To state the question would seem to determine it. If there were errors in lodging the first appeal in this court or if there were fatal errors preliminary thereto, those matters might have been presented to this court by way of testing the jurisdiction in the former appeal. But when the former appeal was lodged here and this court accepted and exercised jurisdiction of the appeal and reversed the judgment, and remanded the cause for a new trial, then the county court was without power to review the decision of this court or test the validity thereof upon jurisdictional grounds, or upon any other grounds. Undoubtedly the duty of the county court was plain to vacate the original judgment for defendant and to grant plaintiff a new trial. Randol v. Harbour-Longmire Co., 127 Okla. 7, 259 P. 548; Stanley, County Treasurer of Marshall County, et al. v. School District No. 4, 142 Okla. 240, 286 P. 340; Carlock et al. v. Chapman, Same v. Walden, District Judge, et al., 165 Okla. 23, 24 P.2d 661; Welch v. Welch, 177 Okla. 330, 58 P.2d 896, and Wagner et al. v. Earp et al., 180 Okla. 59, 67 P.2d 782. It is not necessary to detail or dwell upon the evils which might result if a trial court, upon having its judgment reversed, with directions for a new trial, could then pass upon the propriety or validity or jurisdiction of the determination in the appellate court, and upon conclusion that the determination in the appellate court was invalid, then proceed finally in conformity with the original judgment which had been presented to the appellate court and there fully reversed.
If the trial court in thereafter proceeding was in the position of passing upon the right of this court to recall the mandate, that matter could not be properly considered or passed upon by the trial court. Stanley, County Treasurer, v. School District No. 4 of Marshall County, 142 Okla. 240, 286 P. 340. Thereafter, the appeal in this court was determined by opinion of this court reported in 146 Okla. 291, 294 P. 187, and by that opinion the cause was remanded to the trial court for further trial upon one branch or the title suit. That hearing and determination was necessary to finally determine the rights of the parties in the title suit. That final hearing was had in the trial court in January, 1932. The trial court also in 1932, as above stated, rendered final judgment on the receiver's report.
" See, also, Turner v. Mills, 22 Okla. 1, 97 P. 558; St. Louis-I. M. S. Ry. Co. v. Lewis, 39 Okla. 677, 136 P. 396; Harrill v. Henderson, 60 Okla. 22, 158 P. 1134; Simons v. Floyd, 74 Okla. 134, 177 P. 608; Snyder v. Noss, 99 Okla. 142, 226 P. 319; Shefts v. King, 100 Okla. 153, 228 P. 961; Beamer v. Key, 114 Okla. 276, 246 P. 628; Stanley, County Treas., of Marshall County, v. School District No. 4, 142 Okla. 240, 286 P. 340. For the reasons stated, the action of the trial court in modifying its order of March 22, 1927, is reversed.