Opinion
34192, 34193.
DECIDED OCTOBER 17, 1952.
Damages; from Fayette Superior Court — Judge Byars. May 24, 1952.
Edwin S. Kemp, F. A. Sams, for plaintiff in error.
Robert B. Blackburn, Hewlett, Dennis, Bowden Barton, contra.
1. Special grounds of a motion for new trial must be complete and understandable within themselves without the necessity of reference to other special grounds of the motion, the brief of the evidence, or other parts of the record to understand them. This general principle is so well established as to need no citation of authority. See, however, the numerous cases cited under the catchword "Completeness" in Code (Ann.), § 70-301, and particularly Tarver v. Deppen, 132 Ga. 798 (3, 4) ( 65 S.E. 177); Price v. State, 170 Ga. 294 (3) ( 152 S.E. 572); Perdue Pace v. Hurst, 24 Ga. App. 239 (1) ( 100 S.E. 647); Stubbs v. State, 29 Ga. App. 193 (1) ( 114 S.E. 926); Bray v. C. I. T. Corporation, 51 Ga. App. 196 (4) ( 179 S.E. 925); James v. State, 71 Ga. App. 867, 871 ( 32 S.E.2d 431); Sloan v. Glaze, 72 Ga. App. 415 (4), 418 ( 33 S.E.2d 846); Kittles v. State, 74 Ga. App. 383 (2) ( 39 S.E.2d 766). Consequently, special ground 1 of the motion for new trial excepting to the admission of evidence without setting out the evidence objected to or a copy of the document admitted either in the ground itself or as an exhibit to the motion, and which does not set forth how the evidence was material or how or why it was prejudicial; and special grounds 2, 4 and 6 complaining of the failure of the court to charge certain principles of law, but which fail to set forth literally or in substance the wording of the charges desired; and special ground 5 complaining of a portion of the charge as given as being erroneous and not sound as an abstract principle of law, but which fails to set forth how or wherein the charge was hurtful or prejudicial to the movant, are too incomplete to be considered by this court.
2. Special ground 3 is merely an elaboration of the general grounds. The jury were authorized to find that the defendant Stanley drove his automobile on the left-hand side of the road at a rate of speed of 50 or 60 miles per hour and collided head-on with the plaintiffs' automobile which had been pulled to the extreme edge of the roadway and brought to almost a complete halt in an effort to avoid the collision, and that injuries to Mrs. Chitwood, who was riding as a passenger in the automobile driven by her husband, the other plaintiff, were of a serious and permanent nature. The evidence amply supported the allegations of negligence and authorized the verdicts.
Judgments affirmed. Sutton, C.J., and Felton, J., concur.
DECIDED OCTOBER 17, 1952.
STATEMENT OF FACTS BY WORRILL, J.
Mr. and Mrs. Chitwood in two separate actions sued Stanley for damages alleged to have been sustained by them as the result of the collision of their automobile with Stanley's on U.S. Highway 41 near Hapeville, Georgia. On the trial of the case the jury returned verdicts for Mr. Chitwood for $1500 and for Mrs. Chitwood for $2500. The defendant made a motion for a new trial in each case on the usual general grounds which he amended by the addition of six special grounds, the amendment to the motion in each case being the same. The trial court overruled the motions and the exception here is to those judgments. The amendments to the motions for new trial were as follows:
"Ground 1. Because the following material evidence was illegally admitted by the court to the jury, over the objection of movant: (a) Movant objected to the evidence as soon as and at the time it was offered, and then and there urged that said evidence be excluded as being prejudicial, said evidence being a copy of what purported to be a plea of guilty to a charge of reckless driving.
"Ground 2. That the court failed to give in charge to the jury instructions in regard to the admitted purported copy of said guilty plea, in view of the fact that the defendant swore that he did not enter such a plea.
"Ground 3. That the evidence does not support the verdict as to count one of said petition, in that there is no sufficient evidence to support the charges of negligence as set out in said count.
"Ground 4. That the court failed to give proper instructions as to count one and two in said petition in that the charge should have been so worded as to require a verdict based on the acts of negligence as stated in the separate counts as set out in the petition.
"Ground 5. That the charge made by the court pertaining to ordinary diligence was misleading and confusing in that the court charged that `ordinary diligence is that degree of care which is exercised by ordinarily prudent persons under the same or similar circumstances. The absence of such diligence is termed ordinary negligence, ordinary diligence, I should have said.' Movant avers that said charge was erroneous and not sound as an abstract principle of law.
"Ground 6. That the court erred in failing to charge the jury with reference to sudden emergencies caused by a vehicle coming to a sudden stop without giving any signal or warning, as required by the evidence."