Opinion
F083330
02-23-2022
In re L.P. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. v. ALEXIS M., Defendant and Appellant. STANISLAUS COUNTY COMMUNITY SERVICES AGENCY, Plaintiff and Respondent,
Liana Serobian, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Thomas E. Boze, County Counsel, and Lindy GiacopuzziRotz, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Stanislaus County. Nos. JVDP-19-000193 & JVDP-19-000195 Ann Q. Ameral, Judge.
Liana Serobian, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Thomas E. Boze, County Counsel, and Lindy GiacopuzziRotz, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
DE SANTOS, J.
Alexis M. appeals the juvenile court's order terminating parental rights to her now eight-year-old son, L.P., and four-year-old daughter, M.P., and selecting adoption as their permanent plan. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26.) Mother contends the juvenile court erred by declining to apply the beneficial parent-child relationship exception to adoption and failing to consider the sibling relationship exception to adoption. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i) & (v).) We affirm.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The family (Alexis M. (mother), John P. (father), L.P. (son/sibling), Li.P. (daughter/sibling), and M.P. (daughter/sibling)), came to the attention of the Stanislaus County Community Services Agency (Agency) in April 2019, when it received a referral that mother's then four-year-old daughter, Li.P., told a mandated reporter the children's father sexually abused her. When interviewed by a social worker, Li.P. disclosed the sexual abuse. Mother appeared shocked by the disclosure, while father denied being aware of anyone sexual abusing her or that she disclosed any abuse. The family entered into a voluntary family maintenance agreement (family agreement) in which they stipulated father would remain out of the family home and would not be left with the children unsupervised. Father and Li.P. were referred to Parents United for services related to the sexual abuse allegations, and Li.P. was referred to weekly group therapy.
Despite constant reminders of the family agreement, father was found at mother's home on three separate occasions and mother knowingly allowed him around the children. During an emergency response assessment, mother and father denied father was living there or staying the night, although father's belongings were found in the children's room. Mother told the social worker she questioned father and Li.P. and she did not believe father abused Li.P.
The children were placed in protective custody and the Agency filed a petition alleging they came within the provisions of section 300, subdivisions (b)(1), (d) and (j) based on father's sexual abuse of Li.P., mother's denial of the sexual abuse and her failure to protect Li.P. after disclosure, possible substance abuse by both parents, mother and father knowingly violating the family agreement, and marks and bruises that were found on the children. The girls were placed together in a foster home, while L.P. was placed in a separate foster home. The juvenile court detained the children on August 20, 2019.
The Jurisdiction/Disposition Hearing
The Agency's report for the jurisdiction/disposition hearing recommended mother receive reunification services but father be denied services. The parents had child welfare histories in Kansas and Missouri for neglect and lack of supervision or physical abuse. In the Kansas case, the two older children were removed in December 2016 due to lack of supervision, returned to mother's care in April 2017, and the case was closed in October 2017.
L.P., who was in kindergarten, displayed bullying and sexualized behavior at school and was found eligible for mental health services. Li.P., who was in transitional kindergarten, reportedly hit other children and was set to resume services through Parents United. She exhibited sexualized behaviors in the foster home and became violent in the home and with the care provider, who gave a 14-day notice. As a result, the girls were moved together to a new foster home. While M.P. did not need mental health services, she exhibited sexualized behavior in the foster home.
The parents were having supervised visits with the children. It was noted their parenting skills needed improvement, as they struggled to redirect the children when they misbehaved, and mother used guilt to try to control the children's behaviors. After Li.P. asked to no longer visit father, mother began visiting with Li.P. separately from the family. Li.P. exhibited sexualized and aggressive behavior following visits with both parents and once told staff when she saw her parents, she wanted to kill herself, and on another occasion said she hated herself. It was recommended father's visits be suspended until Li.P.'s mental health could be stabilized through individual counseling. The children began weekly sibling visits in October 2019; the visits were going well, and no concerns were reported.
Mother completed the parenting program she began during the voluntary case and had an intake appointment for another program. She was receiving services at Parents United. Father was attending Parents United but continued to deny the abuse allegations. He had not completed the intake appointment to begin therapeutic visits with Li.P., which were previously ordered.
