Opinion
24A-CR-554
10-31-2024
Michael Todd Stansel, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Katherine D. Jack Jack Law Office LLC Greenfield, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Andrew A. Kobe Section Chief for Criminal Appeals Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Hancock Superior Court The Honorable Dan E. Marshall, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 30D02-2303-CM-452
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Katherine D. Jack Jack Law Office LLC Greenfield, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Andrew A. Kobe Section Chief for Criminal Appeals Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Foley, Judge.
[¶1] Following a bench trial, Michael Todd Stansel ("Stansel") was found guilty of Class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy. Stansel appeals and raises the following restated issues for our review:
I. Whether Stansel waived his evidentiary challenges on appeal; and
II. Whether sufficient evidence was presented to establish that he committed invasion of privacy.
[¶2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶3] Dina Stansel-Knight ("the victim") is Stansel's younger sister. By 2022, their relationship had deteriorated due to multiple disagreements regarding their aging mother's medical care. In August 2022, a civil Order For Protection ("the protective order") was issued and prohibited Stansel from "harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting, or directly or indirectly communicating with" the victim for a period of two years. Ex. Vol. III pp. 4-6. Stansel was served a copy of the protective order.
The protective order was issued pursuant to Indiana Code 34-26-5.
[¶4] On March 15, 2023, the victim called the police following a missed call and voicemail she received from Stansel. The police arrived at the victim's house and observed that the phone number of the missed call belonged to Stansel. The police listened to the voicemail, and the victim informed the police about the protective order. See Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 13-14. The State charged Stansel with Class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy. A bench trial was held. The victim and Stansel testified at the trial.
[¶5] At trial, when asked if Stansel had contacted her after the protective order was issued, the victim responded, "Yes." Tr. Vol. II p. 7. The victim elaborated that she does not answer Stansel's calls because "[t]hey get bl[o]cked[,]" but Stansel "could still leave voicemails." Id. at 8, 10. The victim testified she received a voicemail on March 15, 2023, and she "recognize[d] the voice as being her brother, . . . Stansel." Id. at 8. The victim further revealed that the voicemail was "from a number [she] knew to be associated with" Stansel and that Stansel has had the same phone number for "[a]t least three years." Id. at 9. When asked if she saved the voicemail and if she still had it in some form, the victim answered in the affirmative. Stansel did not object to any aspect of the victim's testimony, and no other evidence of the voicemail was admitted.
[¶6] After the State presented its case-in-chief, Stansel moved for judgment on the evidence, arguing that the State had not met its burden beyond a reasonable doubt because the trial court had not "heard [the voicemail nor] seen any photographic evidence that [the voicemail] was left[.]" Id. at 12. Stansel further asserted that the voicemail "apparently still exists . . . and yet[,] the State didn't see it fit to introduce it." Id. Stansel alleged that the victim's testimony alone "does not . . . meet the [State's] burden." Id. The State countered, arguing that:
The State can offer whatever evidence it sees fit. If the State were to have come in a[nd] played a voicemail for the [c]ourt, the Defense's next argument would be that we can't . . . sufficiently voice match it to [Stansel]. But, today, we have testimony from his sister, who's been his sister for years, . . . that is, in fact, his voice and the number associated with him for at leas[t] three years. Based on these things, the State believes there is enough evidence for the [c]ourt to find [Stansel] guilty as charged.Id. at 13-14. The trial court overruled Stansel's motion for judgment on the evidence.
