Opinion
F078858
09-26-2019
In re E.A., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. STANISLAUS COUNTY COMMUNITY SERVICES AGENCY, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ANGELA A., Defendant and Appellant.
Neale B. Gold, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Thomas E. Boze, County Counsel, and Maria Elena R. Ratliff, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 518163)
OPINION
THE COURT APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Stanislaus County. Ann Q. Ameral, Judge. Neale B. Gold, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Thomas E. Boze, County Counsel, and Maria Elena R. Ratliff, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Before Levy, Acting P.J., Meehan, J. and DeSantos, J.
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Angela A. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court's order terminating her parental rights as to her now 21-month-old daughter, E.A., under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. Mother contends the juvenile court erred in failing to apply the beneficial parent-child relationship exception to adoption. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) We affirm.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
E.A. (the baby) was born premature at 34 weeks in November 2017 while mother was in reunification with her 14- and 11-year-old sons. The baby was admitted to the Neonatal Intensive Care Unit (NICU) with respiratory distress. The juvenile court had removed her sons because she engaged in severe domestic violence with her boyfriend, John A., in their presence. The police responded multiple times in 2016 to reports that John kicked her in the chest and stomach, punched her arms and face, strangled her with both hands and drug her through broken glass. Despite nearly 12 months of services, mother minimized the abuse she suffered and blamed others, including her sons, for their removal. A review hearing was scheduled for January 2018; the Stanislaus County Community Services Agency (agency) recommended the juvenile court terminate mother's reunification services as to both boys, neither of whom wanted to return to her custody.
In December 2017, the agency took the baby into protective custody, placed her in foster care, and filed a dependency petition. In January 2018, the juvenile court found the allegations of a second amended petition true, removed the baby from parental custody, and ordered reunification services for mother consisting of a domestic violence program and individual counseling, as well as visitation. The court terminated reunification services as to mother's sons.
Over the ensuing six months, mother was cooperative with the agency and participated in services. Mother visited the baby at every opportunity. In May 2018, mother's twice-weekly visits increased from one to two hours per visit. Mother was observed to be very affectionate and appropriate during every visit; she arrived on time and with her own supplies for the baby.
Mother, however, continued to deny there had ever been any domestic violence and said she was no longer in a relationship with John. The agency, however, obtained police reports that indicated otherwise. One pertained to an incident in early May 2018 when John was pulled over shortly after midnight for speeding. According to the report, John was driving his "wife's" vehicle, which was registered to mother, who was present and licensed, but the officer had the vehicle towed because she showed signs of alcohol intoxication. When the social worker questioned mother about the incident, mother denied being with John when he was pulled over or being drunk. She said the officer called her and demanded she come to the scene to prove the vehicle was hers. Mother said she walked 20 minutes to get there and when she arrived, she asked the officer to impound the vehicle.
The second incident was a verbal argument between mother and "Juan A." that occurred at approximately 2:00 a.m. on June 9, 2018. Mother first denied to the social worker that police came to her home, accusing them of lying, but then stated her neighbor came to her home, took her phone and called the police, giving them her address. Mother said that Juan and another woman were going to move in with her as roommates, but they had an argument and she asked them to leave. Juan passed out and left early that morning. Mother was to have her first community visit with the baby at mother's home later that day. The social worker was concerned that mother was moving in roommates on the morning of her first community visit even after the social worker made it clear no unauthorized persons were to be in her home when she had the baby. Mother responded that was why she told the roommates to leave. Mother declined to answer whether "Juan" was the baby's father.
That same day, when mother was on a community visit with the baby in her home, a social worker supervisor arrived for an unannounced visit. Mother's vehicle was parked in front but there was no answer. When the supervisor returned an hour later, mother reported that after she picked up the baby, a friend immediately stopped by and they "left for a bit." The social worker was concerned that mother and the baby left with an unauthorized person in their unauthorized vehicle. Mother responded that she did not know she needed to inform the social worker of every aspect of her life. Mother had two more community visits in June 2018, but the agency ended them, and visits returned to the agency, due to concerns mother was still in a relationship with John and was not being truthful with the agency. The social worker did not feel it was appropriate to consider overnight or trial visits.