The parties reached a stipulated resolution at the jurisdictional/disposition hearing on January 15, 2020. The juvenile court found the petition true, removed the children from parental custody, and ordered reunification services for both parents. Additional case notes submitted prior to the hearing stated a December visit between the siblings was "chaotic and out of control." Li.P. instigated matters by repeatedly touching her brother's bottom and refusing to listen to the visitation supervisor. The supervisor had to call coworkers to manage the situation, as Li.P. was defiant, running around, yelling, and showing poor physical boundaries which encouraged her siblings to follow suit. The juvenile court ordered Li.P. to undergo "more intensive therapy."
The Six-Month Review Hearing
At the July 2020 six-month review hearing, the juvenile court followed the Agency's recommendation to continue the parents' services. At the time the children were in individual placements separate from each other. L.P. completed kindergarten and was doing better although he still displayed some bullying behaviors. He was attending bi-weekly mental health counseling sessions. Li.P. completed transitional kindergarten and her behavioral incidents were subsiding. She was attending bi-weekly counseling sessions, but her Parents United group was cancelled in March 2020 due to the Covid-19 pandemic. Li.P. was doing well in her new placement; she was no longer having tantrums, anger problems, or screaming. M.P. was showing behavioral challenges that included daily tantrums, and she was scheduled for a new mental health assessment.
Mother was ordered weekly supervised visits with the children, while father was ordered weekly supervised visits with L.P. and M.P. and weekly therapeutic supervised visits with Li.P. at Sierra Vista. The parents were consistent with these visits. Due to the Covid-19 pandemic, in-person visits at the Agency were suspended; instead, visits were conducted by video chat. Since father's therapeutic visits with Li.P. at Sierra Vista also were suspended, the Agency provided father video chat visits with Li.P., which her siblings also attended.
The 12-Month Review Hearing
In the Agency's 12-month review report, the Agency recommended services continue for both parents and the juvenile court grant the Agency discretion to begin a trial visit at mother's home. L.P. was attending his first-grade class via distance learning and was still in mental health counseling. Li.P.'s Parents United group resumed in August 2020, and she was continuing with bi-monthly mental health counseling. M.P. was assessed twice for mental health services but was found ineligible each time.
L.P. and M.P. were doing well in their homes, but Li.P. continued to have behavioral issues. She threw tantrums, tormented the other foster child, and ran from the care provider, who gave a 14-day notice. Li.P. changed placements again in September 2020.
Mother, who had separated from father, indicated in Parents United counseling that she now believed Li.P. and felt guilty about not accepting her disclosure. Mother's Sierra Vista counselor noted mother now understood she should have believed Li.P. from the beginning. Mother was assigned a new counselor, Judi Schardijn, in August 2020. While father recognized Li.P. had been molested, he continued to deny he molested her.
Mother and father continued to consistently visit the children. Due to the pandemic, they were restricted to video chat visits from June 12 through September 4, 2020, except for July and August, when each parent received one separate in-person visit each month. Father's therapeutic visits with Li.P. had not resumed because he failed to attend group and individual therapy required by Parents United. During the July in-person visit, the supervisor noted the children often disregarded mother's redirection from inappropriate behavior, and she appeared overwhelmed at times. At the August in-person visit, the supervisor noted mother engaged with the children, talked to them frequently, and had appropriate conversations. The children had to be transported separately to visits because they were physically forceful with each other. Mother was told in August 2020 that, due to the pandemic protocols, community visits could not be monitored; therefore, visits had to remain at the Agency until she could begin a trial visit.
In assessing the current situation, the social worker noted that while the parents were cooperative and engaged in services, and they consistently visited the children, "visiting is not parenting." Neither parent made themselves available for the child family team meetings to discuss the children's needs or taken responsibility for why the children came to the Agency's attention.
At the 12-month review hearing in October 2020, the juvenile court continued services for both parents and granted the Agency discretion to begin a trial visit with mother only, which the social worker could terminate if necessary. The juvenile court set an 18-month review hearing for February 5, 2021.
Further references to dates are to the year 2021, unless otherwise stated.
The February 202118-Month Review Hearing
In its report for the 18-month review hearing, the Agency recommended termination of father's services, continuation of mother's services, and a 90-day continuance of the hearing to assess mother during the trial visit with M.P., which began on December 18, 2020, and to allow the older children, who remained in separate foster homes, to begin trial visits with mother.
