Opinion
F075242
11-02-2017
In re O.V., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. STANISLAUS COUNTY COMMUNITY SERVICES AGENCY, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. R.B., Defendant and Appellant.
Elizabeth C. Alexander, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. John P. Doering, County Counsel, and Carrie M. Stephens, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 517530)
OPINION
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Stanislaus County. Ann Q. Ameral, Judge. Elizabeth C. Alexander, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. John P. Doering, County Counsel, and Carrie M. Stephens, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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This is an appeal brought by R.B. (mother), whose rights to her son O.V. were terminated. Mother contends notice under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA or the Act; 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) was deficient. She also contends that the juvenile court erred when it denied her Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petition, in which she requested O.V. be placed with relatives Merle and Jessica B., pursuant to section 361.3. We find mother lacks standing to appeal the latter issue, and in all other respects affirm.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise stated.
Jessica and Merle B., O.V.'s maternal great-aunt and great-uncle, have also filed an appeal to the denial of their section 388 petition and request for placement of O.V. We address their argument in a separate appeal. (Case No. F075244)
INTRODUCTION
Because mother's appeal is limited to the issue of ICWA notice compliance and relative placement of O.V., we address only briefly the procedural history involving the detention, jurisdiction and disposition of O.V., as well as termination of her parental rights, which she does not contest. Detention , Jurisdiction and Disposition
Seven-week old O.V. came to the attention of the Stanislaus County Community Service Agency (Agency) in March of 2016, when he was taken to the hospital by mother and found to have multiple fractures to the parietal bone on the right side of his skull and a subdural hematoma. Mother said she left O.V. in his baby seat on a table and he fell while she was in another room. The injury occurred six hours before he was brought to the hospital.
While at the hospital, mother tested positive for various illegal drugs. Mother identified baby's father as Michael V., who was incarcerated on federal charges of drug trafficking and possession of a firearm. Mother had similar charges pending against her and was arrested at the hospital on existing federal warrants. The investigating officer indicated mother would likely be transported back to Montana.
Father was represented by counsel throughout these proceedings, but never appeared. He is not a party to this appeal.
On March 8, 2016, the Agency filed a section 300 petition alleging failure to protect (§ 300, subd. (b)), as evidenced by injuries to O.V. and mother's positive drug test for methamphetamine and other illegal substances, as well as no provision for support (§ 300, subd. (g)), as both mother and father were incarcerated and unable to care for the child. The petition was found true, neither mother nor father were offered reunification services, O.V. was placed into foster care and, eventually, on January 12, 2017, the juvenile court terminated both mother and father's parental rights. O.V. was found likely to be adopted and adoption was ordered as the permanent plan.
DISCUSSION
I. DID THE JUVENILE COURT COMMIT REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT TERMINATED MOTHER'S PARENTAL RIGHTS WITHOUT PROPER ICWA COMPLIANCE?
Mother contends the juvenile court erred when it terminated her parental rights without proper ICWA notice compliance. We disagree. ICWA Procedural History
Mother completed an ICWA-020 form March 9, 2016, declaring she "may be a member of, or eligible for membership in" the Oglala Sioux Tribe. At detention March 14, 2016, mother stated she was not aware of any other tribal affiliations. While father had not yet been reached for questioning regarding ICWA, the paternal grandfather was present and reported he was not aware of any Native American heritage for either himself or paternal grandmother. On March 17, 2016, father signed an ICWA-020 form stating he had no known Indian ancestry.
On March 22, 2016, the Agency served the ICWA-030 Notice of Child Custody Proceeding for an Indian Child (ICWA-030) on the Oglala Sioux Tribe at two separate addresses by certified mail, return receipt requested, informing them of the upcoming jurisdiction and disposition hearing. Both return receipt green cards for the Oglala Sioux Tribe were received back at the Agency on April 11, 2016.
An amended ICWA-030 was sent to the two Oglala Sioux Tribe addresses April 25, 2016, by certified mail, after the social worker obtained additional information from maternal grandmother. Both green cards for this mailing were returned to the Agency on May 3, 2016.