The agency found mother's unwillingness to be truthful a major concern. Although mother had received 21 months of services, six in this case and 15 months in the prior case, she had yet to demonstrate she was not engaged in a relationship with John and continued to deny domestic violence with him. The agency was concerned about mother's ability to safely parent and protect the baby if services were continued. Consequently, the agency recommended the juvenile court terminate mother's reunification services at the six-month review hearing.
Mother challenged the agency's recommendation and testified at the contested six-month review hearing in August 2018. She denied owning the vehicle John was driving during the May incident, claiming she signed it over to him in October 2016. Nevertheless, she paid for the automobile insurance and responded to the police call because she intended to take possession of the car and sell it. She changed her mind when she arrived at the scene and told the officer she wanted it towed.
Mother testified the June incident involved her friend Annette and Annette's boyfriend, Juan A., who argued on her front porch around midnight. The two had been drinking. Mother told Annette she and Juan had to leave. Mother allowed Annette to use her phone to call for a ride. Juan walked into mother's house, sat down and fell asleep. She allowed him to sleep there, knowing Annette would return to wake him. Meanwhile, mother took her pit bull with her into her vehicle and stayed there until the police called her. By that time, Annette had returned for Juan. Mother explained the situation to the police.
Mother denied John lived with her or that they dated. They last lived together in October 2016, when her sons were removed. She denied John was present at her home during the June incident or that she spoke to him during the May traffic incident. She saw him "[z]ero times" since the baby's birth. She denied the police reports that stated John strangled, punched and kicked her, claiming the only domestic violence incident occurred in 2014 when she threw a hairbrush at John.
The juvenile court found it would be detrimental to return the baby to mother's custody and there was not a substantial probability the baby could be returned if mother were provided more time to reunify. The court found mother was in denial about the domestic violence, had not learned anything and was not being truthful, stating "I don't believe the majority of her testimony." The court terminated mother's reunification services and set a section 366.26 hearing for December 20, 2018. Mother's visits were reduced to once a month.
Mother filed a notice of intent to file a writ petition. Although mother subsequently filed a petition, we dismissed it as facially inadequate for review.
In a report prepared for the section 366.26 hearing, the agency recommended termination of mother's parental rights and adoption with the baby's current caregivers. The baby, who had just turned one, had been placed with her caregivers for nine months and appeared to be doing well with them. The caregivers were certain to adopt the baby if given the opportunity to do so and were committed to the permanent plan of adoption. The caregivers had demonstrated they were capable of caring for the baby and were attentive to her needs, and the baby seemed to enjoy the attention she received from them. According to the social worker, the baby had established a strong bond with the caregivers. The baby was meeting all of her milestones and all of her physical and emotional needs were being met.
Mother consistently visited the baby. After the agency ended community visits, mother visited twice weekly for two hours until August 22, 2018, when reunification services were terminated, after which she visited monthly for two hours per visit. Visitation logs stated that mother was nurturing and "very hands-on" with the baby, who was calm and content with mother. The baby seemed happy with mother and smiled when mother talked to her. Mother was attentive, appropriate and affectionate with her daughter. She did a very good job attending to the baby's needs, and demonstrated appropriate parenting skills. She would hold and care for the baby, talk sweetly to her, rock her gently, kiss her and provide words of affection. At the October 18, 2018 visit, which was the final visit described in the visitation log, mother greeted the baby with a kiss; the baby appeared to be happy to see mother, as she immediately reached to go to her. Mother played with the baby and provided care. Both appeared to enjoy the visit. At the end of the visit, mother hugged and kissed the baby and waved goodbye.
At the December 20, 2018 section 366.26 hearing, mother testified on her own behalf. She described how her daughter smiled and giggled during visits, and did not seem reluctant to go to her. Mother believed it would be traumatizing for her daughter not to know her biological mother. Mother believed her daughter had a bond with her and knew who she was.