L.P. continued to receive mental health counseling and was on psychotropic medication, which was being adjusted. He did not do well with other children in the foster home, as he behaved aggressively toward them, but the foster parents were committed to keeping him and chose to have other children in the home removed.
Li.P. continued in individual counseling and Parents United, where they were working on her aggression and lack of boundaries. Li.P. had bonded with her current care providers, but she continued to have problems getting along with other children in the home and had episodes of tantrums and aggression.
M.P. began preschool prior to starting her trial visit. Her behaviors there, which included tantrums, fighting, being disruptive, and hitting other children and the teacher, resulted in a two-week suspension from preschool. M.P. was assessed for mental health services on December 28, 2020, and was found eligible on January 6. She was referred to Leaps and Bounds and began a "Tots Group" with Parents United on January 4. Mother was overwhelmed at the beginning of the trial visit with the transition and M.P.'s high needs, but the social worker believed she was committed to M.P.'s needs. She missed the first two visits with the older children after M.P. was placed with her.
Mother continued to take responsibility for Li.P.'s molestation. She did not have concerns about her interactions with the children or their behaviors and believed "foster care" was the problem. Mother's counselor, Schardijn, retired, so she transferred to a new counselor on December 29, 2020. Mother was working with a parent mentor weekly.
The social worker opined there continued to be detriment to the children if they were returned to either parent. There was no likelihood father could reunify with the children, as he had not made substantive progress in his services. His visits with the children had been sporadic. His weekly therapeutic visits with Li.P. resumed in October 2020, which meant he no longer was visiting with her siblings, but the therapeutic visits had been inconsistent since he was not consistently attending group sessions that were required for a therapeutic visit to occur. Mother, however, had made progress in her services; she stayed engaged and was consistent with visits and attending services. The family continued to partially visit via Zoom into November 2020. When mother was provided in-person visits, it was noted her parenting skills were appropriate. L.P. and M.P. were transported together to a visit in December 2020.
The social worker stated that while mother struggled with M.P. and was overwhelmed at the beginning of the trial visit, she would be starting a trial visit with the older children soon. The social worker was slowly transitioning the children to mother due to their behaviors and high needs and believed reunification could be achieved if mother continued to make good progress and demonstrate she could safely parent the children and be protective of them.
Mother did not appear at the February 5 review hearing. The juvenile court found it would be detrimental to return the children to either parent, the parents had been offered and provided reasonable services, there was not a substantial probability the children would be returned to father's custody but there was a substantial probability they would be returned to mother's custody, and mother had made significant progress in resolving the problems that led to removal. The juvenile court terminated father's reunification services but continued mother's services. The juvenile court set a 30-day review hearing for March 5, as it was concerned about mother's ability to protect the children from father and to parent all three children, and a continued review hearing for May 3, finding extraordinary circumstances to continue services due to the pandemic and the children's serious behavioral issues.
The Agency's Section 388 Petition
The Agency filed a section 388 petition on February 23 seeking, among other things, modification of the order continuing mother's reunification services to an order terminating her services. As changed circumstances, the Agency alleged it terminated mother's trial visit with M.P. on February 17 due to safety concerns raised by various service providers and because mother had not engaged with services at Sierra Vista since December 2020. The agency asserted it would be in the children's best interest to terminate mother's services so they could have permanency, as they had been in placement since August 2019, L.P. had been with his current care providers, who were committed to adopting him, since November 2019, and M.P. was placed in a concurrent placement on February 17.
The Agency filed a report in support of the petition in which it recommended the juvenile court terminate mother's reunification services and set a section 366.26 hearing. While L.P. and M.P. were in concurrent placements, Li.P was in a foster home that was not a concurrent home.
Contact logs submitted with the report detailed events that occurred after M.P.'s trial visit began on December 18, 2020. They showed that mother minimized M.P.'s behaviors when M.P. was given a mental health assessment on December 28, 2020, and when providing information concerning M.P.'s behaviors to the mental health provider on February 2, 2021.
Mother was having difficulty controlling M.P.'s behavior. M.P. exhibited disruptive behavior at mother's January 25 visit with the children that included hitting and biting mother, screaming, and throwing chairs and overturning tables. Mother had few, if any, skills to manage her. The parent mentor removed M.P. once, but she continued to scream and run around. Finally, the older children were able to comfort M.P. and she calmed down. The parent mentor told the social worker that at her first meeting with mother and M.P. a few weeks earlier, M.P. was screaming so much the parent mentor eventually had to leave because mother could not calm her down.