[¶7] Stansel testified that he did not remember calling the victim or leaving a voicemail for the victim on March 15, 2023. When asked if he "remembered telling the [police he] didn't remember contacting [the victim] because [he] drinks alcohol 24/7" and that he was probably drunk, Stansel responded, "Probably." Id. at 16. When further asked if he "told the [o]fficer [he] is drunk 24/7[,]" Stansel responded, "Probably, I just run my mouth." Id. The trial court found Stansel guilty as charged and sentenced him to 365 days, with thirty days executed and 335 days suspended to probation. This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
I. Admission of Evidence
[¶8] Stansel argues that "[w]ithout admission of the voicemail, foundational elements of the Indiana Rules of Evidence[,]" namely Rules 1002, 1003, 1004 and 901(a), were bypassed. Appellant's Br. pp. 8-9. Stansel claims that, rather than rely on the victim's testimony, the State was obligated to introduce the voicemail recording itself. Yet, Stansel did not object to the victim's testimony about the voicemail nor did he ever move to strike. We note that we review evidentiary decisions for an abuse of the trial court's discretion. Fansler v. State, 100 N.E.3d 250, 253 (Ind. 2018). We will reverse only where the trial court's evidentiary decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Id. "It is well settled that error may not be predicated on the admission of testimony unless there was a timely and specific objection in the trial court." Duncan v. State, 412 N.E.2d 770, 773 (Ind. 1980). Failure to object at trial to the admission of the evidence results in waiver of the error. Conner v. State, 580 N.E.2d 214, 220 (Ind. 1991).
[¶9] Here, Stansel moved for judgment on the evidence. However, his motion was not the proper procedural vehicle to challenge the admission of evidence. Rather, this type of motion tests the sufficiency of the evidence before the trial court. Under the circumstances, we conclude that Stansel waived any challenge to the admission of the victim's testimony regarding receiving a voicemail from Stansel. See Conner, 580 N.E.2d at 220 (concluding that defendant waived any challenge to the admission of his nicknames or street names during the witness's testimony because he failed to object at trial).
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
[¶10] Stansel argues that the victim's testimony was insufficient to prove that he contacted the victim by leaving a voicemail in violation of the protective order. When there is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, "[w]e neither reweigh evidence nor judge witness credibility." Gibson v. State, 51 N.E.3d 204, 210 (Ind. 2016), cert. denied. Instead, we consider only the evidence most favorable to the judgment together with all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Id. "We will affirm the judgment if it is supported by substantial evidence of probative value even if there is some conflict in that evidence." Id. Indeed, we will ultimately "affirm the conviction unless no reasonable factfinder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt." Love v. State, 73 N.E.3d 693, 696 (Ind. 2017).
[¶11] Here, Stansel was convicted of invasion of privacy. This offense is defined in Indiana Code section 35-46-1-15.1(a)(1), which provides as follows: "A person who knowingly or intentionally violates . . . a protective order to prevent domestic or family violence . . . commits invasion of privacy, a Class A misdemeanor."
[¶12] Stansel concedes that the protective order was in effect. However, Stansel challenges the State's evidence as to "whether he contacted [the victim] in violation of the protective order" because the State's sole evidence was the victim's testimony. Appellant's Br. p. 8; see also Appellant's Reply Br. p. 4 (Stansel "disputes whether he contacted [the victim] by . . . leaving a voicemail in violation of [the] protective order"). Stansel further questions the victim's credibility, arguing that "[f]urther doubt is cast by the [victim's] testimony" that he contacted her given that "[his] number was blocked from her phone." Appellant's Br. p. 10. Therefore, Stansel claims that the State did not carry its burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he contacted the victim. We disagree. The record reveals that Stansel and the victim are no strangers to one another given that they are siblings whose relationship deteriorated, resulting in a protective order for the victim against Stansel. In violation of the protective order, Stansel called the victim's phone and left a voicemail. The victim, having recognized the phone number and the voice on the voicemail as that of Stansel, called the police to report his violation of the protective order. Stansel testified that he did not recall calling the victim or leaving a voicemail. However, Stansel also acknowledged the possibility that he could have called the victim when he was drinking alcohol. The trial court, as fact-finder, assessed the credibility of the witnesses and weighed the evidence, and ultimately determined that the victim was credible when it found Stansel guilty. See Wilder v. State, 716 N.E.2d 403, 405 (Ind. 1999) (noting that it is the duty of the fact-finder to assess the credibility of witness testimony and finding that sufficient evidence was presented to prove that defendant was the perpetrator of the offense).
Conclusion
[¶13] Based on the foregoing, Stansel waived any challenges to the evidence and sufficient evidence was presented to prove that Stansel committed invasion of privacy.
[¶14] Affirmed.
Vaidik, J. and Weissmann, J., concur.