In its ruling, the juvenile court began by stating it had never questioned that mother "loves her daughter very much." The real issue was whether mother had met the burden of establishing the parent-child beneficial relationship exception to adoption. From the visitation logs, it appeared to the court that mother had positive visits with the baby, which the baby enjoyed. The court noted at one point, the baby reached out to mother's face, "which would certainly be an action showing a caring relationship." The difficulty the court had, however, was it was "required to find that the detriment of terminating the parent-child relationship is so great that that detriment exceeds or far outweighs the benefits through permanence of adoption. And it is something that the Court has to consider that [the baby] has only lived with her mother for approximately 11 days, that she has been in the care of the current care providers for almost all of [the baby]'s life. And it is the parent that has the burden of proving the parent-child exception, ... which is a hard burden to prove especially when dealing with a very small child." The court agreed there would always be detriment when terminating parental rights, because the child loses that connection, but it did not "really believe that she has met that very, very difficult burden to prove." The court believed it had no option but to approve and adopt the findings and recommendations. Accordingly, the court found termination of parental rights would not be detrimental to the baby and terminated parental rights.
DISCUSSION
At a permanency planning hearing, once the juvenile court finds by clear and convincing evidence the child is likely to be adopted within a reasonable time, the court is required to terminate parental rights and select adoption as the permanent plan unless the parent shows that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child under one of several statutory exceptions. (In re Bailey J. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1314 (Bailey J.).) One of these statutory exceptions is the beneficial relationship exception to adoption, which applies when it would be detrimental to the child to terminate parental rights in that "[t]he parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship." (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).)
" 'To trigger the application of the parental relationship exception, the parent must show the parent-child relationship is sufficiently strong that the child would suffer detriment from its termination.' [Citation.] A beneficial relationship 'is one that "promotes the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents." [Citation.] The existence of this relationship is determined by "[t]he age of the child, the portion of the child's life spent in the parent's custody, the 'positive' or 'negative' effect of interaction between parent and child, and the child's particular needs." ' " (In re Marcelo B. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 635, 643.)
The nature of the relationship between the parent and child is key in determining the existence of a beneficial relationship; it is not sufficient to show that the child derives some benefit from the relationship or shares some " 'emotional bond' " with the parent. (In re K.P. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 614, 621.) "To overcome the preference for adoption and avoid termination of the natural parent's rights, the parent must show that severing the natural parent-child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed." (In re Angel B. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 454, 466.) In other words, the parent must show he or she occupies a " ' "parental role" in the child's life.' " (In re K.P., at p. 621.)
The parent has the burden of proving the statutory exception applies. (In re Megan S. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 247, 252.) The juvenile court's decision a parent has not satisfied this burden is based on whether a beneficial parental relationship exists and whether the existence of that relationship constitutes "a compelling reason for determining that termination would be detrimental to the child." (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B).) "Because a section 366.26 hearing occurs only after the court has repeatedly found the parent unable to meet the child's needs, it is only in an extraordinary case that preservation of the parent's rights will prevail over the Legislature's preference for adoptive placement." (In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1350 (Jasmine D.).)
Appellate courts are divided over the appropriate standard of review to apply to an order determining the applicability of the beneficial parent-child relationship exception. Some courts have applied the substantial evidence test (e.g., In re G.B. (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1147, 1166), while others applied the abuse of discretion standard (e.g., Jasmine D., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 1351). Still other courts have adopted a mixture of both standards, applying the " 'substantial evidence standard of review to the factual issue of the existence of a beneficial parental relationship, and the abuse of discretion standard to the determination of whether there is a compelling reason for finding that termination would be detrimental to the child.' " (In re E.T. (2018) 31 Cal.App.5th 68, 76.)
The issue is currently pending before our Supreme Court in In re Caden C. (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 87, review granted July 24, 2019, S255839. --------
Our conclusion in this case would be the same under any of these standards because the practical differences between them are "not significant," as they all give deference to the juvenile court's judgment. (See Jasmine D., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 1351.) " '[E]valuating the factual basis for an exercise of discretion is similar to analyzing the sufficiency of the evidence for the ruling.... Broad deference must be shown to the trial judge. The reviewing court should interfere only " 'if [it] find[s] that under all the evidence, viewed most favorably in support of the trial court's action, no judge could reasonably have made the order that he [or she] did.' " ' " (Ibid.) Moreover, a substantial evidence challenge to the juvenile court's failure to find a beneficial parental relationship cannot succeed unless the undisputed facts establish the existence of those relationships, since such a challenge amounts to a contention that the "undisputed facts lead to only one conclusion." (In re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1529; Bailey J., supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at p. 1314.)