The social workers went to mother's home on February 17 to terminate M.P.'s trial visit due to safety concerns. While mother's new therapist made an appointment with mother, mother did not attend the session or contact the therapist, and she did not seem to be aware of the missed appointment. The social worker reviewed the other concerns with mother, which included mother twice jeopardizing M.P. from receiving mental health services by minimizing her behaviors; mother's unwillingness to be flexible when the social worker and mental health providers attempted to set up a child family team meeting to get M.P.'s services started; and the January 25 visit where M.P. bit mother's arm, as well as a February 8 visit where mother was carrying M.P. down the hallway with M.P. kicking and screaming.
M.P. was placed in a concurrent foster home. The following day, her care providers reported she had bruising on her thigh and bottom and an abscess on her foot, which mother had not reported. The social worker received a report from one of M.P.'s mental health counselors on February 19 that mother told her one of the "interventions" she used when M.P. was acting out was to put her in the closet and turn the light off, although "one of us" was in there with her. Asked how effective this was, mother stated M.P. did not like it. Based on this information, a suspected child abuse referral was made, and an investigation begun.
When M.P. was interviewed, she said she was put in "mommy's closet" and showed her bruises but not how she got them. M.P.'s counselor told the social worker when she asked mother about the current interventions she used to decrease M.P.'s aggression, mother causally answered she put M.P. in the closet with the light off and M.P. "doesn't like it" and "it's not working." When the counselor appeared concerned, mother added, "one of us is always in there with her." Mother claimed M.P. bruised her forehead on the coffee table while trying to get the cats. Mother admitted noticing the bruises and she "messed up" by not reporting them, but she denied causing them. Mother explained she would sit with M.P. in the closet with the light off until M.P. calmed down, and it lasted only three or four minutes. Mother found the closet to be the most effective form of discipline and when M.P. got scared they would talk it out and she would tell her "it is not scary." Mother understood putting M.P. in the closet was "unusual," but M.P. would apologize when she misbehaved.
A contested evidentiary hearing on the section 388 petition was held on April 30. The social worker testified about mother's failure to report behavioral concerns to the mental health providers. M.P. was seeing a support counselor twice a week and a mental health clinician once a week. At a child family team meeting held two days before the hearing, mother shared she was unaware of some of M.P.'s issues, such as grabbing food and overeating, and she believed her visits went well with no concerns about M.P.'s behavior. At a visit that week, however, the visitation center reported mother's parenting skills needed improvement, as she was unable to control the children when they were roughhousing and running around.
The social worker summarized the problems resulting in termination of the trial visit. Since mother's trial visit was unsuccessful, she was unable to attempt a trial visit with the other children; mother had run out of time and the Agency continued to receive ongoing reports from different providers with the same concerns. L.P. continued to have boundary challenges with inappropriate and appropriate touching and did not get along with other children. Li.P. was in her sixth home because of her physical aggression and anger; she choked a nine-year-old child in her last home. Li.P. told the social worker she was angry because of what father did to her and she appeared to have self-hate, which was being addressed with her in services. Li.P. was not in a concurrent home and was in a home with no other children. M.P. was placed in a concurrent home when the trial visit ended on February 17. Mother had not completed any case plan component and failed to implement what she was being taught.
Mother testified her children were removed because she "broke a family plan" and failed to protect them. Mother denied refusing counseling services for herself when she failed to attend them for about two months; rather, she "had a lot going on." She did not follow up with the provider who assessed M.P. in December 2020 because M.P. was not having any behavioral issues at the time. Regarding visits, mother admitted there were a few visits which were "pretty rough," such as when M.P. bit her on the arm and M.P. and Li.P. "bicker[ed]" with each other, but she thought the visits "were going pretty well." Mother believed she engaged the children well, although she admitted it was "difficult at times" to manage their behaviors, and while she agreed her parenting could improve, the children had been out of her home for so long it was hard when they only had an hour or two to visit. Mother admitted it would be a challenge to manage all three children if they were returned to her, but she had learned the skills to help her manage their behaviors.
