Opinion
HHDCV155040022S
06-21-2016
Steven K. Stanley v. States Attorney
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (#120)
Hon. John J. Nazzaro, J.
The petitioner in the instant matter, Steven K. Stanley, was convicted of violating a protective order, stalking in the first degree and threatening in the second degree. He was sentenced to eighteen years of incarceration and twelve years special parole. Thereafter, he appealed the decision. On July 31, 2015, the petitioner filed a petition for a new trial with the respondent being the State's Attorney. The petitioner asserts that he is entitled a new trial pursuant to General Statutes § 52-270 because of the following: 1) prosecutorial misconduct; 2) deprivation of a fair opportunity to prepare a defense; and 3) abuse of judicial discretion during trial proceedings.
The petition alleges the following facts in support of the petitioner's contention that he is entitled a new trial. The prosecution intimidated and threatened witnesses that petitioner intended to call and the prosecution also violated a judge's court order by using evidence that the judge determined would be stricken if the evidence was not turned over to the petitioner before trial. The prosecution also violated General Statutes § 54-47aa when it entered the petitioner's phone records as a full exhibit, which were stricken from the record by the presiding judge. Furthermore, the petitioner was deprived of a fair opportunity to prepare a defense because the prosecution wrongfully obstructed the petitioner's access to meaningful discovery when the prosecutor failed to disclose material exculpatory evidence and failed to give him the phone records. Lastly, the trial judge abused his discretion when he ruled on a matter that had already been decided by another judge and the trial judge violated Practice Book § 41-17 and General Statutes § 51-183h by presiding over a matter in which he signed the arrest warrant for.
On April 8, 2016, the respondent filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that the petitioner's claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata, as a vast majority of the petitioner's claims have been litigated in other forums. The respondent also argues that summary judgment should be granted because a petition for a new trial does not serve as a substitute for an appeal and the petitioner could have raised such claims on direct appeal. The respondent filed a memorandum of law in support of its motion and attached the following exhibits: 1) petitioner's brief on direct appeal; 2) petitioner's reply brief on direct appeal; 3) decision of the Appellate Court on direct appeal; 4) petitioner's petition for writ of habeas corpus; 5) decision of the habeas court; 6) transcript of the habeas corpus trial; and 7) a motion dated May 9, 2012. The petitioner filed no objection and the matter was heard at short calendar on May 9, 2016. For the reasons set forth below, the motion is granted.
DISCUSSION
" [S]ummary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law . . . In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party . . . The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue [of] material facts which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law . . . and the party opposing such a motion must provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact . . . A material fact . . . [is] a fact which will make a difference in the result of the case." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Stuart v. Freiberg, 316 Conn. 809, 820-21, 116 A.3d 1195 (2015).
" In seeking summary judgment, it is the movant who has the burden of showing the nonexistence of any issue of fact. The courts are in entire agreement that the moving party for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue as to all the material facts, which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law. The courts hold the movant to a strict standard. To satisfy his burden the movant must make a showing that it is quite clear what the truth is, and that excludes any real doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue of material fact . . . As the burden of proof is on the movant, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the opponent . . . When documents submitted in support of a motion for summary judgment fail to establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party has no obligation to submit documents establishing the existence of such an issue . . . Once the moving party has met its burden, however, the opposing party must present evidence that demonstrates the existence of some disputed factual issue . . . It is not enough, however, for the opposing party merely to assert the existence of such a disputed issue. Mere assertions of fact . . . are insufficient to establish the existence of a material fact and, therefore, cannot refute evidence properly presented to the court under Practice Book § [17-45]." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ramirez v. Health Net of the Northeast, Inc., 285 Conn. 1, 10-11, 938 A.2d 576 (2008). " Because res judicata or collateral estoppel, if raised, may be dispositive of a claim, summary judgment [is] the appropriate method for resolving a claim of res judicata." Jackson v. R.G. Whipple, Inc., 225 Conn. 705, 712, 627 A.2d 374 (1993).
The petitioner asserts that he is entitled to a new trial because of the following: 1) prosecutorial misconduct; 2) deprivation of a fair opportunity to prepare a defense; and 3) abuse of judicial discretion. The respondent argues that the petitioner's petition for a new trial is barred by the doctrine of res judicata and by a lack of due diligence.
