Opinion
No. 2013AP2039.
2014-07-22
Kevin STANFORD and Stanford Trust, Plaintiffs–Appellants, v. TIME WARNER CABLE OF SOUTHEASTERN WISCONSIN LIMITED PARTNERSHIP and Clinton Stamps, Defendants–Respondents.
Gritzner, 235 Wis.2d 781, ¶ 27, 611 N.W.2d 906.Id. (citations omitted).
Appeal from an order of the circuit court for Milwaukee County: Christopher R. Foley, Judge. Reversed.
Before CURLEY, P.J., KESSLER and BRENNAN, JJ. ¶ 1 CURLEY, P.J.
Kevin Stanford and the Stanford Trust (hereafter collectively referred to as “Stanford”) appeal the order granting summary judgment on claims alleged against Clinton L. Stamps and Time Warner Cable (hereafter collectively referred to as “Stamps”). The order was accompanied by a written decision in which the trial court determined that: Stamps trespassed on Stanford's property by parking his work van—owned by Time Warner Cable—on a concrete pad next to Stanford's garage without permission; Stamps' trespass was a substantial cause of a fire that began in the van and spread to Stanford's garage, destroying the garage; and, nevertheless, public policy factors precluded liability. Stanford argues that summary judgment is inappropriate in this case because public policy factors do not preclude liability, and we agree. We consequently reverse the trial court's order.
While not pertinent to any issue on appeal—as our standard of review is de novo whether the motion is characterized as a motion for summary judgment, see Smaxwell v. Bayard, 2004 WI 101, ¶ 12, 274 Wis.2d 278, 682 N.W.2d 923 (summary judgment reviewed de novo ); Kidd v. Allaway, 2011 WI App 161, ¶ 10, 338 Wis.2d 129, 807 N.W.2d 700 (whether public policy precludes liability reviewed de novo )—we agree with Stanford that the motions filed by the parties, and the relief granted by the trial court, were for summary judgment. Notably, the parties stipulated to the pertinent facts, and both parties asked the trial court to dismiss the opposing parties' case. Moreover, the trial court's order did in fact dispose of the entire claim. This is a classic summary judgment, even if it was not titled as such. See Alliance Laundry Sys. LLC v. Stroh Die Casting Co., 2008 WI App 180, ¶¶ 12, 22–24, 315 Wis.2d 143, 763 N.W.2d 167 (whether a motion is treated as one for summary judgment depends on the substance of the motion and supporting facts, not the title given by the parties or the trial court).
¶ 14 Stanford now appeals.
Analysis
¶ 15 On appeal, Stanford argues that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on his claims against Stamps. The summary judgment standard is well-known and we need not repeat it here. See Wis. Stat. § 802.08 (2011–12); Alliance Laundry Sys. LLC v. Stroh Die Casting Co., 2008 WI App 180, ¶ 12, 315 Wis.2d 143, 763 N.W.2d 167.
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2011–12 version unless otherwise noted.
¶ 16 Specifically, the issue before us in determining whether summary judgment is appropriate is whether public policy factors preclude liability; this is because the parties agree that Stamps trespassed on Stanford's property and that the trespass was a substantial factor in causing the fire that destroyed Stanford's garage. See, e.g., Coffey v. City of Milwaukee, 74 Wis.2d 526, 541, 247 N.W.2d 132 (1976) (“The determination to not impose liability in instances where a negligent act has been committed and the act is a ‘substantial factor’ in causing the injury rests upon considerations of public policy.”) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Whether public policy factors preclude liability is a question of law we review de novo, benefitting from the trial court's analysis. See Kidd v. Allaway, 2011 WI App 161, ¶ 10, 338 Wis.2d 129, 807 N.W.2d 700. “Before determining whether public policy considerations preclude liability, it is usually a better practice to submit the case to the jury.” Gritzner v. Michael R., 2000 WI 68, ¶ 26, 235 Wis.2d 781, 611 N.W.2d 906. When, as in the case before us, however, “the facts are not complex and the relevant public policy questions have been fully presented,” we may determine whether public policy precludes liability before trial. See id.; see also Stephenson v. Universal Metrics, Inc., 2002 WI 30, ¶ 42, 251 Wis.2d 171, 641 N.W.2d 158 (“The assessment of public policy does not necessarily require a full factual resolution of the cause of action by trial.”).
¶ 17
The public policy reasons that may preclude liability include: (1) the injury is too remote from the negligence, (2) the injury is too wholly out of proportion to the tortfeasor's culpability, (3) in retrospect it appears too highly extraordinary that the negligence should have resulted in the harm, (4) allowing recovery would place too unreasonable a burden on the tortfeasor, (5) allowing recovery would be too likely to open the way for fraudulent claims, and (6) allowing recovery would enter a field that has no sensible or just stopping point.
Gritzner, 235 Wis.2d 781, ¶ 27, 611 N.W.2d 906.
¶ 18 The trial court focused on the first three public policy factors, determining that the damage to Stanford's garage was too remote from Stamps' trespass, the damage was out of proportion to Stamps' culpability, and it was too highly extraordinary that Stamps' trespass should have brought about the harm. See id. The parties also focus on the first three factors. Stanford contends that the trial court's analysis of these public policy factors is misguided, while Stamps argues that the trial court got it right—or, at the very least, that we should affirm summary judgment for some reason, if not the reasons stated by the trial court. See Badtke v. Badtke, 122 Wis.2d 730, 735, 364 N.W.2d 547 (Ct.App.1985).