Mother testified about using the closet when M.P. acted out. Mother said either she or maternal aunt took M.P. into mother's walk-in closet and they sat in there with the light off. A few times M.P. mentioned the dark was scary and there were monsters, but they would reassure her that was not true, they were right there, and they would turn on the light as soon as she calmed down. They went into the closet three or four times a day, but not every day. She started using this method a month after M.P. was placed with her.
Mother testified about her understanding of each's child's behavioral issues. Mother admitted it would be "pretty difficult" to have all three children, but she thought she could handle it. If the children were returned to her, she would continue their services and maternal aunt would watch them when she went to work.
In ruling, the juvenile court believed mother's testimony was credible and she loved her children, but she had over 20 months of services and even if it found extraordinary circumstances to continue to the 24-month juncture, she would not be able to take care of the children within the next three and a half months. The juvenile court found, based on a preponderance of the evidence, there would be substantial risk of detriment if the children were returned and even if it had the authority to return the children that day, it would not be beneficial for them to be returned to mother given their extreme behaviors and inability to get along with each other. The juvenile court found there was a significant change of circumstances in that the trial visit did not work and there was no evidence mother was able to properly care for all three children and granting the section 388 petition would be in the children's best interests. The juvenile court terminated mother's reunification services, found reasonable services were offered or provided to mother, and set a section 366.26 hearing for August 26. The juvenile court reduced father's supervised visits to once per month and mother's supervised visits to twice per month.
Mother filed a writ petition challenging the failure to return the children to her and the termination of her reunification services, which we denied. (Alexis M. v. Superior Court (Aug. 16, 2021, F082750) [nonpub. opn.].)
The Section 366.26 Hearing
In a report for the section 366.26 hearing, the Agency recommended (1) terminating parental rights over now eight-year-old L.P. and four-year-old M.P. and establishing a permanent plan of adoption with their current care providers, and (2) continuing Li.P. as a dependent and establishing another planned living arrangement.
The social worker reported it was certain M.P.'s current caregivers would adopt her if given the opportunity. They had been caring for her for six months and wanted to provide her with permanency and a stable and loving home. While M.P. still struggled with her behaviors, the family was patient with her and worked daily with her. M.P. was healthy and developmentally on track. She injured her forehead when she threw herself against a dresser and a mason jar fell on her head causing a laceration. The caregivers adored M.P., and she had grown emotionally attached to the family. The caregivers were sensitive to M.P.'s needs, actively sought out ways to help her, and worked with service providers on a weekly basis.
With respect to L.P., it was extremely likely his caregivers would adopt him if given the chance. L.P. was placed with them in November 2019, and he had adjusted well in the home and was bonded to his caregivers, who loved and adored him. The caregivers were fully committed to adopting L.P., who expressed his desire for the caregivers to adopt him. L.P. was healthy and on track developmentally. He continued to see a counselor bi-weekly, and his behavior was improving with the support of his counselor and caregivers. He was no longer taking medication.
Li.P had been with her current care provider since March 4, and she was adjusting very well to the home. She still struggled with behaviors and appropriate boundaries, but with her medications and the care provider's calm manners she was starting to improve. Li.P. had bonded well with her care provider and expressed how much she liked the home. While the care provider was not interested in legal guardianship or adoption, she was open to providing Li.P. with long-term foster care.
Mother was visiting the children at the Agency twice a month for one hour, while father had monthly one-hour visits. The parents had been consistent with visits. Visitation logs attached to the report described mother as appropriate and positive, and the visits mutually loving, but the visits were chaotic, as mother struggled to remain in control of the children and implement appropriate discipline.
The report addressed ongoing sibling contact, noting that while the children had a significant relationship with each other, it was chaotic. The children were not placed together because they physically fought when they were together and created a lot of chaos, and for that reason, no effort was made to place them in the same home. Sibling visits were occurring three times a month at the Agency; the visits were supervised because the children were violent together and they needed counseling before visits could be unsupervised. The report noted the "sibling relationship does not impact on permanency planning in that the current permanent planning includes ongoing sibling contact."
Neither parent was present at the August 26 section 366.26 hearing. Mother's attorney asked for a contested hearing as to L.P. and M.P., but the attorney was ready to proceed as to Li.P. The juvenile court approved and adopted the findings and recommendations contained in the report with respect to Li.P., set a review hearing in her case for February 18, 2022, and set a contested section 366.26 hearing as to L.P. and M.P. for September 10.