On May 4, 2016, the date originally set for jurisdiction, the juvenile court noted that the Agency had sent out the ICWA-030, although maternal grandmother's maiden name had been misspelled, and the matter would need to be renoticed. On May 12, 2016, the juvenile court found jurisdiction, but ordered the Agency to renotice the tribes for disposition. A second amended ICWA-030 was sent to both Oglala Sioux Tribe addresses by certified mail May 17, 2016, and green cards for this mailing received May 24, 2016.
At disposition June 22, 2016, the juvenile court noted all ICWA green return receipt cards had been received, but found ICWA status to be "unknown" and it would not make ICWA findings "at this time." A placement review hearing was set for August 2016 and a section 366.26 permanent plan hearing set for October 2016.
On July 29, 2016, prior to the hearing scheduled to review progress on relative placement, the Agency sent Notice of Hearing with the ICWA-030 to all 17 Sioux Tribes by certified mail, return receipt requested. Green cards were received back from 16 of the 17 Sioux Tribes. The Oglala Sioux Tribe signed for receipt of their copy on August 8, 2016.
On August 25, 2016, the Agency sent notice of the upcoming section 366.26 hearing along with an ICWA-030 by certified mail, return receipt requested to the Sioux Tribes that had not as yet sent letters indicating ineligibility for O.V. This included the Oglala Sioux Tribe.
The section 366.26 report dated October 21, 2016, indicated all tribes with the exception of the Oglala Sioux Tribe had sent letters indicating O.V. was not considered eligible for enrollment in their respective tribe.
Also on October 21, 2016, the Agency filed an additional information report indicating the Oglala Sioux Tribe had not yet picked up or acknowledged receipt of the later notice and ICWA-030 sent August 25, 2016, although notice and ICWA-030 had arrived at the postal facility in Sioux Falls, South Dakota on August 28, 2016. Because the Oglala Sioux Tribe had not yet received the packet from the postal service, the juvenile court determined the section 366.26 hearing could not go forward and trailed it to November 28, 2016, for ICWA to perfect.
On November 18, 2016, the Agency filed an additional information report stating the ICWA-030 sent August 25, 2016, to the Oglala Sioux Tribe had still not been delivered or receipt acknowledged. The report contained a narrative from a legal clerk indicating her further efforts to obtain a response from the Oglala Sioux Tribe. The narrative stated that, on October 24, 2016, the legal clerk called the Oglala Sioux Tribe and was informed that the ICWA representative was Shirley Blackstone. Blackstone was contacted and requested the packet be faxed to her at a specific telephone number. The packet of 20 pages, including ICWA-030 was faxed that afternoon. The packet included a request for immediate attention and a response prior to the continued hearing scheduled for November 28, 2016. A fax transmission confirmation was received, acknowledging 20 pages were "transmitted correctly."
After the legal clerk received no response, she again called Blackstone on November 1, 2016. Blackstone stated she did not know if she received the packet. The legal clerk confirmed the fax number, offered to fax the documents again, and immediately did so. The facsimile cover sheet again showed the fax consisted of 20 pages. A fax transmission confirmation was received, also again stating 20 pages were transmitted correctly.
The following day, November 2, 2016, the legal clerk called Blackstone to follow-up. Blackstone again stated she did not know if she got the documents and asked that they be faxed again, but this time to the attention of Jeanne Trueblood, her ICWA assistant. The legal clerk did so, with a similar facsimile sheet stating the fax consisted of 20 pages.
On November 4, 2016, the legal clerk called Trueblood to follow-up. Trueblood acknowledged that she had received the notice and that she was taking it to the enrollment office. On November 8, 2016, Trueblood reported that she had been unable to enter the enrollment office as it was locked and this had been an ongoing issue. The legal clerk attempted to telephone the enrollment office on November 8, 2016, and received a recorded message stating "[d]ue to counting votes, we are closed until further notice." The legal clerk made a second attempt to telephone the enrollment office on November 17, 2016, and received a recorded message stating the mailbox was full and could not accept further messages.
On November 28, 2016, the juvenile court addressed ICWA and found the Agency had done "everything within its power to provide notice pursuant to the ICWA," but that the Oglala Sioux Tribe was proving difficult in getting the green return receipt cards back. The juvenile court found notice had been properly given under the circumstances. The section 366.26 hearing was trailed to December 22, 2016.