General Statutes § 52-270(a) provides that " [t]he Superior Court may grant a new trial of any action that may come before it, for mispleading, the discovery of new evidence or want of actual notice of the action to any defendant or of a reasonable opportunity to appear and defend, when a just defense in whole or part existed, or the want of actual notice to any plaintiff of the entry of a nonsuit for failure to appear at trial or dismissal for failure to prosecute with reasonable diligence, or for other reasonable cause, according to the usual rules in such cases. The judges of the Superior Court may in addition provide by rule for the granting of new trials upon prompt request in cases where the parties or their counsel have not adequately protected their rights during the original trial of an action."
" In deciding upon a petition for a new trial, the function of the trial court is to determine whether the evidence presented at the hearing on the petition together with the evidence presented at the original trial warrants the granting of the petition . . . The basic question which the trial court has to decide is whether upon all the evidence an injustice had been done . . . and whether it is probable that on a new trial a different result would be reached." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Demers v. State, 209 Conn. 143, 148-49, 547 A.2d 28 (1988); see also Asherman v. State, 202 Conn. 429, 434, 521 A.2d 578 (1987). A petition for a new trial " does not furnish a substitute for, or an alternative to, an ordinary appeal but applies only when no other remedy is adequate and when in equity and good conscience relief against a judgment should be granted . . . The procedure is not intended to reach errors available on appeal of which the party should have been aware at the time when an appeal might have been taken . . . The salutary purpose of the statute is that if a party has a meritorious defense and has been deprived of reasonable opportunity to present it, he ought to be permitted to make it upon another trial." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Grimes, 154 Conn. 314, 325, 228 A.2d 141 (1966).
The court first notes that the respondent's motion for summary judgment can be granted on the ground that the respondent met its burden by producing evidence that shows no genuine issue of material fact exists while the petitioner has failed to meet his burden as he failed to present evidence that demonstrated the existence of a disputed factual issue. In fact, the petitioner produced no counter evidence, filed no memorandum in opposition, and answered in the negative when the court asked if he wanted time to file an objection. Nonetheless, the court will still reach the merits of the respondent's arguments to determine whether the respondent is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
I. Prosecutorial Misconduct
The respondent argues that the petitioner's claims that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by: 1) intimidating and threatening the petitioner's witnesses; 2) violating the court's order to disclose the victim's telephone records prior to trial; and 3) violating General Statutes § 54-47aa, are all barred by the doctrine of res judicata.
" The doctrine of res judicata, [or claim preclusion], provides that [a] valid, final judgment rendered on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is an absolute bar to a subsequent action between the same parties . . . upon the same claim or demand . . . Res judicata prevents a litigant from reasserting a claim that has already been decided on the merits . . . Under claim preclusion analysis, a claim--that is, a cause of action--includes all rights of the plaintiff to remedies against the defendant with respect to all or any part of the transaction, or series of connected transactions, out of which the action arose . . . Moreover, claim preclusion prevents the pursuit of any claims relating to the cause of action which were actually made or might have been made . . . [T]he essential concept of the modern rule of claim preclusion is that a judgment against [the] plaintiff is preclusive not simply when it is on the merits but when the procedure in the first action afforded [the] plaintiff a fair opportunity to get to the merits . . . Stated another way, res judicata is based on the public policy that a party should not be able to relitigate a matter which it already has had an opportunity to litigate . . . [W]here a party has fully and fairly litigated his claims, he may be barred from future actions on matters not raised in the prior proceeding . . .
" Because [res judicata and collateral estoppel] are judicially created rules of reason that are enforced on public policy grounds . . . we have observed that whether to apply either doctrine in any particular case should be made based upon a consideration of the doctrine's underlying policies, namely, the interests of the defendant and of the courts in bringing litigation to a close . . . and the competing interest of the plaintiff in the vindication of a just claim . . . These [underlying] purposes are generally identified as being (1) to promote judicial economy by minimizing repetitive litigation; (2) to prevent inconsistent judgments which undermine the integrity of the judicial system; and (3) to provide repose by preventing a person from being harassed by vexatious litigation . . .
