405 "encompasses activities that are directly associated with the driving of a motor vehicle.

    Although it is true that the motor vehicle exception to governmental immunity must be narrowly construed, the majority's reading of the term "operation" is unnecessarily and inappropriately narrow. Stanton v. Battle Creek, 237 Mich. App. 366; 603 N.W.2d 285 (1999), aff'd 466 Mich. 611 (2002). The statute in question makes a governmental agency, such as defendant, liable for its negligent operation of a motor vehicle it owns.

  3. Barrett v. Milai

    No. 300968 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 15, 2011)

    Typically, a genuine issue of material fact regarding gross negligence may be raised through evidence of a disregard of a known danger, or proceeding in the same manner as before when an injury occurred. See, e.g., id; LaMeau v Royal Oak, 289 Mich App 153, 180; 796 NW2d 106 (2010) (because defendants were warned about dangerous condition and failed to subsequently act, a question of fact existed); Staton v Battle Creek, 237 Mich App 366, 375; 603 NW2d 285 (1999) aff'd 466 Mich 611 (2002) (although defendant knew of occasional problems with the forklift brakes before the accident, defendant took appropriate action to notify the department and was otherwise qualified to operate the forklift, no gross negligence). In looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, plaintiff has failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether defendant's conduct was grossly negligent.

  4. Kendricks v. Rehfield

    270 Mich. App. 679 (Mich. Ct. App. 2006)   Cited 57 times
    Finding "an egregious injury" where "officers ignored plaintiff's claim of mistaken identity, and plaintiff was held in jail pending trial for seven months until his claim of mistaken identity was confirmed," despite the officers having "access to fingerprints and photographs could have easily confirmed plaintiff's identity"

    Relevant to the disposition of this action, "[s]ummary disposition is precluded where reasonable jurors honestly could have reached different conclusions with respect to whether a defendant's conduct amounted to gross negligence." Stanton v. Battle Creek, 237 Mich App 366, 375; 603 NW2d 285 (1999), aff'd 466 Mich 611 (2002). The definition of "gross negligence" is now found at MCL 691.1407(7)(a) following amendment by 2004 PA 428.

  5. Ross v. Modern Mirror

    268 Mich. App. 558 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005)   Cited 17 times
    Recognizing that the one-year limit was a statute of limitations that applied to overpayment of benefits

    However, apparently plain statutory language can be rendered ambiguous by its interaction with other statutes. Stanton v. Battle Creek, 237 Mich App 366, 371; 603 NW2d 285 (1999), aff'd 466 Mich 611 (2002). In this case, we find no ambiguity in the statutes, and we agree with the conclusion reached by the WCAC.

  6. Ross v. Modern Mirror Glass Co.

    710 N.W.2d 561 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005)

    However, apparently plain statutory language can be rendered ambiguous by its interaction with other statutes. Stanton v. Battle Creek, 237 Mich App 366, 371; 603 NW2d 285 (1999), affirmed 466 Mich 611; 647 NW2d 508 (2002). In this case, we find no ambiguity in the statutes, and agree with the conclusion reached by the WCAC.

  7. Maxwell v. Citizens Ins. Co. of America

    245 Mich. App. 477 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001)   Cited 9 times
    Declining to adopt the technical definition of "rehabilitate" in favor of the ordinary dictionary definition

    Moreover, this Court reviews issues of statutory construction, as well as a trial court's grant of summary disposition, de novo. Stevenson v Reese, 239 Mich. App. 513, 516; 609 N.W.2d 195 (2000); Stanton v Battle Creek, 237 Mich. App. 366, 368; 603 N.W.2d 285 (1999). III.

  8. People v. Sheeks

    625 N.W.2d 798 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001)   Cited 3 times

    Adrian School Dist v Michigan Public School Employees' Retirement System, 458 Mich. 326, 337; 582 N.W.2d 767 (1998); Faulhaber, supra at 167. Moreover, the general rule of prospectivity does not apply to statutes or amendments that are remedial or procedural. Stanton v Battle Creek, 237 Mich. App. 366, 373; 603 N.W.2d 285 (1999); Faulhaber, supra at 166. A statute is remedial or procedural if it is designed to correct an existing oversight in the law, to redress an existing grievance, or to introduce regulations conducive to the public good, or if it is intended to reform or extend existing rights.

  9. Seales v. City of Detroit

    Case No. 17-1096 (6th Cir. Jan. 31, 2018)   Cited 23 times
    In Seales, for example, the Sixth Circuit held that fourteen days of improper detention was sufficient to carry Plaintiff's burden of establishing the violation of his constitutional right in light of the Plaintiff's repeated protestations of misidentification and the availability of exculpatory evidence.

    "Summary disposition is precluded where reasonable jurors honestly could have reached different conclusions with respect to whether a defendant's conduct amounted to gross negligence." Stanton v. City of Battle Creek, 603 N.W.2d 285, 289 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999), aff'd, 647 N.W.2d 508 (Mich. 2002).

  10. Williamson v. J.C. Penney Life Ins. Co.

    226 F.3d 408 (5th Cir. 2000)   Cited 14 times
    Noting that "[l]ittle meaning can be gleaned from the word `includes'"

    See, e.g., Vanderwagen v. J.C. Penney Life Ins. Co., 202 F.3d 283, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 37762 (10th Cir. Dec. 23, 1999) (unpublished) (analyzing same language in contract governed by Illinois law).See, e.g., Stanton v. City of Battle Creek, 603 N.W.2d 285, 290 (Mich.Ct.App. 1999). In summary, although the policy definition of "land motor vehicle" is not plainly unambiguous, the only reasonable construction is that the requirements of customary use in transportation and operator licensing are mandatory and not merely illustrative.