At the December 22, 2016, hearing, the juvenile court indicated it would proceed with the two pending section 388 petitions, but having just gone to training on new ICWA guidelines, was uncomfortable that there had not been a response from the Oglala Sioux Tribe, the one tribe specifically named by mother. The Agency stated it had not received anything further from the Oglala Sioux Tribe and, since the juvenile court's last ruling, had not made any further efforts to communicate with them. The juvenile court stated that it felt further efforts to communicate with the Oglala Sioux Tribe should be made, "out of an abundance of caution." After hearing evidence on the section 388 petitions, the juvenile court trailed the matter to January 6, 2017. While the juvenile court did not expect the Agency to re-notice the Tribe, it would "like to know what the Oglala Sioux's position is" on whether O.V. was an Indian child.
On January 5, 2017, the Agency filed another additional information report regarding ICWA. The report stated the legal clerk called the Oglala Sioux enrollment office on December 27, 2016, and spoke to Kirkland Ross in that office. He stated he would try to get a response to the legal clerk by the end of the day. That same day, the legal clerk received an e-mail from Farrah Big Crow, the receptionist in the enrollment office, requesting that she e-mail her request to them. The legal clerk e-mailed the ICWA packet to the two e-mail addresses provided and received confirmation from Big Crow that the ICWA packet had been received. On December 30, 2016, the legal clerk sent a follow-up e-mail asking for a response as none had been received as yet.
At the January 6, 2017, continued section 388 petition and original section 366.26 hearing, mother objected to proceeding as it had not been a full 10 days since the Oglala Sioux Tribe had acknowledged that they received the December 27, 2016, e-mailed ICWA packet. The juvenile court trailed the matter to January 12, 2017.
On January 11, 2017, the Agency filed a letter received that day via fax from Trueblood of the Oglala Sioux Tribe Child Protection Services/ICWA stating O.V. was not eligible for enrollment.
On January 12, 2017, the juvenile court found ICWA did not apply. It then conducted the section 366.26 hearing and terminated mother's parental rights. Applicable Law and Analysis
ICWA protects the interests of Indian children and promotes the stability and security of Indian tribes by establishing minimum standards for, and permitting tribal participation in, dependency actions. (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.; In re Holly B. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1261, 1266.) The social services agency and the juvenile court have an "affirmative and continuing duty" to inquire whether a child subject to a section 300 petition is or may be an Indian child in all dependency proceedings where the child is in or at risk of entering foster care. (§ 224.3, subd. (a); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a); In re Damian C. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 192, 198-199.) If either has reason to know an Indian child may be involved, the social services agency "is required to make further inquiry regarding the possible Indian status of the child, and to do so as soon as practicable, by interviewing the parents, Indian custodian, and extended family members ..., contacting the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the State Department of Social Services for assistance in identifying the names and contact information of the tribes in which the child may be a member or eligible for membership in and contacting the tribes and any other person that reasonably can be expected to have information regarding the child's membership status or eligibility." (§ 224.3, subd. (c); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a)(4).) The social services agency and court may have reason to know an Indian child is involved when "[a] person having an interest in the child ... provides information suggesting the child is a member of a tribe or eligible for membership in a tribe or one or more of the child's biological parents, grandparents, or great-grandparents are or were a member of a tribe." (§ 224.3, subd. (b)(1); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a)(5).)
"Notice is a key component of the congressional goal to protect and preserve Indian tribes and Indian families. Notice ensures the tribe will be afforded the opportunity to assert its rights under the Act irrespective of the position of the parents, Indian custodian or state agencies. Specifically, the tribe has the right to obtain jurisdiction over the proceedings by transfer to the tribal court or may intervene in the state court proceedings. Without notice, these important rights granted by the Act would become meaningless." (In re Kahlen W. (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1414, 1421.) Accordingly, if an ICWA inquiry leads the social services agency or juvenile court to know or have reason to know an Indian child is involved, ICWA requires the social services agency to notify the tribe of the pending proceedings and its right of intervention. (25 U.S.C. § 1912, subd. (a); Welf. and Inst. Code, §§ 224.3, subd. (d), 224.2, subd. (a)(5); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(b).) The social services agency must send notice to "all tribes of which a child may be a member or eligible for membership." (§ 224.2, subd. (a)(3).) If the identity or location of the tribe cannot be determined, the same notice must be directed to the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA). (In re Marinna J. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 731, 739, fn. 4.)