" The doctrines of preclusion, however, should be flexible and must give way when their mechanical application would frustrate other social policies based on values equally or more important than the convenience afforded by finality in legal controversies . . . We review the doctrine of res judicata to emphasize that its purposes must inform the decision to foreclose future litigation. The conservation of judicial resources is of paramount importance as our trial dockets are deluged with new cases daily. We further emphasize that where a party has fully and fairly litigated his claims, he may be barred from future actions on matters not raised in the prior proceeding. But the scope of matters precluded necessarily depends on what has occurred in the former adjudication." (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Weiss v. Weiss, 297 Conn. 446, 459-61, 998 A.2d 766 (2010). The doctrine of res judicata applies to petitions for new trials. See Ingram v. State, 160 Conn.App. 479, 482, 124 A.3d 1006, cert. denied, 319 Conn. 957, 125 A.3d 534 (2015).
In the present case, the petitioner's claim that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. In the petitioner's habeas corpus action, he argued that the prosecutor intimidated and threatened his witnesses and the court rendered judgment on the issue, holding that no such intimidation occurred. Specifically, in his habeas action the petitioner alleged that witnesses were threatened as they were waiting in the lobby by the state's attorney, Adam B. Scott, in violation of General Statutes § 53a-151a. The habeas court held that the petitioner failed to prove this claim because it found that the witnesses were not threatened or intimidated by the state, and according to the witnesses' testimony, they all testified truthfully at the criminal trial. Stanley v. Warden, Superior Court, judicial district of Tolland, Docket No. CV-13-4005408-S, (March 11, 2014, Cobb, J.).
The petitioner specifically alleged that " [w]itnesses were threatened in the court lobby as they were subpoena witnesses while they were awaiting to be called in to the court room the states attorney Adam B. Scott threatened and intimidating witnesses in the court lobby this is a violation under CT statute 53a-151a and is a class c felony at this time witnesses were threatened and they see that the states attorney had the petitioner arrested in the court room during this trial they now feared of this threat they were going to be arrested." Respondent's Ex. D, p. 4.
Furthermore, the petitioner's argument that the prosecutor violated the court's order to disclose the victim's telephone records prior to trial was raised and heard on direct appeal. On direct appeal, the petitioner specifically claimed that " the state failed to provide him with his phone records and the victim's phone records in a timely manner and that he therefore was deprived of (1) his right to confront the witnesses against him [under Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004)] and (2) his right to present a defense." State v. Stanley, 161 Conn.App. 10, 17, 125 A.3d 1078 (2015), cert. denied, 320 Conn. 918, 131 A.3d 1154 (2016). The Appellate Court held that the petitioner was not deprived of his right to confront the witness " [b]ecause there was nothing to suggest that the automated compilation of records of all customers' calls was other than standard business routine, the records were not testimonial in nature and Crawford did not apply." Id., 22. The Appellate Court next addressed the petitioner's argument that his right to present a complete defense was violated by the prosecutor's failure to disclose the phone records to him in a timely fashion. Id. The Appellate Court concluded that the state did not have the victim's phone records until the morning of the first day of trial, the petitioner had the opportunity to review them overnight before they were published to the jury, the petitioner used the victim's records to impeach her, and he could have requested a continuance but he did not. Id., 23-24. Therefore, the court held that petitioner's right to present a defense was not violated. Id., 25.
The petitioner's argument that prosecutorial misconduct occurred because his telephone records were obtained in violation of General Statutes § 54-47aa, was similarly raised and decided on direct appeal. The Appellate Court denied relief under § 54-47aa because the prosecutor did not admit the petitioner's telephone records into evidence as the state failed to follow the statutory procedure in General Statutes § 54-47aa by failing to notify the petitioner about its request for the phone records. Id., 27.
Thus, because a valid, final judgment was rendered on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction, the petitioner's claims of prosecutorial misconduct are barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The respondent's motion for summary judgment as to the petitioner's first ground for a new trial is therefore granted.
II. Deprivation of a Fair Opportunity to Prepare a Defense
Next, the petitioner argues that he is entitled to a new trial because he was deprived of a fair opportunity to prepare a defense because the state withheld exculpatory evidence in the form of telephone records and police personnel file(s). These claims were also raised by the petitioner and decided by the court on direct appeal and in the petitioner's habeas corpus proceeding thus, they are also barred by the doctrine of res judicata. On direct appeal the Appellate Court held that the petitioner was not deprived of his right to present a complete defense by the prosecutor's failure to disclose the phone records to him in a timely fashion because, as discussed above, the state did not have the victim's phone records until the morning of the first day of trial, the petitioner had the opportunity to review them overnight before they were published to the jury, he used the phone records to impeach the victim, and he did not request a continuance. See State v. Stanley, supra, 161 Conn.App. 23-25. Subsequently, in a habeas corpus proceeding, the petitioner also raised the claim that he was denied police personnel records. The habeas court permitted the petitioner to proceed on the claim and after hearing the claim, the habeas court concluded that the petitioner failed to prove the claim.