The parents did not appear at the September 10 hearing. The juvenile court stated it read and considered the Agency's section 366.26 report. The Agency did not have any additional evidence to present. The children's attorney submitted on the report. Mother's attorney proceeded by argument only, while father's attorney had no comment. Mother's attorney stated she had spoken with mother that morning and mother could not bring herself to come to the hearing, knowing what the court's decision would be. Mother's attorney argued that based on the history of the case and the "past visit logs," it was clear mother had a relationship with both M.P. and L.P., she "feels like she has a strong bond with them, and she believes that M[.P.] and L[.P.] are bonded to each other," but they were "under no impression that there's been any professionals looking at the relationship, there is no bonding study in this case, but mom would ask that you not terminate her parental rights today."
The juvenile court declined to apply the beneficial parent-child relationship exception to adoption, explaining "the parents have the burden of proving the parent-child beneficial relationship," and there was "insufficient evidence of that." The juvenile court found that while mother had regularly and consistently visited, there was "no showing that termination of parental rights would be so detrimental to the children that it outweighs the … benefit of a permanent relationship in an adoptive home." The juvenile court approved and adopted the findings and recommendations in the report as to L.P. and M.P. Specifically, the juvenile court found there was clear and convincing evidence L.P. and M.P. would be adopted, and "[n]o evidence to the contrary, Court finds that termination of parental rights would not be detrimental." The juvenile court ordered adoption as their permanent plan.
DISCUSSION
The Beneficial Parent-Child Relationship Exception
Mother argues the juvenile court's conclusory decision declining to apply the beneficial parent-child relationship exception is defective on its face and shows a lack of compliance with our Supreme Court's recent decision on the exception in In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614 (Caden C.). Mother further argues that, at a minimum, the record does not support the juvenile court's decision and shows the juvenile court focused on improper factors when making its ruling. We disagree.
At a section 366.26 hearing, when the juvenile court finds by clear and convincing evidence the child is adoptable, it is generally required to terminate parental rights and order the child be placed for adoption unless a statutory exception applies. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1).) One of the statutory exceptions is the beneficial parent-child relationship exception, which applies when "[t]he court finds a compelling reason for determining that termination would be detrimental to the child" where "[t]he parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship." (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) A parent claiming an exception to adoption has the burden of proof to establish by a preponderance of evidence that the exception applies. (In re Melvin A. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1243, 1252.)
To establish the beneficial parent-child relationship exception the parent must show by a preponderance of the evidence three elements: "(1) regular visitation and contact, and (2) a relationship, the continuation of which would benefit the child such that (3) the termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child." (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 631, 636.) In assessing whether termination would be detrimental, the juvenile court "must decide whether the harm from severing the child's relationship with the parent outweighs the benefit to the child of placement in a new adoptive home." (Id. at pp. 631‒632.) When the parent meets this burden, the exception applies such that it would not be in the child's best interest to terminate parental rights and the court selects a permanent plan other than adoption. (Id. at pp. 636‒637.)
The first element of the exception asks the "straightforward" question of whether the parent visited consistently, considering the extent permitted by court orders. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.) The focus is on the best interest of the child as opposed to punishing or rewarding parents for good behavior in maintaining contact. (Ibid.)
The second element asks "whether 'the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.'" (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.) The parent-child relationship "may be shaped by a slew of factors, such as '[t]he age of the child, the portion of the child's life spent in the parent's custody, the "positive" or "negative" effect of interaction between parent and child, and the child's particular needs.'" (Ibid., quoting In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 576.) The juvenile court's focus should again be on the child, and it "must remain mindful that rarely do '[p]arent-child relationships' conform to an entirely consistent pattern." (Caden C., at p. 632.) "[T]he parent must show that the child has a substantial, positive, emotional attachment to the parent-the kind of attachment implying that the child would benefit from continuing the relationship." (Id. at p. 636.)