"'"Since ... failure to give proper notice of a dependency proceeding to a tribe with which the dependent child may be affiliated forecloses participation by the tribe, notice requirements are strictly construed."' [Citations.] The notice requirement applies even if the Indian status of the child is uncertain. [Citation.] The showing required to trigger the statutory notice provisions is minimal; it is less than the showing needed to establish a child is an Indian child within the meaning of ICWA. [Citation.] A hint may suffice for this minimal showing. [Citation.]" (In re Miguel E. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 521, 549.)
We review compliance with ICWA notice under the harmless error standard. (In re E.W. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 396, 402-403.) Notice is sufficient if there was substantial compliance with ICWA. (In re Christopher I. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 533, 566.) The object of ICWA notice is to enable a review of tribal records to determine a child's status under ICWA. (In re D.T. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 1449, 1455.) The notice "must contain enough information to be meaningful. [Citation.] The notice must include: if known, (1) the Indian child's name, birthplace, and birth date; (2) the name of the tribe in which the Indian child is enrolled or may be eligible for enrollment; (3) names and addresses of the child's parents, grandparents, great grandparents, and other identifying information; and (4) a copy of the dependency petition. [Citation.]" (In re Francisco W. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 695, 703.) "It is essential to provide the Indian tribe with all available information about the child's ancestors, especially the ones with the alleged Indian heritage. [Citation.] Notice ... must include available information about the maternal and paternal grandparents and great-grandparents, including maiden, married and former names or aliases; birthdates; place of birth and death; current and former addresses; tribal enrollment numbers; and other identifying data. [Citation.]" (Ibid.)
Mother contends the juvenile court failed to comply with the notice provisions of ICWA because the ICWA notice that was sent to the Oglala Sioux Tribe via fax or e-mail is not contained in the record and, as such, there is "no evidence of what it faxed three times to the tribe, or whether what it 'faxed' was a complete ICWA noticing packet with correct, complete information." We disagree.
Notice was sent to the Oglala Sioux Tribe using the ICWA-030 form by certified return receipt mail on five separate occasions, March 22, April 25, May 17, July 29, and August 25, 2016. On four of these five occasions, the Oglala Sioux acknowledged receipt of the packets by signing and returning green cards, which were filed with the juvenile court. The only ICWA-030 mailing that was not acknowledged as having been received by the Oglala Sioux Tribe was the final mailing sent August 25, 2016, two months prior to the scheduled section 366.26 hearing.
California Rules of Court, rule 5.482(c)(1) provides, in relevant part that, if after notice has been provided and the tribe has not provided a determinative response within 60 days after receiving that notice, then the juvenile court may determine that ICWA does not apply to the proceedings. Notice and a second amended ICWA-030 was sent to the Oglala Sioux Tribe on May 17, 2016, and receipt acknowledged on May 24, 2016. Since no determinative response was received within 60 days, in this case by July 23, 2016, the juvenile court could have determined any time after July 23, 2016, that ICWA did not apply.
However, the juvenile court did not make such a determination at that time but instead continued to press the Agency to get a response from the Oglala Sioux Tribe, the tribe specifically named by mother. It is at this point that the Agency initiated numerous calls to the Oglala Sioux Tribe representative, who requested the "packet" be faxed. The Agency did so, and repeated this process two more times, until the representative from the Oglala Sioux Tribe finally acknowledged receipt of the faxed documents and said she was taking them to the enrollment office, which she was then unable to do because the office was locked. Finally, the packet was e-mailed and the Oglala Sioux Tribe responded, stating O.V. was not eligible for enrollment.
Mother contends on appeal that the record is devoid of what was contained in the "packets" faxed and e-mailed to the Oglala Sioux Tribe, and therefore it is unknown if the information was accurate. We find this claim unfounded. The record is very clear that, in addition to the five mailed ICWA-030 notices, which are included in the record, the 20-page faxed and e-mailed packets, by sworn statement, included the petition and notice of child custody proceedings for an Indian child, i.e., the ICWA-030. While the Agency did not refile the ICWA-030 again and again in its records each time it faxed or e-mailed them, there is no reason to believe it was not the same ICWA-030 that had been mailed on the three most recent mailings, ending with the mailing on August 25, 2016.
