Opinion
F069362
09-04-2014
In re BRADLEY L., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. STANISLAUS COUNTY COMMUNITY SERVICES AGENCY, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. AMANDA K., Defendant and Appellant.
Darlene Kelly, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(Super. Ct. No. 516607)
OPINION
THE COURT APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Stanislaus County. Ann Q. Ameral, Judge. Darlene Kelly, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Before Kane, Acting P.J., Franson, J. and Peña, J.
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Amanda K. (mother) appeals from an order terminating her parental rights (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26) to her one-year-old son, Bradley. After reviewing the entire record, mother's court-appointed appellate counsel informed this court she found no arguable issues to raise in this appeal. Counsel requested and this court granted leave for mother to personally file a letter setting forth a good cause showing that an arguable issue of reversible error does exist. (In re Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 835, 844 (Phoenix H.).)
All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
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Mother has since submitted a letter in which she claims her attorney's summary of the appellate record contains lies about the events that led to Bradley's detention and formal removal from her custody and the termination of her reunification services. She concludes by asking for a second chance to prove she is not a liar or an unsafe parent. Mother's letter otherwise neither addresses the termination proceedings nor sets forth a good cause showing that any arguable issue of reversible error at the termination hearing does exist. (Phoenix H., supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 844.) We will dismiss the appeal.
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL HISTORY
In 2013, the juvenile court exercised its dependency jurisdiction over infant Bradley due to his father's physical abuse of mother's older children and ward, as well as mother's failure to protect those children. As part of its disposition, the juvenile court also removed Bradley from parental custody and ordered reunification services for the parents. Mother did not appeal from the 2013 dispositional order.
At first, mother made good progress towards reunification and appeared positive and eager in the process. According to respondent Stanislaus County Community Services Agency (agency), mother nevertheless had not taken responsibility for and tried to minimize the abuse the older children had suffered. It also appeared mother was less than forthcoming about persons with whom she shared her home and her apparent ongoing relationship with Bradley's father, which called into question her ability to protect Bradley. At a contested evidentiary hearing, mother testified that she was honest with the agency about who lived in her home and denied resuming a relationship with Bradley's father.
The juvenile court concluded that neither parent made substantial progress in court-ordered services and mother in particular had not demonstrated she could protect her children. Having found a substantial risk of detriment remained if Bradley were returned to parental custody, the court terminated all reunification services and set a hearing pursuant to section 366.26 to select and implement a permanent plan for Bradley.
Although mother filed a notice of intent to file a writ petition challenging the court's setting order, she never filed a petition with this court.
At the section 366.26 hearing, it was undisputed that Bradley was likely to be adopted if parental rights were terminated. Mother's counsel objected to termination of parental rights but offered no evidence that termination would be detrimental to Bradley. (See § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B).)
Having found clear and convincing evidence that Bradley was likely to be adopted, the juvenile court terminated parental rights.
DISCUSSION
An appealed-from judgment or order is presumed correct. (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) It is appellant's burden to raise claims of reversible error or other defect and present argument and authority on each point made. If appellant fails to do so, the appeal may be dismissed. (In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, 994.) Mother does not raise any claim of error or other defect against the termination order from which she appeals.
At a termination hearing, the court's proper focus is on the child to determine whether it is likely he would be adopted and if so, order termination of parental rights. Once reunification services are ordered terminated, the focus shifts to the needs of the children for permanency and stability. (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 309.) If, as in this case, the child is likely to be adopted, adoption is the norm. Indeed, the court must order adoption and its necessary consequence, termination of parental rights, unless one of the specified circumstances provides a compelling reason for finding that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child. (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 53.) Here, there was no compelling reason.
To the extent mother challenges the truthfulness of the record's description of the events that led to Bradley's detention and formal removal from her custody and the termination of her reunification services, she cannot claim any arguable issue on this appeal. This is because she has forfeited her arguments by her failure to timely challenge in this court the juvenile court's 2013 dispositional order and its later order terminating reunification services. (In re Elizabeth M. (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 553, 563 [an appeal from the most recent order entered in a dependency matter may not challenge prior orders for which the statutory time for filing an appeal has passed].)
Here, the dispositional order was appealable (In re Eli F. (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 228, 233; § 395) but mother did not pursue an appeal from it. In addition, the order terminating reunification services and setting the section 366.26 hearing could have been reviewed if mother filed a petition for extraordinary writ relief. (§ 366.26, subd. (l).) Yet, again, she failed to act. Therefore, she has forfeited her arguments in this appeal.
DISPOSITION
This appeal is dismissed.