When considering the third element, courts must determine "how the child would be affected by losing the parental relationship-in effect, what life would be like for the child in an adoptive home without the parent in the child's life." (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 633.) The court is guided by the child's best interest in a "specific way: it decides whether the harm of severing the relationship outweighs 'the security and the sense of belonging a new family would confer.'" (Ibid.)" 'If severing the natural parent/child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that,' even considering the benefits of a new adoptive home, termination would 'harm[]' the child, the court should not terminate parental rights.'" (Ibid.) "When the relationship with a parent is so important to the child that the security and stability of a new home wouldn't outweigh its loss, termination would be 'detrimental to the child due to' the child's beneficial relationship with a parent." (Id. at pp. 633‒634.) "In many cases, 'the strength and quality of the natural parent/child relationship' will substantially determine how detrimental it would be to lose that relationship, which must be weighed against the benefits of a new adoptive home." (Id. at p. 634.)
In weighing whether termination would be detrimental, the court does not compare "the parent's attributes as custodial caregiver relative to those of any potential adoptive parent(s)." (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 634.) Moreover, a parent's struggles with issues that led to dependency are relevant only to the extent they inform whether the child would "benefit from continuing the relationship and be harmed, on balance by losing it." (Id. at p. 638.)
We review a juvenile court's ruling on the application of the beneficial parent-child relationship exception using a "hybrid" standard. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 641.) The substantial evidence standard applies to the first two elements of regular visitation and existence of a beneficial relationship. (Id. at pp. 639‒640.) As a reviewing court, we do" 'not reweigh the evidence, evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or resolve evidentiary conflicts'" and will uphold the juvenile court's determinations even when substantial evidence to the contrary also exists. (Id. at p. 640.) The juvenile court's decision as to the third element-whether termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child-is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. (Ibid.) "A court abuses its discretion only when '" 'the trial court has exceeded the limits of legal discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination.'" '" (Id. at p. 641.)
Here, the first element, regular visitation, is not in dispute. After finding mother satisfied this element, the juvenile court moved to the third element, and found mother failed to carry her burden of showing "termination of parental rights would be so detrimental to the children" that it outweighed "the benefit of a permanent relationship in an adoptive home."
While mother contends the juvenile court's cursory ruling was defective on its face, in declining to apply the exception the juvenile court was not required to recite specific findings relative to its conclusions regarding the elements of the exception. (In re A.L. (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1131, 1156.) Although a trial court's statement of its findings or an explanation of the reasons for its decision may be helpful in conducting appellate review, it is not a legal requirement. (Id. at pp. 1156.) Thus, the juvenile court did not err in failing to further explain the basis for its decision. There is nothing in the juvenile court's ruling to show it based its decision on grounds identified in Caden C. to be improper. Therefore, we do not presume the juvenile court erred. Rather, we indulge in every presumption to uphold the judgment and it is the appellant's burden to affirmatively demonstrate error. (In re A.L., at p. 1161.)
Without an express finding on the second element of whether a beneficial relationship existed, we presume the juvenile court, by proceeding to the third element, made an implied finding of a beneficial relationship. There is no showing the juvenile court abused its discretion in finding the harm of severing the parent-child relationship did not outweigh the security of a new adoptive home. While the visitation logs show L.P. and M.P. had an emotional attachment to mother, as they were excited to see her, they were affectionate with her, and they were sometimes sad when visits ended, the logs do not show that severing L.P.'s and M.P.'s relationship with mother would be harmful to them. To the contrary, L.P., who had lived with his caregivers for over two and a half years and was bonded to them, wanted to be adopted by them. While M.P. was too young to give a statement about her desires, in the six months she had been with her caregivers, she had grown emotionally attached to them and the caregivers were committed to adopting her. On this record, the juvenile court reasonably could find that any harm L.P. and M.P. might experience from severing their relationship with mother would be greatly outweighed by the benefits they would receive in a new adoptive home.