Here, the Oglala Sioux Tribe received complete notice by certified mail and acknowledged such on two occasions. The Agency then went to great lengths to be absolutely certain O.V. was not eligible for ICWA, making numerous direct contacts with the Oglala Sioux Tribe, and sending repeated notice and ICWA-030 by fax and e-mail. Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's finding that the ICWA did not apply, and we reject mother's claim to the contrary.
II. DID THE JUVENILE COURT ERR WHEN IT DENIED MOTHER'S SECTION 388 PETITION REQUESTING O.V. BE PLACED WITH MATERNAL RELATIVES AS MANDATED UNDER SECTION 361.3?
Mother, whose parental rights were terminated, seeks to appeal an order, entered immediately before termination, denying her section 388 petition for placement of O.V. with maternal relatives, Jessica and Merle B., as mandated under section 361.3, the relative placement statute. We find mother lacks standing to raise this issue. Relative Placement Procedural History
"In any case in which a child is removed from the physical custody of his or her parents pursuant to Section 361, preferential consideration shall be given to a request by a relative of the child for placement of the child with the relative ...." (§ 361.3, subd. (a).) --------
At detention on March 14, 2016, mother's counsel indicated there were relatives in Montana interested in placement. The juvenile court authorized an Interstate Compact for the Placement of Children (ICPC) be initiated with the state of Montana if a relative made a placement request.
On March 21, 2016, the Agency began the ICPC process in Montana with maternal great aunt and uncle, Nichole and Jay B., who were interested in placement. Maternal great-grandmother also requested an application, which was mailed to her but had not yet been received back by the Agency.
At the originally scheduled jurisdiction hearing May 4, 2016, the juvenile court recited the substance of an off the record conference with the parties, in which the consensus was that the "best-case scenario" would be that the ICPC should proceed so O.V. could be placed with Nichole B.
At the trailed jurisdiction hearing May 12, 2016, the juvenile court again ordered the Agency begin the ICPC process, although the Agency informed the juvenile court that Montana would not officially start the ICPC process until after disposition. Mother's counsel indicated that "prospective placement" was with Nichole and Jay B. The placement specialist stated everything necessary to begin the ICPC process had been submitted. Mother's counsel indicated maternal great-grandmother was the "back-up plan" for placement.
On May 13, 2016, the social worker made contact with maternal great aunt Jessica and Merle B., also in Montana, who also indicated an interest in placement. An application was sent to them on that date. On June 1, 2016, the social worker called Jessica B. to indicate a meeting "between two relatives" would be held to decide whose home should be assessed first.
At the disposition hearing June 22, 2016, mother's counsel indicated mother was "very supportive" of Nichole B. being the preferred placement and understood the Agency was proceeding in that direction. A progress hearing on the ICPC status was scheduled for August 24, 2016.
On July 27, 2016, Nichole B. called to inquire about O.V.'s health and development and was updated by the social worker. A week later, Nichole B. telephoned to say they had been assigned a social worker in Montana, who was going to assess their home. Nichole telephoned several times to report that, according to their Montana social worker, the ICPC process was expected to be completed by September 1, 2016. On August 15, 2016, Nichole B. called to inquire whether O.V. had drugs in his system when he was born. She was told she needed to talk to mother, as that information was private.
At the progress hearing held August 24, 2016, the ICPC initiated in Montana was said to be proceeding appropriately. The Agency reported that Nichole and Jay B. had not been to California to visit O.V.
On August 30, 2016, Nichole B. sent a message stating they had completed everything on their end. When asked why they had not visited O.V., Nichole B. said it was difficult and expensive, since they had children and livestock to care for.
On September 6, 2016, Nichole B. sent another message stating that Montana had put the paperwork in the mail and asked about the transition process and arranging a time to pick up O.V. The social worker replied that the current caregivers said their door was "open" for a visit so they could get to know O.V. The following day, the current caregiver stated they would be willing to take O.V. to Montana to ease the transition.
On September 15, 2016, the Agency reported that Nichole B. informed the social worker they would no longer take placement of O.V. Nichole suggested "the second relatives interested in placement," Jessica and Merle B., who had expressed interest in the past, be assessed to take placement of O.V. When the social worker called Nichole B. to ask what had happened, she said she and her husband had decided their two children were enough. She thought Jessica and Merle B. would be a "better fit," although "they might not have the best relationship."