¶ 19 Our analysis of all six public policy factors leads us to conclude that summary judgment is not appropriate in this case.
¶ 20 Turning to the first public policy factor, we conclude that the injury is not too remote from the trespass. See Gritzner, 235 Wis.2d 781, ¶ 27, 611 N.W.2d 906. “Whether the injury is too ‘remote’ ... ‘is a restatement of the old chain of causation test.’ ” Kidd, 338 Wis.2d 129, ¶ 14, 807 N.W.2d 700 (citation omitted).
[T]he remoteness inquiry “revives the intervening or superseding cause doctrine, which had passed away with the adoption of the substantial factor test of cause-in-fact.” A determination that the injury is too removed or separated from the negligence is “essentially just a determination that a superseding cause should relieve the defendant of liability.” Thus, in considering the time, place or sequence of events, we consider whether “the chain of causation was direct and unbroken.”
Id. (citations omitted).
¶ 21 While the parties agree that the act of parking the van near the garage did not, by itself, start the fire, there is no dispute that Stamps' trespass set in motion the chain of events leading to the fire; additionally, there is not enough evidence to conclusively establish that there was a “ ‘superseding cause’ ” that broke the chain of events set in motion by Stamps' trespass. See id. (citation omitted). First, the parties agree that the garage would not have caught fire if Stamps had not parked his van next to it. This is in stark contrast to Kidd—a case in which parents of a teenage girl sued a man for negligent mutilation of their daughter's body when the man hit her body, which was lying on the highway after she had already been killed in an earlier accident, with his car. See id., ¶¶ 2–6. In Kidd, we held that the man who subsequently hit the plaintiffs' daughter's body should not be held liable, primarily because it was the first car accident that caused the daughter's death and it was the first accident that set the chain of events leading to the second contact in motion. See id., ¶¶ 17–19. Unlike the Kidd case, Stamps' trespass did set the chain of events leading to the fire in motion. Second, in this case there is no evidence of a superseding cause of the fire that broke the chain of causation. See id., ¶ 14. While Stamps believes, given the rude comments made by his neighbor Tamara, that the fire was an act of arson, the parties point to no facts conclusively establishing the cause of the fire. Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude that the fire damage is too remote from Stamps' trespass.
¶ 22 Turning to the second public policy factor, see Gritzner, 235 Wis.2d 781, ¶ 27, 611 N.W.2d 906, we conclude that the fire damage to the garage is not wholly out of proportion to Stamps' culpability. Just because no one objected to his parking next to the garage does not mean that he had permission to do so. Likewise, the fact the Stamps never saw anyone other than a few stray cats leave or enter the garage does not mean that no person would be injured by his decision to park where he did not have permission. Contrary to what Stamps implicitly argues, the fact that he never got “caught” parking without permission does not negate his culpability. Rather, we agree with Stanford that Stamps' actions “were intentional, deceitful, and disreputable.” Even assuming that Stamps had permission to park the van from the previous tenants of the Stanford property, the parties agree that he did not have permission from anyone after the fall of 2008, when the tenants moved out. This means that Stamps parked on Stanford's property without permission for a minimum of seven months. That Stamps may now be held responsible for the fire damage to the garage is not out of proportion to his wrongdoing.
¶ 23 Regarding the third public policy factor, see Gritzner, 235 Wis.2d 781, ¶ 27, 611 N.W.2d 906, we conclude that, in retrospect, it is not too highly extraordinary that Stamps' trespass should have brought about the harm. In determining otherwise, the trial court appears to have assumed that the fire was an act of arson. However, as we have already noted, the parties agree that the cause of the fire is unknown. Vans—and any vehicles or machines with internal combustion engines—can and do catch fire for any number of reasons, and a vehicle catching fire is not a once-in-a-lifetime event. The consequences of such fires can be disastrous, as they were in this case. Indeed, the risks inherent in automobiles are part of why we have rules about where people can park. Given the facts before us, we conclude that the damage caused by the trespass is not so extraordinary that liability must be precluded.
¶ 24 Turning to the final three factors—whether allowing recovery would place too unreasonable a burden on the tortfeasor, be too likely to open the way for fraudulent claims, or enter a field that has no sensible or just stopping point, see id.—we conclude, for all the aforementioned reasons, that these factors do not preclude liability. We do not think that allowing recovery will place too unreasonable a burden upon Stamps, who, as noted, parked on Stanford's property without permission for a considerable period of time. Nor can we imagine—given that the parties agree that Stamps' trespass was “clearly a substantial factor in bringing about the damages,” and given that the parties agree that the cause of the fire is unknown—that allowing recovery in the instant case will likely open the way for fraudulent claims or enter a field that has no sensible or just stopping point. See id.
¶ 25 Therefore, for all of the foregoing reasons, we conclude that public policy factors do not preclude liability, and that summary judgment on Stanford's claims against the defendants must be denied.
Order reversed.
Not recommended for publication in the official reports.