The grant or denial of a continuance is within the sound discretion of the trial judge and will not be overturned absent a showing of abuse. Alan has made no such showing. Stanley v. Amos, 79 Ga. App. 297, 300 ( 53 SE2d 568) (1949); Betenbo v. Brooks Tabor, 17 Ga. App. 754 ( 88 SE 411) (1916). Moreover, the trial court's order shows that the matter came before the trial court in a nonjury trial, after which, "the [c]ourt having heard and considered evidence, pleadings, and testimony," found that Mattie was entitled to a writ of possession. Alan failed to request that a transcript of these proceedings be included in the record.

Accord Adoption of Quenette, 341 N.W.2d 619, 622 (4) (N.D. 1983). Nor did the mother in seeking a continuance satisfy her evidentiary burden of showing due diligence. OCGA § 9-10-166; see Stanley v. Amos, 79 Ga. App. 297, 300-301 ( 53 S.E.2d 568) (1949). Accordingly, we find that the court did not manifestly and clearly abuse its discretion in refusing to continue the case.

]" (Emphasis supplied.) Stanley v. Amos, 79 Ga. App. 297, 300-301 ( 53 S.E.2d 568) (1949). Moreover, no evidence was presented that "[defendant's] condition `was expected to improve so as to enable him to be present at a future trial of the case.

It was not an abuse of discretion to deny the request for continuance. OCGA §§ 9-10-166 and 167; Stanley v. Amos, 79 Ga. App. 297, 300 ( 53 S.E.2d 568) (1949). Judgment affirmed. Carley, C. J., and McMurray, P. J., concur.

To be considered, in the exercise of that discretion by the trial court, is the obvious lack of surprise as to the speed evidence, the fact that the trial had progressed far into its development, that there were out-of-state witnesses who had come for trial at considerable sacrifice and expense, and the possibility that because Southern had misconceived the impact of the speed testimony, it wished belatedly to change its trial tactics. See Phillips v. Hopper, 237 Ga. 68, 71 ( 227 S.E.2d 1); Stanley v. Amos, 79 Ga. App. 297 ( 53 S.E.2d 568). On the basis of this evidence, the trial court ruled that there was no support for a claim of surprise and the calling of such an expert at so late a date would amount to trial by ambush and declined to allow the witness to be called. Southern was allowed to and did present evidence by two persons present on the train that because the train proceeded from point A to point B in a certain amount of time, it was not possible for the train to have accelerated to such a speed and further both testified they looked at and were certain that the speedometer on the train reflected that before and at the time of the impact the train was proceeding at a steady rate of 20 mph. Though the rebuttal evidence of the expert may have been relevant and material, we also recognize the trial court's dilemma.

The discretion of the trial court in granting or refusing a continuance will not be disturbed by the appellate court unless it appears to have been manifestly abused. Stanley v. Amos, 79 Ga. App. 297 et seq. ( 53 S.E.2d 568); Clay v. Barlow, 73 Ga. 787 (2); Betenbo v. Brooks Tabor, 17 Ga. App. 754 ( 88 S.E. 411).