On September 16, 2016, the social worker contacted another social worker regarding the application previously submitted by Jessica and Merle B., and it was agreed to submit the ICPC paperwork for them.
On September 19, 2016, the social worker spoke to Jessica B. and reported on O.V.'s health. Jessica B. stated they wanted to be considered for placement and submitted paperwork in June, but Nichole and Jay B. were assessed first. They still wanted placement of O.V. Jessica B. inquired about coming to visit, was told to get in touch with the current caregivers, and then sent a message that they would be in the area from October 17, to October 21, 2016. The social worker said she would work on scheduling a visit.
On September 21, 2016, the social worker completed the ICPC request for Jessica and Merle B., and sent a letter to Montana requesting an "expedited home evaluation and social assessment."
On September 23, 2016, a meeting was held between the agency ICPC coordinator, the social worker, a social work supervisor and a manager to discuss the case. It was decided that it would not be in O.V.'s best interests to move him as the ICPC process was long and he had developed a significant bond with his caretakers. It would instead recommend he be adopted by the current caregivers.
Several days later, the social worker spoke to Jessica B. and explained that the ICPC paperwork had been submitted, but that it was currently the Agency's position that O.V. should stay with his current caretakers and be adopted by them unless the placement disrupted or O.V. was found to be ICWA eligible and the Tribe desired a relative placement.
The report filed in anticipation of the section 366.26 hearing stated the Agency would not consider moving O.V. from his current placement to the home of the second relative family, Jessica and Merle B., unless the current placement were to disrupt or ICWA was found to apply. The reasoning was that O.V. had developed a strong bond to his current caregivers and it would not be in his best interest "at the moment." Mother's Section 388 Petition
Mother filed a section 388 petition October 12, 2016, requesting that the juvenile court order the Agency to allow a visit between O.V. and Jessica and Merle B. and order an expedited ICPC on their home. Mother also requested that, if her parental rights were terminated, that the juvenile court set a hearing and place O.V. with Jessica and Merle B. for adoption.
The section 388 petition was set for a hearing October 21, 2016, to coincide with the section 366.26 hearing. Section 388 Hearing
The hearing on the contested section 388 petition was heard on December 22, 2016. The social worker, Jessica and Merle B., and O.V.'s de facto parents were present; mother was not. During the morning session, the juvenile court stated it would be best for the parties during lunch recess to "figure out some kind of transitional plan so that [O.V.]'s interests are being met." When court resumed, the Agency stated it was not in favor of moving O.V. to Jessica and Merle B.'s home. Following testimony by Jessica B., Merle B, and the de facto mother, the juvenile court continued the matter to January 6, 2017.
At the continued section 388 hearing on January 6, 2017, mother was not present. The juvenile court denied her petition, finding it moot on the issue of allowing Jessica and Merle B. to visit O.V., which they had done. It then found that setting a section 361.3 hearing and ordering placement of O.V. with Jessica and Merle B. was not in the child's best interests. Standing
"A parent cannot raise issues on appeal which do not affect his or her own rights." (In re Devin M. (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1538, 1541.) "A parent's appeal from a judgment terminating parental rights confers standing to appeal an order concerning the dependent child's placement only if the placement order's reversal advances the parent's argument against terminating parental rights." (In re K.C. (2011) 52 Cal.4th 231, 238.) When, as here, a parent does not contest the termination of parental rights, they relinquish the only interest in the dependent child that could render them aggrieved by the juvenile court's placement order. (Ibid.)
Here, mother does not contest the termination of her parental rights other than in the context of ICWA notice. She argues, if this court determines ICWA notice is inadequate as she suggests, the case must be remanded for new notice with the Oglala Sioux Tribe. If the Oglala Sioux Tribe then finds O.V. to be ICWA eligible, the new ICWA placement preferences would apply and, if the Oglala Sioux Tribe preferred a relative placement or tribal customary adoption, then her parental rights might not be terminated. Because we have found adequate ICWA notice, mother is not aggrieved by the juvenile court's order denying relative placement of O.V., and lacks standing to raise the issue here.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/s/_________
FRANSON, J. WE CONCUR: /s/_________
GOMES, Acting P.J. /s/_________
PEÑA, J.