Opinion
3:22-cv-113-KRG-KAP
02-10-2023
SHAWN STANFORD, Plaintiff, v. ALFRED SHAUKRY, M.D., and PRESBYTERIAN HOSPITAL, Defendants
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Keith A. Pesto, United States Magistrate Judge
Recommendation
The complaint, ECF no. 7, should be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
Report
Plaintiff Stanford is an inmate at S.C.I. Laurel Highlands, serving a 7-15 year sentence imposed in the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County in July 2018 after his guilty plea to drug delivery resulting in death, see Commonwealth v. Stanford, CP-36-CR-345-2018 (C.P. Lancaster). In July 2022 Stanford filed a pro se civil complaint subject to the Prison Litigation Reform Act dated June 30, 2022, against two defendants who are described as Alfred Shaukry, M.D., and Presbyterian Hospital Oakland in Pittsburgh PA, (i.e., UPMC Presbyterian). In full, the statement of facts in support of the claim is that on September 30, 2021, “THE ABOVE M.D-AFRED SHAUKRYS GAVE ME THE WRONG MEDICATION THAT I SHOULD HAVE TAKEN. IT IS CALLED, 1000 MEG ONCE A DAY, IT'S CALLED V-ANCOMYCIN. IT CAUSE BURNS ALL OVER MY BODY.” Complaint IV.C. Stanford goes on to say that personnel at the prison refused to take pictures of his burns. The Court granted Stanford leave to proceed in forma pauperis and referred the matter to me for pretrial management yesterday.
The PLRA's screening requirements for litigants proceeding in forma pauperis are set out at 28 U.S.C.§ 1915(e)(2):
(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that
(A) the allegation of poverty is untrue; or
(B) the action or appeal
(i) is frivolous or malicious;
(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or
(iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.
When a plaintiff brings a civil rights claim against a defendant who is not a state or local government official or employee, the plaintiff must allege facts showing that the defendant acted under color of state law, because Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(1) requires a short plain statement of the basis for the court's jurisdiction. In West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988), the Supreme Court held that a physician is employed by the state to provide medical services to state prison inmates acts under the color of state law. This does not rope into federal court all medical service providers solely because they treated an inmate: the matter must be examined case by case and defendant by defendant. For instance, care that emergency room personnel provide an inmate in response to an emergency is not action under color of law where neither the ER personnel nor the employing hospital are fairly described as performing a state function or assuming voluntarily any of the state's duties. Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Service, 577 F.3d 816, 831 (7th Cir. 2009).
Stanford could overcome that pleading shortfall. The more serious defect in his complaint is that it is inadequate to state a claim. Rule 8(a)(2) requires him to plead facts that state a claim within this court's jurisdiction that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Allegations that only show that a claim might conceivably exist are not sufficient. Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
To state an Eighth Amendment claim under 42 U.S.C.§ 1983 against an inmate health care provider (here, Dr. Shaukry), Stanford must allege facts allowing the plausible inference that Dr. Shaukry is responsible for “acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). To constitute deliberate indifference, “the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). The taxonomy of deliberate indifference claims recognized in this circuit includes cases where (1) prison authorities deny reasonable requests for medical treatment, (2) knowledge of the need for medical care is accompanied by the intentional refusal to provide it, (3) necessary medical treatment is delayed for non-medical reasons, and (4) prison authorities prevent an inmate from receiving recommended treatment for serious medical needs. Pearson v. Prison Health Service, 850 F.3d 526, 538 (3d Cir.2017). Stanford does not, by alleging that he had an adverse reaction to a medication given to him on one occasion, allege a plausible claim of deliberate indifference.
Stanford may have intended to allege a state law claim of negligence. A medical malpractice claim requires allegations of a duty owed by the physician to the patient, a breach of that duty by the physician, that the breach was the proximate cause of harm to the patient, and that the damages suffered by the patient were a direct result of the harm. See e.g. Toogood v. Rogal, 824 A.2d 1140, 1145 (Pa. 2003). A professional negligence claim on these facts would have required Stanford to timely file a certificate of merit, see Pa.R.Civ.P. No. 1042.3; Liggon-Redding v. Estate of Sugarman, 659 F.3d 258, 265 (3d Cir.2011).
However, medical negligence without accompanying deliberate indifference does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Ryle v. Fuh, 820 Fed.Appx. 121, 123 (3d Cir. 2020). See also Bayton v. Monroe County Prison, 2013 WL 2897795 at *7-8 (M.D. Pa. June 11, 2013)(Alleging adverse reaction from nurse's mistaken administration of pain medication did not state an Eighth Amendment claim). Negligence claims are properly brought in state court.
To state a claim against an institutional or corporate defendant (here, UPMC Presbyterian), Stanford must allege facts allowing the plausible inference that plaintiff was injured by actions resulting from that defendant's official policy or its custom that is so well-settled as to virtually constitute law. See Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011); McTernan v. City of York, 564 F.3d 636, 657-58 (3d Cir.2009). A municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor or on a respondeat superior theory. See Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). The same rule applies to nongovernmental corporate defendants. See Glisson v. Indiana Department of Corrections, 849 F.3d 372, 378-79 (7th Cir. 2017)(collecting cases). Stanford does not even attempt to allege a relevant custom or policy of UPMC Presbyterian. If he had, Stanford's failure to state a claim against Dr. Shaukry means that he has failed to state any claim against the hospital for a second reason: if there has been no underlying constitutional violation alleged against the individual defendant associated with the healthcare provider, any policy of the healthcare provider cannot be a basis for liability because it has not been alleged to have caused a constitutional violation. See Ryle v. Fuh, supra, 820 Fed.Appx. at 124.
The Court of Appeals, in Grayson v. Mayview State Hospital, 293 F.3d 103 (3d Cir.2002) and similar cases, directs district courts to allow plaintiffs in civil rights cases leave to amend deficient complaints unless that amendment is “futile” or “inequitable.” The First Circuit observed long ago:
A plaintiff will not be thrown out of court for failing to plead facts in support of every arcane element of his claim. But when a complaint omits facts that, if they existed, would clearly dominate the case, it seems fair to assume that those facts do not exist.
O'Brien v. DiGrazia, 544 F.2d 543, 546 (1st Cir. 1976). A complaint can be deficient for failure to satisfy some esoteric rule of law, or because the facts do not support a claim of liability that belongs in federal court. As applied to this case, it would be proper to allow amendment to permit Stanford to plead facts showing that defendants acted under color of state law, because that is what the First Circuit would call an arcane legal element. However, Stanford's complaint is deficient because it simply lacks facts that support a federal claim. That does not permit a court to assume there must be a federal claim out there and all Stanford needs is enough do-overs to state it. That would be inequitable because it would be advocacy on behalf of the plaintiff.
Grayson does not give plaintiff the right to amend state law claims, and this Court would have no basis for exercising jurisdiction over them. The Court could dismiss the complaint with prejudice or dismiss the complaint without prejudice to Stanford pursuing any state law claims in state court under 42 Pa.C.S.§ 5103(b)(2).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.§ 636(b)(1), the parties can within fourteen days file written objections to my recommendation. In the absence of timely and specific objections, any appeal would be severely hampered or entirely defaulted. See EEOC v. City of Long Branch, 866 F.3d 93, 100 (3d Cir. 2017) (describing standard of appellate review when no timely and specific objections are filed as limited to review for plain error).