Mother claims her case is similar to In re J.D. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 833. There, the appellate court reversed an order terminating parental rights over a six-year-old child because it could not determine whether the juvenile court's ruling, in which it declined to apply the beneficial parent-child relationship exception, complied with the principles announced in Caden C. (In re J.D., at pp. 839‒840.) While the juvenile court acknowledged the child had a positive relationship with his mother but found it did not amount to a parental bond, the appellate court determined the mother presented evidence to support a finding the child had "a 'substantial, positive, emotional attachment' to her sufficient to meet the second element," based on the agency's reports that described the child's attitude toward his mother in a positive light, the relative caregiver's acknowledgment the child had a positive bond with his mother, and visitation logs that showed the mother acted in a parental role during visits and the child was attached to the mother. (Id. at pp. 851, 855‒858.) The appellate court believed this evidence would compel a determination that mother proved the existence of a beneficial relationship as a matter of law if not for evidence the mother sometimes bad-mouthed, threatened, and undermined the relative caregiver's efforts, and deemed it prudent to remand for a new section 366.26 hearing because neither the parties nor the court had the benefit of Caden C. (In re J.D., at pp. 862, 863.) In remanding the matter, the appellate court provided guidance with respect to the third element, as it was concerned the juvenile court improperly considered whether postadoption contact with the mother would continue after the adoption. (Id. at pp. 865‒868.)
Here, the issue is not whether mother proved L.P. and M.P. had a beneficial relationship with her, but rather whether the harm of severing that relationship outweighs the benefits of a new adoptive home. As we have explained, while the visitation logs show L.P. and M.P. had an emotional attachment to mother, they do not show their relationship with mother was so important to them that the security and stability of a new home would not outweigh the loss of that relationship. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 633‒634.) Without evidence of harm, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in finding mother failed to carry her burden of proving terminating L.P.'s and M.P.'s relationship with her "would be detrimental to [them] even when balanced against the countervailing benefit of a new, adoptive home." (Id. at p. 636.) Therefore, the juvenile court did not err in declining to apply the beneficial parent-child relationship exception to adoption.
The Sibling Relationship Exception
Mother also contends the juvenile court committed an error in law in failing to decide whether the sibling relationship exception to adoption applied. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(v).) Mother asserts that because her trial attorney argued mother believed M.P. and L.P. "are bonded to each other," the juvenile court was required to decide the applicability of this exception.
The sibling relationship exception provides an exception to termination of parental rights when "[t]here would be substantial interference with a child's sibling relationship, taking into consideration the nature and extent of the relationship, including, but not limited to, whether the child was raised with a sibling in the same home, whether the child shared significant common experiences or has existing close and strong bonds with a sibling, and whether ongoing contact is in the child's best interest, including the child's long-term emotional interest, as compared to the benefit of legal permanence through adoption." (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(v); see In re D.O. (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 166, 173.)
In our view, mother's attorney's mere mention of a bond between M.P. and L.P. did not require the juvenile court to decide this issue. Because mother did not specifically request consideration of the sibling relationship exception or even argue the elements of the exception, the court was under no duty to make a specific finding regarding the exception. The failure to raise the sibling relationship exception in the juvenile court forfeits it as an issue on appeal. (In re Erik P. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 395, 403 [holding the father forfeited right to assert applicability of sibling relationship exception]; In re Rachel M. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 1289, 1295 [concluding claim based on different exception was forfeited and stating, "[t]he juvenile court does not have a sua sponte duty to determine whether an exception to adoption applies"]; see In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293.)
In any event, assuming the record demonstrates "a strong sibling relationship," the evidence did not compel the juvenile court to conclude that "the benefit to [L.P. or M.P.] of continuing the sibling relationship[s]" outweighed "the benefit [L.P. or M.P.] would receive by gaining a permanent home through adoption." (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 61.) Moreover, the Agency stated in its report with respect to L.P. and M.P. that the sibling relationships "does not impact on permanency planning in that the current permanency planning includes the siblings remaining in contact with each other." Thus, the evidence shows termination of mother's rights would not interfere with the sibling relationships. (In re D.O., supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at pp. 175-176 ["it is not a foregone conclusion that terminating parental rights will substantially interfere with a sibling relationship, and the juvenile court must make this factual determination"].)
The sibling relationship exception requires the juvenile court" 'first to determine whether terminating parental rights would substantially interfere with the sibling relationship'" and, if so," 'to weigh the child's best interest in continuing that sibling relationship against the benefit the child would receive by the permanency of adoption.'" (In re D.O., supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at pp. 173‒174.) The exception is evaluated from the perspective of the child being considered for adoption, not the perspective of the child's siblings. (Id. at p. 174.) It is the parent's burden to show the exception applies. (Id. at pp. 173, 176.)
DISPOSITION
The order terminating mother's parental rights to L.P. and M.P. is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: FRANSON, ACTING P. J., PEÑA, J.