Referred to as claim #5 in the habeas decision.
III. Abuse of Judicial Discretion During Trial Proceedings
Lastly, the petitioner asserts that he is entitled to a new trial because of abuse of judicial discretion during trial proceedings. Specifically, he asserts that: 1) the court abused its discretion by reconsidering earlier rulings made by another judge; 2) the court failed to comply with Practice Book § 41-17; and 3) the trial court failed to comply with General Statutes § 51-183h. The respondent argues that the petitioner's first two claims are also barred by the doctrine of res judicata and his third claim is barred because he did not diligently pursue it under General Statutes § 51-183h. The court agrees.
On direct appeal the petitioner claimed that the trial judge abused his discretion by ruling on a matter previously decided by another judge. See State v. Stanley, supra, 161 Conn.App. 30. The Appellate Court rejected the claim asserting that under the law of the case doctrine, a " trial judge need not follow the decisions of another judge made at an earlier stage of the proceedings . . . A judge may find it appropriate to rely upon a previous ruling. But the law of the case is not an inflexible principle and in a proper situation a judge may modify or depart from an interlocutory ruling of another coordinate magistrate, in whole or in part." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. The petitioner's assertion that the court failed to comply with the provisions of Practice Book § 41-17 has also been litigated during criminal court proceedings and on direct appeal. The petitioner filed a motion seeking to disqualify the court, C. Taylor, J., pursuant to Practice Book § 41-17 from presiding over motions relating to the phone records because Judge Taylor had signed his arrest warrant, however, the court, Fuger, J., denied the motion for disqualification. Id., 31. The Appellate Court held that the petitioner could not prevail on his claim that Practice Book § 41-17 was violated because the rule of practice was inapplicable as Judge Taylor did not sign a search warrant, nor did he rule on the validity of a search warrant. Id., 31-32. Judge Taylor signed an arrest warrant and no claim was made that Judge Taylor ruled on any motion or order directly attacking the arrest warrant. Id., 32. Because a valid, final judgment was rendered on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction, the petitioner is barred from bringing this subsequent action, alleging abuse of judicial discretion, as grounds for a new trial.
Practice Book § 41-17 provides that " [a] judicial authority who signed any warrant or order for the seizure of property, testimony or evidence or for the interception of any communications shall not preside at any hearing on a motion made pertaining to such warrant or order."
The respondent argues that the claim that the petitioner is entitled to a new trial because the trial court failed to comply with General Statutes § 51-183h is barred because it was not diligently pursued by the petitioner. " Due diligence is a necessary condition to success in prosecuting a petition for a new trial . . . Under § 52-270 the exercise of due diligence is a condition precedent to a finding of reasonable cause . . . Reasonable is a relative term which varies in the context in which it is used, and its meaning may be affected by the facts of the particular controversy . . . It is also synonymous with [e]quitable, fair, just . . . [Section 52-270] does not furnish a substitute for, nor an alternative to, an ordinary appeal, but applies only when no other remedy is adequate and when in equity and good conscience relief against a judgment should be granted." (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Jacobs v. Fazzano, 59 Conn.App. 716, 724, 757 A.2d 1215 (2000).
General Statutes § 51-183h provides that " [n]o judge may preside at the hearing of any motion attacking the validity or sufficiency of any bench warrant or arrest which he has signed."
In the present case, the petitioner raised this claim on appeal, however, the Appellate Court refused to review the claim because it was not properly preserved. This court also declines to address this claim because it was not diligently pursued by the petitioner. The petitioner had both the facts and the law necessary to raise the trial court's failure to comply with General Statutes § 51-183h in previous proceedings. It is clear that the petitioner knew Judge Taylor signed the arrest warrant as he sought to have him disqualified. The petitioner has not demonstrated to the court that he diligently pursued this claim and a petition for a new trial is not intended to reach errors available on appeal of which the party should have been aware at the time when an appeal might have been taken. Thus, the petitioner is also barred from bringing this claim.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the respondent's motion for summary judgment is granted.
It is so ordered.