Here, there is no question the evidence established the first prong of the exception—that mother maintained regular visitation and contact with the baby. The question is whether mother established the second prong—that the baby would benefit from continuing her relationship with mother. We conclude she did not as, contrary to mother's assertion, the evidence does not lead to only one conclusion, namely, that the baby would suffer detriment on the termination of parental rights.
The evidence showed the baby was removed from mother's custody while in the NICU, 11 days after birth, and never lived with mother. At the time of the section 366.26 hearing, the baby was only 12 months old, too young to understand the concept of a biological parent. (See In re Angel B., supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 467.) Mother contends the quality of visits and her demonstration of appropriate parenting skills shows she has a significant relationship with the baby which contributes to the baby's overall well-being. Although mother was affectionate and appropriate during visits, and she and the baby shared a positive relationship, there was nothing to indicate the baby had "a substantial, positive emotional attachment" to mother or that the baby would be greatly harmed if the relationship were severed. (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575.) The evidence showed the baby had a strong bond with her caregivers, with whom she had lived for most of her life and who were meeting her needs. The baby is entitled to stability and permanence with an adoptive family. "Where a biological parent ... is incapable of functioning in that role, the child should be given every opportunity to bond with an individual who will assume the role of a parent." (In re Brittany C. (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 847, 854.)
Mother contends her case is similar to In re E.T., supra, 31 Cal.App.5th 68. There, the appellate court held the lower court erred by failing to recognize the mother's relationship with her children outweighed the benefit that would accrue from termination of parental rights. (Id. at p. 70.) The record demonstrated the four-year-old twins, who had lived almost half their lives with their mother, were "very tied" to her. (Id. at p. 77.) The twins "demonstrated anxiety, uncertainty and fear" when they were first removed from their mother (id. at p. 72); there was evidence that separation from their mother caused them to be "sad [and] withdrawn and [to] act out[,]" but the mother "was able to ease their fear and anxiety" (id. at p. 76); and the social services agency thought mother should always be a presence in their lives (ibid). In contrast here, the baby never lived with mother, the agency did not believe mother should always be a presence in her life, and there is no evidence the baby was "very tied" to mother or experienced anxiety when separated from her.
Mother contends the juvenile court misinterpreted the statute in making its ruling. She argues the order terminating parental rights must be reversed because the juvenile court "mistakenly believed it must find the detriment far outweighed the benefits of a potential adoption, and therefore it had no option but to approve and adopt the findings and orders of the Agency." She asserts the statute does not state the court must find detriment "far outweighs" the benefits of adoption, but rather merely requires the court to find a compelling reason for determining termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child, and if the juvenile court had understood the standard correctly, it may have believed mother met her burden of proof and declined to terminate parental rights.
Even if we were to find the juvenile court erred by misstating the applicable standard, we review the results rather than the reasoning of the juvenile court's decision. (In re Jeremy S. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 514, 521, fn. 3; Florio v. Lau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 637, 653 ["In reviewing a trial court's decision, we review the result, not the reasoning. A decision right in result will not be reversed because it is based on an erroneous theory."].)
Here, the juvenile court found mother did not meet her burden of establishing the applicability of the beneficial parent-child relationship exception to adoption. While there was evidence that mother had a positive relationship with the baby and acted in a parental role during visits, there was no evidence the baby would suffer detriment if the relationship were severed. Instead, the evidence showed the baby had a strong bond with her caregivers, with whom she had lived for a majority of her life, and mother's relationship with the baby was not so significant in her life that preserving it outweighed the benefits of adoption. Mother's frequent and loving contact was insufficient to show the requisite beneficial parental relationship. (See Bailey J., supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at p. 1316.)
In sum, the juvenile court did not err by declining to apply the beneficial parent-child relationship exception and properly terminated mother's parental rights.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court's order terminating mother's parental rights is affirmed.